The Red Sea Question: Ethiopia’s Historical Access, the New Horn Rivalry, and the Struggle Over Regional Order
The politics of the Horn of Africa are increasingly being shaped by one strategic reality: control, access, and influence around the Red Sea. What appears on the surface to be a series of separate disputes—Ethiopia’s search for maritime access, the Ethiopia–Somalia dispute, tensions involving Eritrea, Sudan’s civil war, Egypt’s Nile-water concerns, and Ethiopia’s internal conflicts—are increasingly interconnected.
The statement in the accompanying image, particularly its emphasis on Red Sea governance, the Nile, Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland, illustrates this wider geopolitical contest. Ethiopia is not mentioned, but Ethiopia is central to virtually every one of these strategic questions.
Ethiopia and the Red Sea: A Historical Question
Ethiopia’s relationship with the Red Sea is not a new ambition.
For much of modern history, the Ethiopian state was connected to the Red Sea through the territories that became Eritrea. Following the post-Second World War arrangements, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and was subsequently incorporated into Ethiopia in 1962.
During that period, Massawa and Assab were important maritime outlets for Ethiopia.
The political situation changed dramatically after the Eritrean war of independence. Eritrea became independent in 1993, during the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Ethiopia subsequently became a landlocked country.
It is therefore historically inaccurate to describe the situation simply as one Ethiopian government “giving away” Assab and Massawa to Eritrea. The separation of Eritrea was the result of a much longer political, military and international process. Nevertheless, the strategic consequence for Ethiopia was enormous:
A country of more than 100 million people became landlocked while remaining geographically dependent on the Red Sea corridor.
That geographical reality has never disappeared.
Why the Red Sea Matters So Much to Ethiopia
For Ethiopia, access to the sea is not merely a question of national prestige.
It affects:
* import and export costs;
* national economic competitiveness;
* access to international markets;
* energy and logistics security;
* military and strategic autonomy;
* development of manufacturing;
* regional trade integration;
* and Ethiopia’s long-term geopolitical independence.
Djibouti currently provides Ethiopia’s principal maritime gateway. The development of alternative corridors involving Somaliland and other regional routes is therefore strategically important.
This explains why Ethiopia’s maritime-access policy has generated such intense regional reactions.
The El Alamein Message
The declaration shown in the image places particular emphasis on five issues:
1. Red Sea governance by Red Sea littoral states;
2. protecting Egyptian and Sudanese interests concerning the Nile;
3. maintaining Sudan’s territorial unity;
4. rejecting recognition or support for Somaliland;
5. supporting Somalia’s fight against terrorism and the African Union mission in Somalia.
Taken individually, these positions can be presented as regional-security policies.
Taken together, however, they reveal something much larger:
The emerging contest over who defines the political order of the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.
Ethiopia is a major regional power located immediately adjacent to this strategic system, yet it is not a Red Sea littoral state after Eritrea’s independence.
That creates an uncomfortable geopolitical contradiction.
Ethiopia has enormous economic, demographic and military weight in the Horn, but no sovereign coastline.
Egypt’s Strategic Concern
Egypt’s interest in the Horn of Africa cannot be separated from the Nile.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has fundamentally changed the strategic relationship between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Cairo regards the Nile as a vital national-security issue, while Ethiopia regards hydropower development as essential to its economic transformation.
The result is a wider strategic competition.
From Egypt’s perspective, developments that increase Ethiopia’s strategic independence—particularly an Ethiopian maritime arrangement, military capability on the Red Sea, or stronger relations with Somaliland—can potentially alter the regional balance.
From Ethiopia’s perspective, efforts to prevent it from obtaining reliable maritime access can be interpreted as an attempt to contain Ethiopia economically and strategically.
This is why the Red Sea and Nile questions increasingly overlap.
⸻
Eritrea: The Missing Piece
Eritrea occupies an exceptionally important position.
It controls a long Red Sea coastline, including the ports of Massawa and Assab, while Ethiopia remains landlocked.
The relationship between Addis Ababa and Asmara has consequently enormous strategic significance.
Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a devastating border war from 1998–2000 and later restored diplomatic relations in 2018. However, the relationship has subsequently deteriorated again.
Eritrea’s strategic interests do not necessarily coincide with Ethiopia’s.
For Ethiopia, greater access to the Red Sea is an economic and national-security objective.
For Eritrea, maintaining sovereignty over its coastline and preventing a return of overwhelming Ethiopian influence is a fundamental strategic concern.
This creates a structural rivalry that cannot simply be reduced to the personalities of individual leaders.
⸻
Somalia and Somaliland: Another Front in the Same Strategic Competition
Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland dramatically intensified the regional debate.
The agreement was widely understood as opening the possibility of Ethiopia obtaining long-term access to the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden through Somaliland.
Somalia strongly rejected the arrangement, arguing that Somaliland remains part of Somalia.
The issue subsequently became internationalized.
Türkiye’s mediation produced the Ankara Declaration in December 2024, in which Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to pursue mutually acceptable commercial arrangements giving Ethiopia reliable access to the sea under Somalia’s sovereignty.
This was an important diplomatic development because it demonstrated that the maritime-access question could potentially be addressed without permanently transforming the territorial status of Somaliland.
But the strategic competition did not disappear.
⸻
Sudan: The Third Strategic Pressure Point
Sudan is equally important.
The Sudanese civil war has created a major security vacuum between Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, South Sudan and the Red Sea.
Egypt has strong historical and security interests in Sudan.
Ethiopia has its own interests, including border security, refugees, trade routes, the Nile and the disputed Al-Fashaga area.
Eritrea also has security concerns along Sudan’s eastern frontier.
Consequently, Sudan’s instability has the potential to transform the balance of power throughout the Horn.
The principle expressed in the El Alamein statement—support for Sudan’s territorial unity—therefore has major regional implications.
⸻
Ethiopia’s Internal Conflicts Cannot Be Separated From the Regional Environment
This is where Ethiopia’s internal political crisis becomes particularly important.
The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 ended the major phase of the Ethiopia–TPLF war in northern Ethiopia. However, serious political and territorial disputes remained, including questions surrounding the status of disputed territories and the implementation of the peace agreement.
At the same time, the conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and Fano-affiliated armed groups in Amhara has created another major security challenge.
These conflicts weaken Ethiopia internally at precisely the time when the country faces intense external strategic competition.
That creates a dangerous situation.
A country does not need to be defeated militarily to lose geopolitical influence. Internal fragmentation can produce the same result.
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Are Fano and the TPLF Working Together to Break Up Ethiopia?
This claim needs to be treated carefully.
There are widespread political allegations that Ethiopia’s internal conflicts are being exploited by external powers, including Egypt and Eritrea. There are also political narratives alleging cooperation between different Ethiopian opposition forces.
However, there is not sufficient publicly established evidence to state as a fact that Fano and the TPLF are jointly operating under Egyptian or Eritrean direction to dismantle Ethiopia.
Indeed, the political and military histories of the TPLF and Fano include substantial hostility and fundamentally different political interests.
That does not mean external actors cannot exploit Ethiopia’s internal divisions.
It means the stronger and more defensible argument is this:
Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation creates opportunities for external powers to pursue their own strategic interests, regardless of whether those Ethiopian actors are formally coordinating with one another.
This distinction is important.
A serious geopolitical analysis should separate documented facts, political allegations and strategic possibilities.
⸻
The Greater Danger: Fragmentation
The most serious danger for Ethiopia may therefore not be a single foreign alliance.
It is the combination of:
internal political fragmentation + armed conflict + ethnic polarization + economic pressure + regional rivalries + external intervention.
If these factors reinforce one another, Ethiopia could become increasingly preoccupied with internal survival rather than long-term national strategy.
And that would directly affect the Red Sea question.
A fragmented Ethiopia would have considerably less bargaining power with:
* Egypt;
* Eritrea;
* Somalia;
* Somaliland;
* Sudan;
* Djibouti;
* Gulf states;
* and international powers.
⸻
The Red Sea Cannot Be Understood Without Ethiopia
The central contradiction of the current regional order is therefore clear.
The Red Sea is increasingly described as a strategic space belonging to its littoral states.
But one of the largest and most influential countries in the Horn of Africa—Ethiopia—is geographically dependent upon that same sea while possessing no sovereign coastline.
This creates a long-term strategic question that cannot simply be removed from regional politics.
Ethiopia’s interest in maritime access is unlikely to disappear because of diplomatic declarations.
Likewise, neighboring states are unlikely to ignore Ethiopia’s growing economic and strategic importance.
The realistic solution therefore cannot be perpetual confrontation.
It must eventually involve a mutually acceptable framework for Ethiopian maritime access that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring states while recognizing Ethiopia’s legitimate economic and strategic interests.
⸻
A New Geopolitical Reality
The Horn of Africa is entering a period in which the following issues are becoming inseparable:
The Red Sea
↓
Ethiopian maritime access
↓
Somaliland and Somalia
↓
Eritrea
↓
Egypt and the Nile
↓
Sudan’s war
↓
Gulf-state competition
↓
Ethiopia’s internal stability
This is why Ethiopia’s domestic political stability is no longer only an Ethiopian matter.
A weakened Ethiopia changes the balance of power throughout the entire Horn.
A stable Ethiopia, by contrast, can become an economic bridge between Africa, the Red Sea, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.
⸻
Ethiopia’s Strategic Choice
The lesson from the current regional environment should not be that Ethiopia must seek confrontation with Egypt, Eritrea or Somalia.
Nor should Ethiopia assume that every regional initiative is automatically a conspiracy against it.
The lesson should be that Ethiopia needs a coherent national strategy.
That strategy should combine:
* internal political reconciliation;
* preservation of national territorial integrity;
* implementation of the Pretoria peace process;
* peaceful resolution of disputes with neighboring countries;
* diversified port access;
* strong relations with Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland;
* pragmatic engagement with Eritrea;
* continued dialogue with Egypt and Sudan;
* expansion of economic diplomacy with Gulf and Asian powers;
* and a long-term national maritime-access strategy.
The Red Sea question will not disappear.
The real question is whether Ethiopia will approach it as a divided country reacting to events—or as a stable regional power shaping its own future.
Final thought
The history of the Horn of Africa demonstrates that geography cannot be negotiated away.
Ethiopia may have lost its sovereign coastline when Eritrea became independent, but its economic geography did not change. Ethiopia remains physically connected to the Red Sea system and economically dependent upon it.
Therefore, the future of the Horn will permanently designed by Ethiopia.
#country#country#country#country
Gadisa Erko
Cross-Border & Refugee Crisis
1 engagementsUNITED NATIONS — Sudan’s military leader is openly defying a U.S.-backed ceasefire push after Washington withheld his visa to attend the U.N. General Assembly, exposing a widening rift over a war that has become not only one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters, but also a regional struggle for influence stretching to the Red Sea.
Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s armed forces and de facto leader, had been expected in New York during UNGA before the Trump administration withheld his visa amid a dispute over a proposed 90-day humanitarian truce. Days later, Burhan struck a defiant tone from Khartoum.
"We will keep our heads high. We will not accept bargaining, sell ourselves cheaply to anyone or bow to anyone," Burhan said Saturday, according to Anadolu Agency. "We do not need a visa to any country or anyone’s permission."
Sudan's army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan
Sudan's army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan gestures to soldiers inside the presidential palace after the Sudanese army said it had taken control of the building, in the capital Khartoum, Sudan March 26, 2025. (Sudan Transitional Sovereignty Council/Handout via Reuters)
The State Department has accused both Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, and the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, of failing to make serious commitments to an immediate truce.
"Neither the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, nor their respective leaders, represent legitimate, constitutional governance for Sudan," State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott said Sept. 22, adding that the conduct of both leaders renders them "ineligible to govern the country."
The State Department said both sides had instead intensified combat operations and drone strikes that killed civilians and said Washington had repeatedly asked them to accept a humanitarian truce "without preconditions" and commit to an inclusive political dialogue leading to civilian government.
But a senior advisor to Burhan disputed Washington’s account in an on-camera interview with Fox News Digital on the sidelines of UNGA.
Sudanese forces
Sudanese army soldiers take part in a military parade as part of religious commemorations by Muslim devotees of the birthday of Islam's Prophet Mohamed in Sudan's capital Khartoum on Aug. 23, 2025 (Ebrahim Hamid AFP via Getty Images)
Dr. Amjad Farid Al-Tayyib, the foreign affairs advisor to Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, said Sudan never rejected the American ceasefire proposal and instead submitted technical comments on it.
"We never rejected this proposal," Farid said. "The Sudanese government wants war with no one."
Farid said a negotiating team had intended to accompany Burhan and accused Washington of undermining the very diplomatic process it was seeking to advance by preventing the delegation from traveling.
The State Department declined to comment on Burhan’s specific visa case, citing its policy of not discussing individual visa decisions. A State Department spokesperson told Fox News Digital on background that Washington is instead focused on a broader diplomatic framework with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE through the Quad, linking a humanitarian truce and sustained aid access to a permanent ceasefire, civilian transition and reconstruction.
"We are working with our partners to encourage the parties to agree to the humanitarian truce and guarantee humanitarian access, and to also ensure external military or financial support to the warring parties is cut off," the spokesperson said.
The spokesperson added that the Quad supports the Quintet-led civilian political track and rejects parallel diplomatic processes that could fragment negotiations.
The United Nations also challenged Washington over the visa decision. "We immediately raised with the U.S. authorities the issue regarding the denial of visa to the President of the Transitional Sovereign Council of the Sudan, who was scheduled to address the General Assembly this week," U.N. Secretary-General spokesman Stéphane Dujarric told Fox News Digital.
Cameron Hudson, a former director for African affairs on the National Security Council who also served as chief of staff to successive U.S. presidential special envoys for Sudan, said his understanding was that Washington had asked the Sudanese to send a delegation both to the U.N. and to Washington for talks on a ceasefire.
He said the Sudanese were preparing to do so before Washington, in his understanding, made Burhan’s visa contingent on signing the ceasefire agreement before traveling.
"It doesn’t fully make sense why the United States took this decision at the last minute," Hudson told Fox News Digital.
Sudan's civil war has seen tens of thousands killed, millions displaced.
Armed men salute the governor of Sudan's Red Sea State Mustafa Mahmud in Port Sudan in the war-torn country on July 24, 2024. Sudan has been gripped by war since April 2023, when fighting erupted between forces loyal to army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF led by his former deputy Mohamed Hamdan Daglo. The conflict in the country of 48 million has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions and triggered one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. (AFP via Getty Images)
Farid said the central dispute is whether the RSF would be required to withdraw from civilian areas it controls. He argued that freezing current lines of control risks turning a temporary ceasefire into a de facto partition of Sudan.
The dispute comes against the backdrop of a brutal civil war that erupted in April 2023 following a power struggle between Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti.
Both sides have been accused of serious violations, but Hudson told Fox News Digital that treating their records as interchangeable obscures an important distinction.
"The RSF is committing war crimes on a scale and with an intention that the army does not," Hudson said.
Hudson said SAF has struck civilian targets and committed war crimes, including through drone attacks, but said the RSF’s record goes significantly further.
"They have committed mass rape, mass killing, torture, sexual enslavement," Hudson said, arguing that Western descriptions of "both sides" can create the impression that the two forces are committing the same crimes "on the same scale or with the same intention."
U.N. investigators have also drawn distinctions while documenting abuses by both forces.
Sudanese Armed Popular Resistance Force.
Members of Sudanese Armed Popular Resistance Force take part in a military parade for fresh graduates, in Al-Qadarif state, in eastern Sudan on May 20, 2026. (AFP via Getty Images)
A U.N. fact-finding mission reported in September 2025 that both SAF and RSF were responsible for direct, large-scale attacks against civilians and the destruction of critical civilian infrastructure. But it found that the RSF, particularly during its siege of El Fasher and surrounding areas, committed crimes against humanity including murder, torture, enslavement, rape, sexual slavery, forced displacement and persecution on ethnic, gender and political grounds.
A separate U.N. Human Rights Office report released in February documented more than 6,000 killings during the first three days of the RSF’s final offensive on El Fasher and found that the violations could amount to war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.
Farid nevertheless accused the U.N. and Western governments of creating what he called a ‘false equivalence’ between Sudan’s military and the RSF.
"The U.N. is not staying neutral," he told Fox News Digital, arguing that international institutions have documented RSF atrocities without taking sufficient action against the group or those supporting it.
Farid nevertheless accused the U.N. and Western governments of creating what he called a false equivalence between Sudan’s military and the RSF.
U.N. Secretary-General spokesman Stéphane Dujarric rejected the allegation that the organization was equating the two sides. "This is not about equating two sides," Dujarric told Fox News Digital. "We focus on the facts, the violations that have been documented, and above all, the devastating toll this war has taken on civilians since 15 April 2023."
Dujarric said both the RSF and SAF have used explosive weapons in densely populated areas and that the U.N. Human Rights Office has documented attacks affecting schools, hospitals, markets and religious sites.
He pointed specifically to what he described as "particularly grave violations" by the RSF and affiliated forces in Darfur, including mass killings, sexual violence, torture, abductions and forced displacement, while noting that serious abuses have also been documented in SAF-controlled areas, including arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and summary executions.
The war, meanwhile, increasingly extends beyond Sudan’s borders.
Foreign backing has become a central feature of the conflict. A July 2026 UK government assessment, drawing on U.N. and other reporting, said the RSF had benefited from support networks involving the UAE and neighboring countries, while SAF had received backing from states including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The UAE has repeatedly denied providing military support to the RSF.
Fox News Digital reached out to the UAE Embassy in Washington and the UAE mission to the U.N. but did not receive a response in time for publication.
A Sudanese refugee father from Al-Fashir rides on a motorized cart with his family travelling between Chad and Sudan
A Sudanese refugee father from Al-Fashir rides on a motorized cart with his family travelling between Chad and Sudan amid the ongoing conflict between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese army, at the Tine border post in eastern Chad, November 22, 2025. (Amr Abdallah Dalsh/Reuters)
Hudson said the RSF’s foreign relationships are only part of a much larger regional competition.
He said Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Qatar have supported the army to varying degrees, while outside powers pursue their own strategic interests in Sudan.
That competition increasingly centers on Sudan’s Red Sea coastline. "There is a regional battle of influence among neighboring states and regional states who want to be able to control Sudan’s Red Sea coastline," Hudson said, pointing to potential military, port and economic access.
"Superimposed on top of the conflict inside Sudan is a regional proxy conflict for influence in Sudan and in the wider Horn of Africa, Red Sea region," he said.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also said foreign powers are central to prolonging the war. "What’s happening in Sudan would not be happening were it not for external actors supporting one side or the other," Rubio told reporters during UNGA week, describing U.S. efforts to secure even limited humanitarian agreements as "very frustrating."
Sec. Marco Rubio
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivers remarks at the start of a ministerial meeting on political violence, at the State Department in Washington, D.C., U.S., July 16, 2026. (Jonathan Ernst/Reuters)
Rubio said the parties have repeatedly agreed to commitments only to abandon them when one side believes it is gaining the upper hand. "There are external actors. I’m not going to single them out. You know who they are," Rubio said. "That war and that conflict and that crisis would not be happening were it not for the active participation of external actors that are feeding one side of that conflict or another."
He said meaningful progress would depend on those states pressuring their respective partners in Sudan.
"Until those external actors are prepared to use influence and pressure their respective proxies to live up to the commitments that they’re making, we’re not going to make progress," Rubio said.
Sudanese refugee who fled Al-Fashir
Mona Mohamed, 33, a Sudanese refugee who fled Al-Fashir, reacts during an interview with Reuters, amid ongoing conflict in Sudan between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese army, at the Iridimi refugee camp, northwest of the town of Iriba, in Wadi Fira province, eastern Chad, November 27, 2025. (Amr Abdallah Dalsh/Reuters)
Sudan’s strategic value goes beyond geography. The country has significant gold, agricultural and livestock resources and sits at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East. The World Bank has described Sudan as rich in fertile land, water and minerals, while noting its substantial gold production and agricultural potential.
Sudan also controls critical infrastructure used to transport South Sudanese crude oil to the Red Sea. A World Bank assessment says South Sudan’s oil has historically traveled through pipelines across Sudan to Port Sudan, its key export route.
Hudson said that broader regional competition helps explain why Washington has struggled to force Sudan’s outside backers to pull away.
"The United States is not going to use the limited political capital that it has with Saudi Arabia or Egypt or Turkey or UAE to get them to control their support to one side or the other in this conflict," he said.
Hudson also questioned Washington’s diplomatic strategy, arguing that pressure on Burhan has not been matched by sufficient direct engagement inside Sudan.
He said Massad Boulos, President Donald Trump’s senior advisor for Arab and African affairs, has never traveled to Sudan while attempting to mediate the conflict.
Massad Boulos, senior advisor to President Donald Trump.
Massad Boulos, senior advisor to President Donald Trump, speaks during an interview with the Associated Press at the United States' embassy in Cairo, Egypt, Monday, Nov. 3, 2025. (Amr Nabil/AP Photo)
"He’s trying to mediate peace in a country that he’s never been to," Hudson said, arguing that Washington needs more "personal diplomacy" and less reliance on public statements and social media.
"If we want these people to sign a ceasefire deal, then they have to trust us," Hudson said. "And right now we’ve given them no reason to do so."
Sudan hospital
Patients are pictured in one of the rooms of the Saudi hospital in Khartoum's twin-city Omdurman on March 20, 2025 as most hospitals and schools no longer function in the Sudanese capital and its environs due to the ongoing war which broke out in April 2023. Since April 2023, the conflict has pitted army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against his former deputy and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, leaving thousands dead and uprooting more than 11 million, according to U.N. figures, with many living in makeshift camps and over 3.5 million fleeing across the country's borders. (Ebrahim Hamid / AFP via Getty Images)
The U.N. acknowledged that international efforts have so far failed to stop the fighting. "Unfortunately, we are not seeing the war abating," Dujarric said, reiterating the U.N. position that "there is no military solution to the conflict," and noting Washington’s diplomatic role as the US and African Union co-chaired a Sept. 23 meeting bringing together the Quad and Quintet diplomatic groupings.
"The immediate priority is to stop the killing and secure a cessation of hostilities, while creating the conditions for a credible political process," he said.
#refugee#refugee#country#country
Nnajiuba Kenneth Chinonso
Cross-Border & Refugee Crisis
4 engagementsWaqa' al-Kalam | وقع الكلام
استعد لغتك .. احكي قصتك ..تستعد نفسك ..وحياتك والوطن الحلم — استيلا غايتانو
"وقع الكلام" مشروع أدبي يمتد على أربعة أشهر، يدعو الكاتبات والكتّاب السودانيين لاسترجاع لغتهم بعد الحرب — من خلال جلسات عبر الإنترنت مع الكاتبة السودانية المعروفة ستيلا غايتانو، حيث يكتب كل مشارك قصصه الخاصة عن الذاكرة والفقدان والفرح.
من يحق له التقديم: الكاتبات والكتّاب السودانيون المقيمون في السودان، جنوب السودان، ألمانيا، مصر، إثيوبيا، كينيا، أوغندا، أو تشاد
سيحصل المشاركون الذين يقع عليهم الاختيار على مكافأة.
عن استمارة التقديم : هذا مجرد نقطة انطلاق لتقديمك إلى الموضوع — وليس تقديمك النهائي
آخر موعد للتقديم: ١ أكتوبر، ٢٠٢٦
سيتم التواصل مباشرة مع المتقدمين الذين يقع عليهم الاختيار.
📩 قدّم طلبك عبر الرابط أدناه.
https://forms.cloud.microsoft/e/6GiWbAZCYw
—
"Reclaim your language.. tell your story.. and you will reclaim yourself, your life, and the homeland of your dreams." — Stella Gaitano
Waqa' al-Kalam is a four-month literary project inviting Sudanese writers to reclaim their language after war — through online sessions with acclaimed Sudanese author Stella Gaitano, with each participant writing their stories on memories, losses and happiness.
Who can apply: Sudanese writers residing in Sudan, South Sudan, Germany, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, or Chad
Selected participants will rewarded.
About the form: This is only a starting point to get you into the topic — not your final submission
Deadline to apply: October 1st
Selected applicants will be contacted directly.
📩 Apply through the link below.
https://forms.cloud.microsoft/e/6GiWbAZCYw
#country#country#country#country
Mohammed Abdulrhaman
Cross-Border & Refugee Crisis
4 engagementsYassir Arman
How we should look at the relationship between the two Sudans
Yasir Arman
Should we look at the relationship between the two states of Sudan through a keyhole or from the broader perspective of history, geography, culture and mutual interests?
I dedicate this contribution to martyrs and friends, and especially to our leader Dr John Garang De Mabior, Yousif Kuwa Mekki, Mohamed Juma Nail, Hashim Abubakr, Mohamed Ahmed Omar Al Haboub, Yasir Jafar Al Sanhouri, Abdelbaset Al Adnani, David Majok Mac, Lol Chol, the well-known singer of the Belfam battalion, Bona Obec Nyuela, Isaac Tut Dhier, Dr Justin Yac Arop, Clement Katinga, Gilo Agada, David Nari, Jok Dum, Mabuto Mayen, Malwal Biong, Koul Deng Koul (Suk), Daud Yahya Bolad, Scopos Lubro Kenyi, Lewis Al Yardou, Peire Okeruk, Abd Al Hamid Abbas and Rafat Rahmatallah. They are just a few of my many departed friends who were martyred. They wrote a new history of relations between the two Sudans and these are seeds that must grow and yield results for the benefit of the two peoples. From those who are still with us, I dedicate this to Dr Mansour Khalid with warm affection.
By Yasir Arman
At the start, let me express my gratitude to the newspaper Al Watan and to my friend Michael Christopher for this great initiative. I salute all the leaders and ministers involved and everyone who took part in this seminar entitled “Peace in Sudan and its effect on the stability of South Sudan”. We learned from our communities and some of our teachers in school and in public life that South and North Sudan occupy the same place in our hearts and minds. Our love for the two Sudans is everlasting and we will always have a joint task now and in the future to build strategic relations between the two countries. We cannot afford to forget this task.
Let me take this opportunity to thank the Mediation and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan for hosting the Sudan peace talks in their capital city, Juba. It is a historical event that will strengthen and improve bilateral relations between the two countries. The historical contradictions which have characterised relations between Northern and Southern Sudan and which later extended to the two Sudans are rooted in the depths of history and in the issues of nation-building which Sudan has encountered since 1956 and long before and which the two Sudans continue to face today.
We believe that peace in the two Sudans and its effect on them, as well as on the region and the world, is the right theme for today’s seminar and that each country will contribute to peace in the other, even if the peace process has different features in each country.
The current peace processes in Sudan and South Sudan and the contribution being made to them by the leadership of both countries will not only have a significant impact on stability but should also be extended to our ongoing efforts to create a new relationship that enables us to recover slowly from our troubled past and benefit from our historical, geographical and cultural links, blood ties and mutual interest in achieving strategic relations, leading eventually to a Sudanese Union between two independent sovereign states.
We should not take a narrow view of relations between Sudan and South Sudan. This relationship is much broader than that and has deep roots in the history of the Nile Valley civilisation. Without considering the historical and cultural links between the two peoples, there will be something missing in our efforts to achieve a paradigm shift in this relationship in a manner that is truly consistent with our mutual interests, our links, our blood ties, geography, history and culture. If we want to move forward, we need to see where we have come from in order to understand where we are going to.
Sudanism still exists and has not been erased by international borders between the two countries. It is the umbilical cord of relations between North and South Sudan. Despite the fact that we are now in a different situation and live in two countries, most of us still believe in Sudanism and long for the Sudan that no longer exists today and for the strategic links between the two countries that are dictated by current and historical interests. We can see this clearly just as Michelangelo saw an exquisite statue in a block of marble and trimmed off excess material before he began to carve the statue itself. Creating strategic relations between the two countries will not happen without difficulties like a sculpture hewn from rock. But it is possible and necessary to do this just like Michelangelo created his statue from a block of raw marble.
The Sudan peace talks in Juba offer another opportunity to correct the historical mistakes in Sudanese politics which led to the secession of South Sudan and to pursue a new National Project within Sudan and between the two Sudans. Juba itself is an open history book of the mistakes made by the centre of the Sudanese state in Khartoum. If we had dealt wisely in the past with the issues of nation-building, we should not have needed a visa to come to Juba.
Hovering around us in this hall in Juba are the spirits of Benjamin Loki, the leader of the Liberal Party, who came from Lainya and whose constituency was several miles from Juba, Father Saterlino Ohure from Eastern Equatoria, Frank Wel Garang from Wau in Bahr el Ghazal and Buth Diu and Bullen Alier from Upper Nile. They addressed issues of nation-building in bold and strong speeches in the First Parliament (1954-58). These uncles of ours were sublime and, if we had listened to them, we would not be in this position today. Frank Wel Garang said that they did not have any bad or ill intention towards Sudan but that, without responding to the demands of the Southerners, the South would leave Sudan just as Pakistan had left India. He went on to say that, unless things were to go well in Southern Sudan, they would never go well in Sudan. Peace in Sudan still faces the same old and renewed dilemmas of how to reach a credible process of nation-building based on equal citizenship without discrimination. So the contribution of the Republic of South Sudan is not only necessary for the stability of South Sudan but is also important for the Sudanese story itself and to avoid the mistakes of the past, including correcting fatal political mistakes between the two Sudans and restoring strategic relations between them with good faith and a clear vision for achieving peace in both countries. The importance of hosting the Sudan peace talks in Juba is driven by the importance of the relationship between the two countries.
South Sudan is the only country in the region which has an organic geographical relationship with the three regions where there are wars in Sudan (Blue Nile, South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Darfur). South Sudan is connected by the Nile, history, culture, values, interests, borders, national security and a common future with Sudan. The current peace process is an opportunity to transform the catastrophe in relations between the two states into an asset and to transform secession into a Sudanese Union between two independent states. The borders of the two countries are not separated by natural phenomena like a sea or an ocean. On the contrary, there are more than 10 million pastoralists on the borders of the two Sudans. This border was linked in the past to river, rail and road transport and extends more than 2,018 kilometres. It represents an important border for national security in both countries and is perhaps equivalent in length to the international borders between South Sudan and its other neighbours. South Sudan used to import more than 137 different commodities from Sudan, just as the products of South Sudan, which has a climate similar to East Africa, will find a welcome market in Sudan and the Middle East. We should restore river, road and rail transport links so that the economies of both countries will prosper. The two Sudans have more than 140 million feddan of arable land and the largest animal resources in the African continent. What we are lacking is the vision to establish strategic relations on a new foundation.
The fate of each country could impact seriously on the fate of the other, be it prosperity or collapse, and it is up to them to make sure that they prosper rather than collapse. The project of the New Sudan, which first emerged from South Sudan, is another intellectual resource for linking the two countries. It is another currency that can be a medium of exchange and intellectual commonality as the glorious December Revolution, in one of its key slogans, called for building a New Sudan.
Economics, security, defence and correct parameters of nation-building are the agenda for both Sudans and it is possible to develop them into a Sudanese Union between both countries.
There is indeed great potential for the Sudanese Union to develop into a regional union that includes Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Kenya, Libya, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. A Sudanese Union would contribute to improving African-Arab relations and would increase the chances of prosperity in the region and in Africa.
South Sudan’s biggest asset is its people and culture. Moreover, it also has a bigger geographical area than Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya put together. If we stand back and look at the two Sudans from the perspective of their geographical size rather than through the keyhole, we see that they have the biggest area in the whole of Africa. The future of the two countries lies in their huge agricultural area and arable land. What clearly shows the importance of agriculture is that expert studies have concluded that three countries – Canada, Australia and the two Sudans – can provide food for the whole population of the world.
The wars that have taken place in the two Sudans have been at the expense of the future of their populations. The two countries have a combined population of no more than 50 million people, whereas their land area is enough for more than 500 million people. So wars pose a threat to the population’s strategic existence and strategic interests. Peace and progress towards a new democratic national project based on equal citizenship is the main issue in the peace process. In our meetings these days with the Forces for Freedom and Change, I suggested that the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the Forces for Freedom and Change and the Mediation should go and visit the tomb of Obaid Haj Al Amin in Wau, who is one of the most important leaders of the 1924 White Flag Revolution. We are on the threshold of the one-hundredth anniversary of this great 1924 Revolution, which represents our national, symbolic and historical capital and heritage and the social roots of many of its leaders were both from the North and the South. The revolution was led by Ali Abdel Latif, who spent many years in prison-like our icon of change and struggle, Nelson Mandela, and by Abdul Fadil Al Maz who led the Second River War and who was martyred at the age of 28. As Obaid Al Haj Al Amin is buried in Wau, Abdul Fadil al Maz in Khartoum and Ali Abd Al Latif in Cairo, the Nile and its tributaries embrace them all.
The absence of Southerners has made Sudan like tasteless food. Southerners also miss, to a large extent, the warmth of relations which connected them to the North. Our relations did not just revolve around war but there were more human aspects based on history, culture and blood ties and many good things despite the ugliness of war. But even the war, if we start to write its history, brought out many common human values. Our humanity was reflected in some aspects of the worst human phenomenon, which is war. How many brave men and women joined the battlefield from both sides! We should build on their courage to develop a new strategic relationship.
The Sudanese state after independence gained many of its national resources in the fields of culture, music, the arts, the military, professionals, technicians, nursing, education and services from the contribution of talented Southern Sudanese. There are talented people in both countries who could contribute to the prosperity of both countries if a meaningful strategic relationship is established between them.
One of the most important things about the mediation of the Republic of South Sudan in the Sudan peace talks is that South Sudan does not have an agenda to damage Sudan’s national interests. South Sudan’s interests lie in exporting its oil and managing to resolve its own internal wars. Sudan has a lot of experience and experts in many fields who could contribute to state and institution-building in the Republic of South Sudan and Northern Sudanese are also closest to the social psychology of the Southerners. Through their relations with each other, the two Sudans can consolidate independence and sovereignty in both states. As for the global economic landscape and exploitation within the nation-state, the leading intellectual Joseph Garang, who was Minister for Southern Affairs in the early period of Nimeiri’s Government and author of the booklet “The Dilemma of the Southern Intellectual”, in one of his perceptive sayings, compared those who escaped from national exploitation to global exploitation to “someone who escapes from a den of hyenas to find himself in a den of lions”. Consequently, the two Sudans need each other if they are to confront this troubled world and projects for global exploitation.
European countries have fought wars with each other and, in the Second World War which ended in 1945, no one could have imagined that France and Germany would join a single European Union. Today you can go from Spain to the borders of Turkey with a single visa. Although individual European countries have different democratic governance systems, there is one European political and economic area, and borders do not present any impediment to movement. If European countries, developed as they are, have established a European Union, it is all the more necessary for us to establish a Sudanese Union and the current peace talks have an important role to play in achieving this.
Redefining Sudan’s National Project and achieving sustainable peace in Sudan call for lessons to be learnt from the two biggest events that Sudan has witnessed: the secession of the South and genocide. The Sudan peace talks in Juba therefore have a deep meaning and significance for Sudanese and are a catalyst for achieving a new National Project.
During the wars in South Sudan, it was remarkable that millions of displaced Southerners headed northwards. This trend was driven by shared values and cultural links, blood ties, history and geography and the Nile has always played a significant role. Today, refugees from both Sudans all go to the other country. This movement of IDPs and refugees reflects the need for strategic relations between the two countries. The common history and the participation of many Northerners on the side of the Southerners in the last war (1983-2005), especially from the Two Areas Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile), is an additional important reason for building a strategic relationship because this area provides an organic link between the two countries. The border area is an area of human intermingling and the most beautiful place for building a Sudanese Union.
In the last 32 years, there has never been a better opportunity for peace in Sudan than the one that exists today. The good news is that Juba is playing an active role in this. What happens now presents big opportunities as well as challenges and concerns. Boosting peace in both Sudans would be an added value and would reflect progress and stability in both countries. We call for the holding of an inclusive conference for active forces in both countries to promote a joint vision for a Sudanese Union and the establishment of political, economic and cultural institutions to support this concept. We have been an advocate of a Sudanese Union since South Sudan’s independence in 2011.
When the last Framework Agreement between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North/Sudan Revolutionary Front was signed on 24 January 2020, President Salva Kiir Mayardit mentioned, in response to my call for a Sudanese Union, that he is in support of strategic relations and that he dreamed of seeing security and peace prevail in both countries. He mentioned that, in earlier times, vehicles carrying goods used to travel safely from Dongola in the far North of Sudan to Yei in the far South of South Sudan without encountering any obstacles. He called for this situation to be restored. This represents an important call.
Finally, the one thing I want to achieve in my future political work and to which I will devote my remaining effort, energy and time is to contribute humbly to establishing a Sudanese Union between the two Sudans as independent sovereign states. Many thanks and appreciation
#country#country#country#country
Rudwan Himat
Cross-Border & Refugee Crisis
0 engagementsSudan: More Than 1.2 Million Returnees Face Displacement and Humanitarian Needs
August 24, 2026
KHARTOUM, Sudan — More than 1.24 million Sudanese have returned to the country from neighbouring states since 2024, but many remain unable to reach their intended destinations, according to a new report by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).
The report indicates that more than 45% of returnees have not yet reached the areas where they ultimately intend to settle, highlighting the continuing impact of insecurity, displacement and humanitarian constraints across Sudan.
Egypt accounts for the largest number of returns
Egypt recorded the largest share of cross-border returns, with approximately 823,000 movements, followed by South Sudan with 223,000 and Chad with 103,000.
Despite continued insecurity, approximately 72% of surveyed returnees said they intend to return to their original homes.
However, significant gaps remain between intended destinations and current locations. Khartoum State was identified as the intended destination by 59% of returnees, but only 34% had reached the capital.
Meanwhile, Al Jazirah State currently hosts about 35% of returnees, although only 11% identified it as their intended destination. Blue Nile State hosts approximately 9%, while Northern State and River Nile State account for 5% and 4%, respectively.
Protection and border challenges
The UNHCR report also highlights the difficult circumstances many returnees experienced before coming back to Sudan.
Nearly 49% of surveyed returnees had sought asylum in their countries of departure. Among those who returned, 41% cited protection concerns abroad, while 45% reported lengthy delays in border processing as factors affecting their return.
These findings underline the complex protection environment facing Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers, particularly those attempting to cross borders while seeking safety and access to basic services.
Humanitarian needs remain severe
Financial assistance is identified as the most urgent need among returnees across Sudan, with as many as 96% of respondents identifying cash or financial support as a priority.
Other major needs include:
Food assistance;
Healthcare and medicines;
Clean and safe drinking water;
Emergency and long-term shelter;
Civil documentation;
Family reunification; and
Protection for women and children.
The lack of civil documentation presents an additional challenge, potentially limiting returnees' access to essential services, housing, employment and other forms of assistance.
Return does not necessarily mean durable reintegration
The UNHCR findings demonstrate that the return of more than one million Sudanese does not necessarily represent a durable solution to displacement.
Many returnees remain stranded away from their intended homes, while insecurity and limited access to essential services continue to influence where they can live.
The scale of the movement also places substantial pressure on communities that are receiving large numbers of displaced and returning populations.
Humanitarian agencies and national authorities face the continuing challenge of supporting returnees while also addressing the needs of internally displaced people and other vulnerable populations affected by Sudan's prolonged conflict.
Conclusion
The return of more than 1.24 million Sudanese since 2024 marks a significant population movement, but the UNHCR findings show that many returnees still face serious barriers to achieving safe and sustainable reintegration.
For many, the immediate priority is not simply returning to Sudan but reaching their intended homes safely, accessing basic services, obtaining documentation, reuniting with family members and rebuilding their livelihoods.
Continued humanitarian assistance, protection monitoring and support for voluntary, safe and dignified return will remain critical as Sudanese communities seek to recover amid persistent insecurity and displacement.
#refugee#country#country#country
𝕄𝕚𝕘𝕣𝕒𝕟𝕥𝕤 & 𝕣𝕖𝕗𝕦𝕘𝕖𝕖𝕤 𝕍𝕠𝕚𝕔𝕖
Cross-Border & Refugee Crisis
1 engagementsHow we should look at the relationship between the two Sudans
By @Yasir Arman
Should we look at the relationship between the two states of Sudan through a keyhole or from the broader perspective of history, geography, culture and mutual interests?
I dedicate this contribution to martyrs and friends, and especially to our leader Dr John Garang De Mabior, Yousif Kuwa Mekki, Mohamed Juma Nail, Hashim Abubakr, Mohamed Ahmed Omar Al Haboub, Yasir Jafar Al Sanhouri, Abdelbaset Al Adnani, David Majok Mac, Lol Chol, the well-known singer of the Belfam battalion, Bona Obec Nyuela, Isaac Tut Dhier, Dr Justin Yac Arop, Clement Katinga, Gilo Agada, David Nari, Jok Dum, Mabuto Mayen, Malwal Biong, Koul Deng Koul (Suk), Daud Yahya Bolad, Scopos Lubro Kenyi, Lewis Al Yardou, Peire Okeruk, Abd Al Hamid Abbas and Rafat Rahmatallah. They are just a few of my many departed friends who were martyred. They wrote a new history of relations between the two Sudans and these are seeds that must grow and yield results for the benefit of the two peoples. From those who are still with us, I dedicate this to Dr Mansour Khalid with warm affection.
By Yasir Arman
At the start, let me express my gratitude to the newspaper Al Watan and to my friend Michael Christopher for this great initiative. I salute all the leaders and ministers involved and everyone who took part in this seminar entitled “Peace in Sudan and its effect on the stability of South Sudan”. We learned from our communities and some of our teachers in school and in public life that South and North Sudan occupy the same place in our hearts and minds. Our love for the two Sudans is everlasting and we will always have a joint task now and in the future to build strategic relations between the two countries. We cannot afford to forget this task.
Let me take this opportunity to thank the Mediation and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan for hosting the Sudan peace talks in their capital city, Juba. It is a historical event that will strengthen and improve bilateral relations between the two countries. The historical contradictions which have characterised relations between Northern and Southern Sudan and which later extended to the two Sudans are rooted in the depths of history and in the issues of nation-building which Sudan has encountered since 1956 and long before and which the two Sudans continue to face today.
We believe that peace in the two Sudans and its effect on them, as well as on the region and the world, is the right theme for today’s seminar and that each country will contribute to peace in the other, even if the peace process has different features in each country.
The current peace processes in Sudan and South Sudan and the contribution being made to them by the leadership of both countries will not only have a significant impact on stability but should also be extended to our ongoing efforts to create a new relationship that enables us to recover slowly from our troubled past and benefit from our historical, geographical and cultural links, blood ties and mutual interest in achieving strategic relations, leading eventually to a Sudanese Union between two independent sovereign states.
We should not take a narrow view of relations between Sudan and South Sudan. This relationship is much broader than that and has deep roots in the history of the Nile Valley civilisation. Without considering the historical and cultural links between the two peoples, there will be something missing in our efforts to achieve a paradigm shift in this relationship in a manner that is truly consistent with our mutual interests, our links, our blood ties, geography, history and culture. If we want to move forward, we need to see where we have come from in order to understand where we are going to.
Sudanism still exists and has not been erased by international borders between the two countries. It is the umbilical cord of relations between North and South Sudan. Despite the fact that we are now in a different situation and live in two countries, most of us still believe in Sudanism and long for the Sudan that no longer exists today and for the strategic links between the two countries that are dictated by current and historical interests. We can see this clearly just as Michelangelo saw an exquisite statue in a block of marble and trimmed off excess material before he began to carve the statue itself. Creating strategic relations between the two countries will not happen without difficulties like a sculpture hewn from rock. But it is possible and necessary to do this just like Michelangelo created his statue from a block of raw marble.
The Sudan peace talks in Juba offer another opportunity to correct the historical mistakes in Sudanese politics which led to the secession of South Sudan and to pursue a new National Project within Sudan and between the two Sudans. Juba itself is an open history book of the mistakes made by the centre of the Sudanese state in Khartoum. If we had dealt wisely in the past with the issues of nation-building, we should not have needed a visa to come to Juba.
Hovering around us in this hall in Juba are the spirits of Benjamin Loki, the leader of the Liberal Party, who came from Lainya and whose constituency was several miles from Juba, Father Saterlino Ohure from Eastern Equatoria, Frank Wel Garang from Wau in Bahr el Ghazal and Buth Diu and Bullen Alier from Upper Nile. They addressed issues of nation-building in bold and strong speeches in the First Parliament (1954-58). These uncles of ours were sublime and, if we had listened to them, we would not be in this position today. Frank Wel Garang said that they did not have any bad or ill intention towards Sudan but that, without responding to the demands of the Southerners, the South would leave Sudan just as Pakistan had left India. He went on to say that, unless things were to go well in Southern Sudan, they would never go well in Sudan. Peace in Sudan still faces the same old and renewed dilemmas of how to reach a credible process of nation-building based on equal citizenship without discrimination. So the contribution of the Republic of South Sudan is not only necessary for the stability of South Sudan but is also important for the Sudanese story itself and to avoid the mistakes of the past, including correcting fatal political mistakes between the two Sudans and restoring strategic relations between them with good faith and a clear vision for achieving peace in both countries. The importance of hosting the Sudan peace talks in Juba is driven by the importance of the relationship between the two countries.
South Sudan is the only country in the region which has an organic geographical relationship with the three regions where there are wars in Sudan (Blue Nile, South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Darfur). South Sudan is connected by the Nile, history, culture, values, interests, borders, national security and a common future with Sudan. The current peace process is an opportunity to transform the catastrophe in relations between the two states into an asset and to transform secession into a Sudanese Union between two independent states. The borders of the two countries are not separated by natural phenomena like a sea or an ocean. On the contrary, there are more than 10 million pastoralists on the borders of the two Sudans. This border was linked in the past to river, rail and road transport and extends more than 2,018 kilometres. It represents an important border for national security in both countries and is perhaps equivalent in length to the international borders between South Sudan and its other neighbours. South Sudan used to import more than 137 different commodities from Sudan, just as the products of South Sudan, which has a climate similar to East Africa, will find a welcome market in Sudan and the Middle East. We should restore river, road and rail transport links so that the economies of both countries will prosper. The two Sudans have more than 140 million feddan of arable land and the largest animal resources in the African continent. What we are lacking is the vision to establish strategic relations on a new foundation.
The fate of each country could impact seriously on the fate of the other, be it prosperity or collapse, and it is up to them to make sure that they prosper rather than collapse. The project of the New Sudan, which first emerged from South Sudan, is another intellectual resource for linking the two countries. It is another currency that can be a medium of exchange and intellectual commonality as the glorious December Revolution, in one of its key slogans, called for building a New Sudan.
Economics, security, defence and correct parameters of nation-building are the agenda for both Sudans and it is possible to develop them into a Sudanese Union between both countries.
There is indeed great potential for the Sudanese Union to develop into a regional union that includes Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Kenya, Libya, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. A Sudanese Union would contribute to improving African-Arab relations and would increase the chances of prosperity in the region and in Africa.
South Sudan’s biggest asset is its people and culture. Moreover, it also has a bigger geographical area than Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya put together. If we stand back and look at the two Sudans from the perspective of their geographical size rather than through the keyhole, we see that they have the biggest area in the whole of Africa. The future of the two countries lies in their huge agricultural area and arable land. What clearly shows the importance of agriculture is that expert studies have concluded that three countries – Canada, Australia and the two Sudans – can provide food for the whole population of the world.
The wars that have taken place in the two Sudans have been at the expense of the future of their populations. The two countries have a combined population of no more than 50 million people, whereas their land area is enough for more than 500 million people. So wars pose a threat to the population’s strategic existence and strategic interests. Peace and progress towards a new democratic national project based on equal citizenship is the main issue in the peace process. In our meetings these days with the Forces for Freedom and Change, I suggested that the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the Forces for Freedom and Change and the Mediation should go and visit the tomb of Obaid Haj Al Amin in Wau, who is one of the most important leaders of the 1924 White Flag Revolution. We are on the threshold of the one-hundredth anniversary of this great 1924 Revolution, which represents our national, symbolic and historical capital and heritage and the social roots of many of its leaders were both from the North and the South. The revolution was led by Ali Abdel Latif, who spent many years in prison-like our icon of change and struggle, Nelson Mandela, and by Abdul Fadil Al Maz who led the Second River War and who was martyred at the age of 28. As Obaid Al Haj Al Amin is buried in Wau, Abdul Fadil al Maz in Khartoum and Ali Abd Al Latif in Cairo, the Nile and its tributaries embrace them all.
The absence of Southerners has made Sudan like tasteless food. Southerners also miss, to a large extent, the warmth of relations which connected them to the North. Our relations did not just revolve around war but there were more human aspects based on history, culture and blood ties and many good things despite the ugliness of war. But even the war, if we start to write its history, brought out many common human values. Our humanity was reflected in some aspects of the worst human phenomenon, which is war. How many brave men and women joined the battlefield from both sides! We should build on their courage to develop a new strategic relationship.
The Sudanese state after independence gained many of its national resources in the fields of culture, music, the arts, the military, professionals, technicians, nursing, education and services from the contribution of talented Southern Sudanese. There are talented people in both countries who could contribute to the prosperity of both countries if a meaningful strategic relationship is established between them.
One of the most important things about the mediation of the Republic of South Sudan in the Sudan peace talks is that South Sudan does not have an agenda to damage Sudan’s national interests. South Sudan’s interests lie in exporting its oil and managing to resolve its own internal wars. Sudan has a lot of experience and experts in many fields who could contribute to state and institution-building in the Republic of South Sudan and Northern Sudanese are also closest to the social psychology of the Southerners. Through their relations with each other, the two Sudans can consolidate independence and sovereignty in both states. As for the global economic landscape and exploitation within the nation-state, the leading intellectual Joseph Garang, who was Minister for Southern Affairs in the early period of Nimeiri’s Government and author of the booklet “The Dilemma of the Southern Intellectual”, in one of his perceptive sayings, compared those who escaped from national exploitation to global exploitation to “someone who escapes from a den of hyenas to find himself in a den of lions”. Consequently, the two Sudans need each other if they are to confront this troubled world and projects for global exploitation.
European countries have fought wars with each other and, in the Second World War which ended in 1945, no one could have imagined that France and Germany would join a single European Union. Today you can go from Spain to the borders of Turkey with a single visa. Although individual European countries have different democratic governance systems, there is one European political and economic area, and borders do not present any impediment to movement. If European countries, developed as they are, have established a European Union, it is all the more necessary for us to establish a Sudanese Union and the current peace talks have an important role to play in achieving this.
Redefining Sudan’s National Project and achieving sustainable peace in Sudan call for lessons to be learnt from the two biggest events that Sudan has witnessed: the secession of the South and genocide. The Sudan peace talks in Juba therefore have a deep meaning and significance for Sudanese and are a catalyst for achieving a new National Project.
During the wars in South Sudan, it was remarkable that millions of displaced Southerners headed northwards. This trend was driven by shared values and cultural links, blood ties, history and geography and the Nile has always played a significant role. Today, refugees from both Sudans all go to the other country. This movement of IDPs and refugees reflects the need for strategic relations between the two countries. The common history and the participation of many Northerners on the side of the Southerners in the last war (1983-2005), especially from the Two Areas Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile), is an additional important reason for building a strategic relationship because this area provides an organic link between the two countries. The border area is an area of human intermingling and the most beautiful place for building a Sudanese Union.
In the last 32 years, there has never been a better opportunity for peace in Sudan than the one that exists today. The good news is that Juba is playing an active role in this. What happens now presents big opportunities as well as challenges and concerns. Boosting peace in both Sudans would be an added value and would reflect progress and stability in both countries. We call for the holding of an inclusive conference for active forces in both countries to promote a joint vision for a Sudanese Union and the establishment of political, economic and cultural institutions to support this concept. We have been an advocate of a Sudanese Union since South Sudan’s independence in 2011.
When the last Framework Agreement between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North/Sudan Revolutionary Front was signed on 24 January 2020, President Salva Kiir Mayardit mentioned, in response to my call for a Sudanese Union, that he is in support of strategic relations and that he dreamed of seeing security and peace prevail in both countries. He mentioned that, in earlier times, vehicles carrying goods used to travel safely from Dongola in the far North of Sudan to Yei in the far South of South Sudan without encountering any obstacles. He called for this situation to be restored. This represents an important call.
Finally, the one thing I want to achieve in my future political work and to which I will devote my remaining effort, energy and time is to contribute humbly to establishing a Sudanese Union between the two Sudans as independent sovereign states.�Many thanks and appreciation.
#country#country#country#country
PaanLuel Wël
Cross-Border & Refugee Crisis
43 engagements