SPLM-N

Schizo Armchair General Presents: East/Horn of Africa- The Geopolitical Tinderbox no one is talking about 🇸🇴🇪🇹🇪🇷🇸🇸🇸🇩🇪🇬 After my last Schizo Armchair General post about the Iran War, I got a lot of interesting feedback and may make this a recurring series for my fellow armchair generals on this subreddit. I am not an expert on geopolitical and military matters, just an autistic schizo who obsesses over them. Today I want to talk about the major flashpoints occurring in East Africa and the Horn of Africa that is buried in the news cycle. This will be a long read, so grab a snack. In the past decade, these regions have seen an explosion in violence related to a myriad of factors be it water in the age of the climate crisis, access to mining, land rights, and various other disputes to which some call this region a “conflict belt.” Worryingly, many players and factions in this neighborhood have competing and overlapping interests spurred on by greater outside powers on the global stage. This complex web of alliances and rivalries reminds me of Europe before World War I with wide differences. While a major war in this region isn’t inevitable, there are many factors that make a greater conflict likely to occur. **Somalia** **and Somaliland** 🇸🇴 For over forty years, Somalia has become a failed state due to increased meddling by outside powers and poor governance from past leaders such as General Siad Barre. It’s a tragic shame as years ago Somalia was a developing country, but it’s a victim of geography as it’s situated at the mouth of the Red Sea, a key shipping lane. Internally, it occasionally struggles to put down insurgencies by Islamist groups such as Al-Shabaab and other militant groups. Because Somalia can hardly keep control of its own territory, it makes it vulnerable to be carved up piecemeal by outside powers. In the past couple of years, the breakaway region of Somaliland has received recognition from countries such as Ethiopia, who want access to the sea (more on that in a bit), and Israel, who want a key launching pad for attacks on Ansar Allah in Yemen. Somalia is furious at both of these developments, but there isn’t much they can do about it as of now, given that they had no choice but to allow for Türkiye’s mediation efforts with Ethiopia. Somalia has simultaneously increased military and economic ties with Türkiye and Egypt, the latter of whom is Ethiopia’s chief regional rival (more on THAT in a bit also). **Ethiopia VS. Eritrea** 🇪🇹🇪🇷 For a long time, the land of what is now Eritrea was part of Ethiopia, but Eritreans rebelled against Addis Ababa’s rule and engaged in an armed rebellion in September 1961 which ended in May 1991 with Eritrean independence. Both nations had periodic conflicts along their shared borders but it was none other than Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who helped negotiate peace with Eritrea for which he won a Nobel Peace Prize (hilariously ironic considering the path he’s gone down). The existential problem for Ethiopia is that it is now the most populous landlocked country in the world and the second largest country by population in Africa behind Nigeria. A growing population with increasing energy needs and costs is an unsustainable status quo for Ethiopia yet these ambitions for Ethiopia, and to an extent Abiy Ahmed himself, have put it at odds with other regional powers. After Abiy won the Nobel Peace Prize, the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia launched an armed insurgency against the Ethiopian state led by the TPLF. Depending on who you ask, Tigrayans rebelled either because of lack of representation in government or ethnic disputes. In response, Ethiopia, with an alliance of Eritrea and local groups like the Oromos and the Amhara’s Fano group, was able to beat back the TPLF’s advances and contained it until a peace deal was signed in 2022 at an enormous humanitarian cost of an estimated 600,000 lives. The Tigray War quietly slipped under the radar as Ethiopia controlled what information got out. Both sides committed horrific war crimes and what little peace remains hasn’t soothed the ethnic and tribal divisions. Ethiopia’s once allies against the TPLF are now switching sides as Abiy’s power moves have placed them at odds. The Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups have their own grievances against Addis Ababa and Eritrea has grown uneasy at Abiy’s plan to gain access to the sea at the expense of Eritrean land. In response, Eritrea has grown close to none other than Egypt for a strong military ally. It’s already too messy and I haven’t even talked about the apocalyptic horror show unfolding next door. **Sudan’s Civil War and the South Sudanese Descent** 🇸🇩🇸🇸 I don’t even know where to begin with this one. Sudan has unfortunately been too familiar with conflict ever since independence from British/Egyptian colonial rule in the late fifties. Like many post-colonial countries, there has been a lot of internal strife due to land and ethnic disputes stemming from artificially-drawn borders. In what is now Sudan, you have majority Muslim Arabs and Arab-speaking ethnic groups. In South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan in 2011, you have majority black populations who are Christian or practice local indigenous faiths and traditions. When both Sudan and South Sudan were one country, there were decades of war between the ruling Islamic military regime in Khartoum against southern rebels such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The south was also home to Sudan’s biggest oil wells from where the profits were never given back to the South Sudanese. South Sudan gained independence after decades of struggle (and possibly George Clooney, I shit you not), but decades of intentional underdevelopment by Khartoum set South Sudan back causing civil war, and eventually a compounding refugee crisis from the north. Sudan’s ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is the current greatest humanitarian catastrophe in the world today and most don’t even know about it. Over ten million people have fled the country, millions of people have lost access to food, water, and medicine, and an untold number of people, possibly in the tens or hundreds of thousands have been killed. A gruesome number of women and children have suffered untold sexual violence, mostly at the hands of the RSF. Where most conflicts in Sudan’s modern history have been in the peripheries of the south and the western Darfur region, the ongoing civil war came home to the capital Khartoum and the larger cities such as Omdurman. The RSF, led by the psychopathic warlord Mohamad Hamdan Dagolo (Hemedti), are a criminal enterprise and a private army of sadistic, evil fucking bastards. They grew out of the Janjaweed (Devils on horseback) militia, created by former dictator Omar al-Bashir to genocide the Darfur peoples who engaged in rebellion against the state in 2003. Soon the Janjaweed rebranded and served powers like the United Arab Emirates who want Sudanese gold and cannon fodder for their wars such as in Yemen. The RSF now has a near-monopoly on Sudan’s gold mines thanks to strong UAE backing. The RSF in conjunction with the Sudanese military, overthrew Omar al-Bashir after a popular uprising in 2019, but turned on each other after failures to implement a power-sharing agreement. The RSF are committing the same atrocities today through ISIS-style genocidal violence against non-Arabs throughout Sudan. For example, when the RSF took the city of Al-Fasher, they killed so many people that you could see pools of blood from space. During the ongoing civil war, the RSF with UAE backing, have set up a complex logistical network in East Africa from Libya, Chad, down and across the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has allegedly given access to RSF forces for training and shelter to undermine key SAF ally Egypt. The RSF reportedly formed an alliance with southern rebel group SPLM-North and has ties to South Sudan, traditional enemies of Khartoum. South Sudan meanwhile has its own power struggle between President Salva Kiir (former SPLM commander) and former vice president Riek Machar, each of whom lead their own armed factions. Unsurprisingly, conflict from the north has potential to overlap into the south and oil fields determine the course of a potential war. Despite being cordial, Salva Kiir allegedly has ties to anti-Khartoum forces in the north and allows RSF supply routes on South Sudanese soil; South Sudanese citizens have even fought in the RSF as mercenaries. In its corner, the SAF has close ties with Egypt as much of their officers were trained in Egyptian military academies. Allegedly, the SAF have backers in both Türkiye and Iran, who have provided weapons like munitions and drones. The Sudanese civil war is not just another African conflict, but a proxy war driven primarily by the UAE’s lust for gold they can sell in their tacky shopping centers in Dubai. As of now, neither side can gain an advantage in the war and a realistic possibility is that Sudan will fragment into separate states again unless outside powers gain greater momentum in the war. **The Egypt Equation** 🇪🇬 Out of all the outside players, it’s Egypt that has much skin in the game of power competitions occurring within these regions and it’s all because of the Nile River. Their regional adversary, Ethiopia, built what is called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) which has the output to provide electricity for millions of its people. The problem is that they built it in parts of the Nile, which travels upwards to Egypt and can possibly reduce water flow which is necessary for Egypt’s livelihood and survival, unacceptable for them especially now during Climate Change. This has been a thorn in Egypt’s side and negotiations have broken down between both countries. No war is on the horizon, but Ethiopia has dug its heels in while Egypt, wielding the largest military in the Arab world, has made moves to ally itself with Eritrea and Somalia. Due to economic constraints, Egypt cannot embroil itself in a protracted war, so its influence over regional events have remained in the shadows. I’ve heard whispers that Ethiopia accused Egypt of backing the TPLF during the Tigray War, but no hard evidence of this exists. In Sudan, Egypt provides diplomatic (and possibly material) support to the SAF in their war against Ethiopian allies in the RSF. Ethiopia’s internal instability benefits Egypt so Ethiopia must play its own hand accordingly. To summarize, everything’s fucked, but not to the point where the entire region will ignite all at once. Egypt’s economy is in poor shape and cannot afford a protracted war that will damage its society further especially with Ansar Allah’s Red Sea blockade and the Iran War. Ethiopia’s internal ethnic divisions continue to stall Abiy Ahmed’s dreams to gain permanent access to the Red Sea. Until Ethiopia can stabilize its own internal divisions, there’s no way a single Ethiopian soldier will set foot in Eritrea. Yet, neither Ethiopia nor Egypt can afford the current status quo. Ethiopia cannot afford to be landlocked and Egypt cannot afford reduced water into the Nile because of Ethiopia’s dam projects during the age of the Climate Crisis. Sudan and its people will tragically continue to suffer through savage civil war no thanks to the UAE and its neocolonial ambitions to secure gold. If you’ve made it this far, I salute you fellow armchair generals for your patience as you’ve read through my schizophrenic ramblings. Carry on.🫡 **Sources** [https://cja.org/where-we-work/somalia/](https://cja.org/where-we-work/somalia/) [https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tuerkiye-expands-security-footprint-in-somalia-with-anti-piracy-operation-5580048](https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tuerkiye-expands-security-footprint-in-somalia-with-anti-piracy-operation-5580048) [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/ethiopia-and-eritrea-are-on-the-brink-of-war-again/](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/ethiopia-and-eritrea-are-on-the-brink-of-war-again/) [https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/b210-ethiopia-eritrea-and-tigray-powder-keg-horn-africa](https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/b210-ethiopia-eritrea-and-tigray-powder-keg-horn-africa) [https://hornreview.org/2026/08/04/nethiopias-tigray-the-return-of-war-by-other-means/](https://hornreview.org/2026/08/04/nethiopias-tigray-the-return-of-war-by-other-means/) [https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/148414/Egypt-Eritrea-reject-non-littoral-states-](https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/148414/Egypt-Eritrea-reject-non-littoral-states-) [https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-sudan-s-war-is-destroying-its-development-future](https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-sudan-s-war-is-destroying-its-development-future) [https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/south-sudan/](https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/south-sudan/) [https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/sakane\_16.html](https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/sakane_16.html) [https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/9/3/foreign-fighters-and-external-support-fuel-sudans-war-un-backed-probe](https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/9/3/foreign-fighters-and-external-support-fuel-sudans-war-un-backed-probe) [https://acleddata.com/report/blue-nile-peripheral-front-central-battleground-sudan-conflict](https://acleddata.com/report/blue-nile-peripheral-front-central-battleground-sudan-conflict) [https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/south-sudan-could-be-dragged-into-war-next-door/](https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/south-sudan-could-be-dragged-into-war-next-door/) [https://responsiblestatecraft.org/egypt-ethiopia-tensions/](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/egypt-ethiopia-tensions/) [https://hornreview.org/2026/05/08/egypts-geometry-of-pressure-and-the-multi-front-containment-strategy-sudan-tigray-and-the-logic-of-shadow-pressure/](https://hornreview.org/2026/05/08/egypts-geometry-of-pressure-and-the-multi-front-containment-strategy-sudan-tigray-and-the-logic-of-shadow-pressure/)

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) Regarding the Claims Made in the Statement Attributed to the Paramount Chief of the “Otoro” Tribe We have come across a statement bearing the signature of the Paramount Chief of the “Otoro” Tribe, Kuku Al-Digair Damjla, circulated through various media platforms this morning, 22 August 2026, accusing the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – North of violating the decision to cease tribal fighting issued by Commander Abdalaziz Adam Al-Hilu, Chairman & Commander in Chief of the SPLM/ A - N , in welcoming the initiative of Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo Musa, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the Government of Peace. Naturally, we were surprised by this statement, just as many others were. In this regard, we would like to clarify the following: First: There is no war between the Otoro tribal component and the SPLM/A - N . This is something we have consistently reiterated. Second: What was stated in the statement of the Paramount Chief of the “Otoro” Tribe this morning does not make logical sense, because the types of weapons mentioned in his statement could not be used inside the liberated town of Kauda for any reason. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army cannot conduct military operations in such a manner. Third: The Sudan People’s Liberation Army was not a party to this conflict in the first place and therefore could not have violated the decision to cease tribal fighting, as alleged in the statement. There have been no military operations carried out by the SPLA - N , either previously or currently, against the Otoro Tribe. This is what we deem necessary to clarify. The struggle continues, and victory is certain. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North 22 August 2026

Based on the details of the meeting in Juba between Mini Arko Minawi and Abdulaziz al-Hilu, this encounter highlights the deep ideological and strategic fault lines currently tearing Sudan apart. In the context of the ongoing civil war and the formation of competing administrations (specifically the mention of al-Hilu serving as Vice President in an RSF-aligned/Hemedti-led Government of National Unity), several key political dynamics emerge: The Conflict of Alliances: SAF vs. RSF The dialogue reflects the sharp divide between Sudan's former rebel movements. Mini Arko Minawi (Governor of Darfur and leader of the SLM-Minawi) has aligned his forces with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) While he claims this is to protect civilians in Darfur from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), his critics—including al-Hilu—see this as an alliance with the "Muslim Brotherhood" (the remnants of the Omar al-Bashir regime). Abdulaziz al-Hilu, according to your account, has moved into a formal political partnership with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) This represents a "marriage of convenience" between the RSF and the SPLM-N (North), united by a shared goal of dismantling the old military-Islamist establishment in Khartoum. The Warning of "The School of Killers" Al-Hilu’s warning to Minawi regarding the "Muslim Brotherhood" refers to the NCP (National Congress Party) remnants within the SAF leadership. The Price of Loyalty: Al-Hilu’s reference to Dr. Khalil Ibrahim (the late leader of the Justice and Equality Movement who was killed in 2011) serves as a historical cautionary tale. He is arguing that the central military establishment in Khartoum uses Darfuri leaders as "proxies" or "shields" during times of crisis, only to discard or eliminate them once their usefulness expires. General Yasir al-Atta,The specific mention of SAF General Yasir al-Atta—a hardline figure in the current military council—illustrates al-Hilu’s belief that the SAF leadership has no genuine intent for peace and only seeks the total military defeat of its rivals. The Secularism vs. Islamism Debate The core of al-Hilu’s political philosophy has always been the transformation of Sudan into a secular state. By labeling the SAF as the "Muslim Brotherhood," al-Hilu frames the war not just as a power struggle, but as a fight against the ideology that led to the secession of South Sudan. His statement that "there will be no solution" unless Minawi takes action suggests that al-Hilu views Minawi’s current position as a barrier to a new, decentralized, and secular Sudan. The Threat of Further Fragmentation Al-Hilu’s comment about Sudan becoming "a country like South Sudan" highlights the catastrophic trajectory of the current war. If the major armed groups (SLM, SPLM-N, RSF, and SAF) cannot find a common political ground, the result may be the balkanization of Sudan, where Darfur, the Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan), and the Blue Nile become de facto independent or autonomous regions, leaving a rump state in the Nile valley controlled by the SAF. This meeting indicates that while South Sudan (Juba) remains the primary mediator, the gap between the internal actors is widening. Al-Hilu is positioning himself as a revolutionary who refuses to compromise with the "old center," while challenging Minawi to reconsider his role in a system that al-Hilu believes is destined to betray him. The warning that Minawi will be "their price" suggests that if the SAF succeeds, it will eventually turn on its current Darfuri allies to consolidate central power.

Hon. Yasser arman Yasser Saeed Arman is one of the most prominent Sudanese politicians whose name is associated with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). He is one of the northern leaders who joined the movement in the 1980s and became one of the foremost advocates of the “New Sudan” project proposed by Dr. John Garang, which is based on rebuilding the Sudanese state on the foundations of citizenship, equality, and justice. Background and education Yasser Saeed Arman was born on 5 October 1961 (and some sources mention 1962) in Gezira State in central Sudan, and belongs to the Jaali tribe. He received his education in Sudan, then joined the Faculty of Law at the University of Cairo – Khartoum branch (currently Nileain University), where he became involved in political and student activism. In his early years he was affiliated with the Sudanese Communist Party before leaving it to join the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in the mid-1980s. His joining the Popular Movement Arman joined the Popular Movement led by Dr. John Garang around 1986–1987, and became one of the first northern leaders within the movement. He gained the trust of the movement’s leadership and contributed to political, media, and diplomatic work, and later became one of its foremost spokespersons. His contributions to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Yasser Arman played an important role in several areas, most notably: Promoting the New Sudan project inside and outside Sudan. Participating in political negotiations with Sudanese governments. Contributing to the preparation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Nairobi) in 2005. Representing the Popular Movement in regional and international forums. Presiding over the Popular Movement’s parliamentary bloc in the National Assembly after the peace agreement. He served as Deputy Secretary-General of the Popular Movement, then Secretary-General of the Popular Movement – North after South Sudan’s secession. His positions on the issues of the people of South Sudan Arman adopted positions supporting the rights of southerners, most notably: Calling for an end to the civil war through political solutions. Defending the rights of the people of South Sudan and marginalized regions. Demanding equality for all citizens regardless of religion, ethnicity, or culture. Supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and guaranteeing the constitutional and political rights of southerners. Supporting John Garang’s vision, which called for the unity of Sudan on new foundations, and then respecting the result of the referendum on self-determination that led to South Sudan’s independence in 2011. His view of identity issues in Sudan Yasser Arman sees Sudan’s crisis as being linked to a national identity crisis, and he proposes a vision based on: Recognition of cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic diversity. Building a unifying Sudanese identity that is not based on race or religion. Strengthening the principle of citizenship as the basis of rights and duties. Respecting diversity as a source of strength for the state. His view of the political system and governance He calls for: Establishing a democratic, pluralist state. Transitional power through free and fair elections. Judicial independence and the supremacy of the rule of law. Decentralization and power-sharing between the central government and the regions. Reforming state institutions and security services to ensure professionalism and neutrality. His view of the relationship between religion and the state: That the state should be neutral toward religions. Guaranteeing freedom of belief and worship for all citizens. Not using religion in politics. That laws should be based on principles of citizenship and equal constitutional rights. Some politicians support Arman’s positions as a starting point for building a civil state, while others oppose them and prefer a larger role for Islamic Sharia. His economic vision: A fair distribution of wealth between regions. Developing marginalized areas. Combating corruption and promoting transparency. Investing in agriculture, infrastructure, education, and health. Encouraging sustainable development and improving the investment climate. His social vision Achieving social justice. Strengthening the role of women and youth in public life. Protecting human rights. Promoting a culture of peace and peaceful coexistence. Addressing the effects of wars through national reconciliation and transitional justice. After South Sudan’s independence After 2011, Yasser Arman continued his political activity in Sudan within the Popular Movement – North (SPLM-N), serving as its Secretary-General, then continuing his political work within coalitions and civic forces after the splits within the movement. He remained among those calling for an end to conflicts through dialogue and political settlement. Assessment Yasser Saeed Arman is seen as one of the most prominent political figures associated with the Popular Movement. He contributed to the movement’s political, negotiating, and media work, and defended the causes of diversity, citizenship, and democracy. In return, some of his positions remain a subject of disagreement among Sudanese political forces, especially regarding his view of the relationship between religion and the state, the path of the Popular Movement – North, and the political transformations Sudan witnessed after 2011. Assessments of his role differ depending on political and intellectual positions toward his project and his vision for Sudan’s future.

of urgent aid and medical care more accessible. Efforts would be on neutralizing, among those targeted, RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and SPLM-N leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and diminishing logistical capabilities…

#SudanNews The Emergency Lawyers Group and local sources say drone attacks across Sudan killed at least 30 civilians and five soldiers this week, with the deadliest strikes hitting El Obeid in North Kordofan, where the civilian death toll has risen to 23. The reports also point to drone attacks that killed five soldiers in Delling in South Kordofan and seven civilians in separate incidents in North Kordofan, while residents reported renewed drone activity over Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdurman in Khartoum state. The Emergency Lawyers Group said drone attacks attributed to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) killed 23 civilians and injured 19 others in a series of strikes on El Obeid on Wednesday evening and Thursday morning. According to the group, an initial strike on residential neighbourhoods killed five civilians and injured 12 others. A second attack targeted mourners gathered at a cemetery during the victims’ funeral, killing four civilians and injuring seven more. Further strikes hit neighbourhoods near the Sudanese Armed Force’s (SAF) Fifth Infantry Division headquarters, killing 13 civilians. In a separate attack early on Thursday, a drone struck a truck carrying food at the southern entrance to the city, killing the driver. The Sudanese Doctors Network condemned the attacks. Network spokesperson Tasnim El Amin told Radio Dabanga that targeting civilians, service facilities and food transport vehicles constituted a serious violation of international humanitarian law. The National Umma Party also condemned the strikes, describing them as a war crime and renewing calls for an immediate end to attacks on residential areas and civilian infrastructure. Five soldiers reported killed in Delling Local sources said a drone strike on Delling in South Kordofan on Wednesday killed at least five soldiers. The sources attributed the attack to a joint operation by the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North led by Abdelaziz El Hilu (SPLM-N). Radio Dabanga could not independently verify the claim. The attack came amid continued shelling and drone strikes on Delling, which have repeatedly killed both soldiers and civilians in recent months. Several groups accused the RSF and the SPLM N of destroying a bridge on the Delling-Kadugli road. The United Nations warned that damage to the crossing could disrupt civilian movement and humanitarian aid during the rainy season. Four civilians killed in North Kordofan The Emergency Lawyers Group said an army drone strike killed four civilians and injured another person in the Adeid Raha area of Sudri locality in North Kordofan on Wednesday. The organisation said the attack came less than a day after another drone strike targeted two civilian vehicles in the same area, killing three civilians and injuring another person. The group condemned the repeated attacks and called for an independent investigation and accountability for those responsible. Drone attack reported in Bahri Residents reported a drone attack on northern Bahri on Wednesday evening, hours after a similar attack targeted Omdurman. SAF sources said air defences intercepted the drone, although Radio Dabanga could not independently verify the claim. No information was immediately available on casualties or damage. https://t.co/zGmwtpWqmG