Merowe

Cairo’s Shadow War in Sudan: Drones, Borders and a Fading Army Ally General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan is a career officer with long‑standing ties to Egyptian commanders, and his military rule mirrors Sisi’s own path from barracks to presidency. By Carla Davies ModernDiplomacy.eu August 5, 2026 Egypt has moved from rhetorical backing of Sudan’s army to active enabler of its war effort, with a covert drone hub on Egyptian soil symbolising how Cairo has tied its regional strategy to the survival of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Since fighting erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, Egypt has framed its stance as defence of Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and of its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces.” Officially, President Abdel Fattah al‑Sisi repeats pledges of “non‑interference,” presenting Egypt’s role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid and hosting Sudanese refugees. In practice, that line has steadily eroded. Years of joint drills, intelligence sharing and arms ties since 2019 created deep interoperability between the two militaries, well before the civil war began. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were explained away as being on pre‑scheduled exercises, a narrative few regional observers accepted. The New York Times investigation into East Oweinat in Egypt’s Western Desert crystallises this shift from backstage support to direct operational involvement. Satellite imagery, flight records and videos show a once‑civil agricultural airstrip expanded since 2018 with a second runway, new hangars and satellite links, and by 2025 hosting Turkish Akinci combat drones. According to U.S. and European officials cited in that reporting, those drones have for at least six months flown strike missions into Sudan, hitting RSF targets up to hundreds of miles inside the country, including convoys on supply routes from Libya and Chad. The drones and their munitions match Turkish systems, but are based on Egyptian territory and shield Sudan’s military assets from RSF retaliation, blurring whether Cairo is merely hosting or also directing the campaign. For Cairo, East Oweinat offers plausible deniability: operations are embedded in a desert reclamation project far from public scrutiny, yet close enough to Sudan’s border to project sustained air power. For Sudan’s army, it is a lifeline in a war where the RSF has excelled at capturing bases and shooting down drones; at least several Akinci units have reportedly been lost to RSF fire in recent months. RSF statements and battlefield evidence further illuminate the depth of Egyptian support. In January 2026 the RSF published what it called “irrefutable” proof of Egypt’s direct role, citing captured Egyptian‑made ammunition, armoured vehicles and testimonies from detained SAF‑aligned commanders who described arms, training and medical support routed from Egypt. Egypt’s wager on the SAF is rooted in hard security and regime‑survival logic. Egyptian strategists see Sudan’s collapse as an existential threat, evoking fears of refugee flows and arms smuggling on a porous southern frontier. Control of the Nile is still more fundamental: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Cairo has tightened security and military coordination with Khartoum to present a united front against Ethiopia’s GERD and protect its historic water share. There is also an ideological affinity. General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan is a career officer with long‑standing ties to Egyptian commanders, and his military rule mirrors Sisi’s own path from barracks to presidency. Backing the SAF fits a long‑standing Egyptian instinct to side with Sudan’s regular army “whoever is in charge of it,” and more broadly to prefer strong central militaries over unruly civilian transitions in the Arab world. The SAF’s reliance upon Muslim Brotherhood–aligned militias and ideologues, including the glorification of early militant figures such as Bara Bin Malik, against the backdrop of Washington’s formal designation of key Muslim Brotherhood chapters as terrorist organisations, should be unsettling to Cairo. Yet by 2026, Egypt’s bet looks increasingly brittle. The war has killed tens of thousands, displaced more than 14 million and pushed parts of Sudan close to famine, while neither side has secured decisive control. Burhan’s legitimacy is deeply disputed: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military transition, and many of the forces that drove the 2018–19 uprising see him as the continuation of military dominance, not a route to elections. Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel entities” and alternative governments in exile is presented as a defence of Sudanese unity, but in effect delegitimises broad civilian coalitions trying to organise outside the SAF–RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the current military leadership, Egypt narrows the field of acceptable interlocutors to a junta whose territorial control and popular backing are both eroding. At the same time, Egypt seeks recognition as a mediator, through formats like the Quad and by hosting conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. That posture sits uneasily with explicit promises not to be “lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, and with mounting evidence of Egyptian‑based air operations in the conflict. The covert base in the desert, and the drones that rise from its runways toward Sudanese skies, have become emblematic of a policy that claims non‑interference while in practice helping to lock Sudan into a devastating, externalised war. Carla Davies *Carla Davies is a Brussels-based journalist. She writes on foreign affairs for EU Political Report and has an interest in the Middle East and Africa. ~~~~~~~~~~~ *Head of Sudan's armed forces Abdel Fattah al-Burhan greets army officers after a drone strike hit an army base where he attended a graduation ceremony, in Gebit, Sudan, July 31, 2024. Sudanese Sovereign Council Media Office/Handout via REUTERS

🇸🇩 الجيش السوداني يؤمّن طريق الصادرات بعد استرداده بارا، جبرة الشيخ، أم سيالة وعدد من المناطق من قبضة قوات الدعم السريع خلال معارك عنيفة هذا الأسبوع، أعلن الجيش السوداني عن تأمين طريق الصادرات الرابط بين ولاية الخرطوم وولاية شمال كردفان وعاصمتها الأبيض، في خطوة من شأنها تعزيز حركة النقل والإمداد بين الولايتين. مروي الآن - Merowe Now #مروي_الآن #السودان #الجيش_السوداني #شمال_كردفان #الأبيض #بارا #جبرة_الشيخ #أم_سيالة

في إطار التعاون الأكاديمي والعلمي المشترك بين جامعة مروي التكنولوجية وجامعة بلغرود للتعاون والاقتصاد والقانون بجمهورية روسيا الاتحادية اذ ان الجامعتان تربطهما اتفاقية تعاون مشترك من خلال كرسي اليونسكو "التعليم من أجل التنمية المستدامة" نظمت جامعة مروي التكنولوجية ندوة علمية إلكترونية (Webinar) بعنوان "التراث الثقافي غير المادي ودوره في تحقيق أهداف التنمية المستدامة" عبر تقنية Google Meet، بمشاركة عدد من الأساتذة والباحثين والمتخصصين من الجامعتين. وفي مستهل الندوة رحب الدكتور عبد المنعم عبد العزيز الشيخ عميد كلية الدراسات العليا بجامعة مروي التكنولوجية بالمشاركين معرباً عن شكره وتقديره لجامعة بلغرود مؤكداً أهمية الشراكة العلمية بين الجامعتين وضرورة المضي قدماً في تعزيز مجالات التعاون الأكاديمي والبحثي بما يخدم أهداف التنمية المستدامة.وكما تحدثت عن جامعة بلغرود الدكتورة اليزا فيتا تراسوفه نائب رئيس البحث العلمي بالجامعة وشهدت الندوة تقديم عدد من الأوراق العلمية المتخصصة. حيث قدم البروفيسور نصر الدين سليمان علي رئيس قسم الفولكلور بكلية الآداب والدراسات الإنسانية بجامعة دنقلا ورقة بعنوان "الدور الاقتصادي للتراث الثقافي غير المادي". كما قدم البروفيسور محمد عز الدين علي الحلو، عميد كلية الآداب والدراسات الإنسانية وأستاذ علم المعلومات والمكتبات بجامعة دنقلا ورقة بعنوان "توثيق ورقمنة التراث الثقافي" تناول فيها أهمية التقنيات الحديثة في حفظ التراث الثقافي وتوثيقه. وقدم البروفيسور محمد فتح الرحمن، أستاذ الآثار بكلية الآداب والدراسات الإنسانية بجامعة دنقلا ورقة علمية تناولت (أثر الحرب على التراث الثقافي في السودان). كما قدم الدكتور آدم يوسف مصطفى آدم عميد شؤون الطلاب والأستاذ بكلية التربية ورئيس قسم اللغات والدراسات الإنسانية بجامعة مروي التكنولوجية ورقة علمية بعنوان " التراث الثقافي غير المادي في التعليم ودوره في تحقيق اهداف التنمية المستدامة . . وقدم الأستاذ محمد الأمين السكوري، ممثل موقع جبل البركل للتراث العالمي ورقة بعنوان "التراث الثقافي والبيئة" تناول فيها العلاقة بين التراث الثقافي والمحافظة على البيئة ودورهما في تحقيق التنمية المستدامة. وفي ختام أعمال الندوة تقدم الدكتور البلولة محمد البلولة منسق كرسي اليونسكو بجامعة مروي التكنولوجية بالشكر والتقدير لجميع المشاركين والمتحدثين مؤكداً أهمية استمرار مثل هذه الفعاليات العلمية وتبادل الخبرات بين الجامعتين ومشدداً على مواصلة التعاون المشترك وتوسيع مجالات الشراكة الأكاديمية والبحثية في المستقبل. وقد خرجت الندوة بعدد من التوصيات التي أكدت أهمية المحافظة على التراث الثقافي غير المادي وتوثيقه ورقمنته وتعزيز دوره في دعم التنمية المستدامة وترسيخ الهوية الثقافية للأجيال القادمة. Within the framework of academic and scientific cooperation between Merowe University of Technological and Belgorod University of Cooperation, Economics and Law (Russian Federation) — the two universities being linked by a mutual cooperation agreement through the UNESCO Chair "Education for Sustainable Development" — Merowe University of Technology organized an online scientific event (Webinar) entitled "the Role Intangible Cultural Heritage in Achieving the SDGs," held via Google Meet, with the participation of a number of professors, researchers, and specialists from both universities. At the opening of the event , Dr. Abd al-Mun'im Abd al-Aziz al-Sheikh, Dean of the Graduates College at Merowe University Technological , welcomed the participants, expressing his gratitude and appreciation to Belgorod University and affirming the importance of the scientific partnership between the two institutions, as well as the necessity of advancing and strengthening areas of academic and research cooperation in service of the SDGs. Spoke on behalf of Belgorod University of Cooperation, Economics and Law Elizaveta Tarasova. The webnar featured the presentation of a number of specialized scientific papers: Professor Nasr al-Din Sulayman Ali, Head of the Folklore Department at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Dongola, presented a paper entitled "The Economic Role of Intangible Cultural Heritage." Professor Muhammad Izz al-Din Ali al-Hulw, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities and Professor of Information Science and Library Studies at the University of Dongola, presented a paper entitled "Documentation and Digitization of Cultural Heritage," in which he addressed the importance of modern technologies in the preservation and documentation of cultural heritage. Professor Muhammad Fath al-Rahman, Professor of Archaeology at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Dongola, presented a scientific paper examining "The Impact of War on Cultural Heritage in Sudan." Dr. Adam Yousif Mustafa Adam, Dean of Student Affairs and Faculty Member at the College of Education and Head of Department of Languages and humanities , Merowe University of Technological , presented a scientific paper entitled "the Integration of Intangible Cultural Heritage into Education and Its Role in support the SDGs." Mr. Muhammad al-Amin al-Sakuri, Representative of the Jebel Barkal World Heritage Site, presented a paper entitled "Cultural Heritage and the Environment," in which he explored the relationship between cultural heritage and environmental conservation and their respective roles in achieving sustainable development. At the conclusion of the webnar proceedings, Dr. al-Balula Muhammad al-Balula, UNESCO Chair Coordinator at Merowe University of Technology , extended his thanks and appreciation to all participants and speakers, emphasizing the importance of continuing such scientific events and the exchange of expertise between the two universities, and stressing the need to sustain joint cooperation and broaden the scope of academic and research partnership in the future. The webnar concluded with a set of recommendations affirming the importance of preserving, documenting, and digitizing intangible cultural heritage, as well as reinforcing its role in supporting sustainable development and consolidating cultural identity for future generations

ملحق 3: Commercial & Investment Vision for Public Subscription in Sukuk and Shares of the Sudanese Energy Bank Prepared by / Eng. Othman Haider Abdelhadi --- Executive Summary The proposed Sudanese Energy Bank aims to establish a national investment-driven renewable energy ecosystem that transforms ordinary citizens from electricity consumers into direct stakeholders and producers of clean energy. The model is specifically designed for citizens who do not own suitable rooftops for private solar generation, enabling them instead to invest through: Green Energy Sukuk Public Energy Shares Community-Owned Solar Farms Floating Solar Power Plants Pumped Hydro Energy Storage Systems Wind Energy Projects The project combines Islamic finance, public ownership, renewable infrastructure, and long-term sustainable profitability into one strategic national framework. --- 1. Strategic Vision The vision of the Sudanese Energy Bank is to position Sudan as: A regional clean energy hub A renewable electricity exporter A center for solar manufacturing industries A model for public energy ownership in Africa and the Middle East --- 2. Investment Products A. Green Energy Sukuk Sharia-compliant investment instruments representing proportional ownership in energy-generating assets. Proposed Sukuk Categories Sukuk Type Purpose Investment Duration Expected Annual Return Solar Farm Sukuk Utility-scale solar plants 7–15 years 12%–20% Floating Solar Sukuk Solar systems on reservoirs 10–20 years 15%–22% Pumped Hydro Sukuk Water storage energy systems 15–25 years 18%–25% Wind Energy Sukuk Wind farm developments 10–20 years 14%–23% --- B. Public Energy Shares Low-cost shares designed for mass public participation. Key Features Affordable entry value Tradable within national markets Annual or semiannual dividends Transferable and inheritable Accessible to citizens inside and outside Sudan --- 3. Why Sudan? Sudan possesses exceptional renewable energy advantages: One of the world’s highest solar irradiation levels Vast desert lands suitable for mega solar projects Long Red Sea coastline with strong wind potential Large water reservoirs and dams Growing electricity demand Limited traditional grid coverage These advantages create ideal conditions for large-scale renewable infrastructure investments. --- 4. Utilization of Sukuk and Share Capital A. Large-Scale Solar Farms Proposed Locations Dongola Atbara Port Sudan Northern State River Nile State Advantages Extremely high solar exposure Low land acquisition cost Ease of future expansion Strategic proximity to transmission corridors --- B. Floating Solar Power Plants Concept Deploy floating photovoltaic systems over: Dams Reservoirs Artificial lakes Water storage basins Strategic Benefits Reduced water evaporation Improved panel efficiency through natural cooling Efficient use of unused water surfaces Lower land dependency Potential Sites Merowe Dam Roseires Dam Jebel Aulia Dam --- 5. Pumped Hydro Energy Storage Instead of Conventional Batteries Strategic Energy Storage System Operational Model During Daytime Excess solar electricity is used to pump water into elevated storage reservoirs. During Nighttime Stored water is released through turbines to generate stable electricity after sunset. --- Why This Model is Ideal for Sudan Factor Conventional Batteries Pumped Hydro Storage Lifespan 5–12 years 50–100 years Long-Term Cost Very High Significantly Lower Import Dependency High Low Scalability Limited Excellent Environmental Impact Higher Lower --- Strategic Outcome This model enables Sudan to achieve: Stable 24-hour electricity supply Reduced diesel dependence Lower energy storage costs Long-term national energy security --- 6. Wind Energy Expansion Proposed Wind Energy Zones A. Southern Red Sea Coast Red Sea State Advantages: Consistent wind speeds Excellent coastal conditions Access to maritime infrastructure --- B. Dongola Advantages: Strong seasonal winds Large open landscapes High integration potential with solar farms --- 7. Expected Investor Returns Example Scenario If an investor contributes: USD 1,000 in Energy Sukuk With an average annual return of: 18% Projected growth: Year Approximate Value 1 USD 1,180 5 USD 2,287 10 USD 5,233 genui{"math_block_widget_always_prefetch_v2":{"content":"A=P(1+r)^n"}} --- 8. Revenue Sources of the Sudanese Energy Bank Primary revenue streams include: Residential electricity sales Industrial power supply contracts Mining sector electricity supply Government infrastructure agreements Future electricity exports Carbon credit trading Grid stabilization services Energy storage operations --- 9. National Economic Impact Direct Benefits Employment Creation The project will create large-scale jobs in: Engineering Manufacturing Installation Logistics Maintenance Construction --- Industrial Localization Future industrial opportunities include: Solar panel manufacturing Electrical cable industries Steel structure fabrication Transformer manufacturing Renewable energy component assembly --- Currency and Economic Stability The project contributes to: Reducing fuel imports Lowering diesel consumption Supporting national currency stability Enhancing energy independence --- 10. Proposed Institutional Structure The following entities may operate under the umbrella of the Sudanese Energy Bank: 1. Sudanese Solar Farms Company 2. Sudanese Energy Storage Company 3. Sudanese Wind Energy Company 4. Sudanese Energy Exchange 5. Sudan Green Investment Fund --- 11. International Financing Opportunities Potential strategic partners include: Islamic Development Bank African Development Bank World Bank Global Climate Funds Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds International Renewable Energy Investors --- 12. Long-Term Vision Within 15–25 years, Sudan can potentially become: A regional renewable energy powerhouse A major exporter of clean electricity A renewable manufacturing center A leading African model for public energy ownership --- Conclusion The public subscription model of the Sudanese Energy Bank is not merely an electricity project. It represents: A national economic transformation strategy A sustainable infrastructure platform A public wealth-generation mechanism A long-term energy security solution A pathway toward industrial and financial independence By integrating public investment, renewable energy, and strategic infrastructure, Sudan can build one of the most ambitious clean energy economies in Africa and the Middle East.

*ACTION FAITH PRAYER MINISTRY WORLDWIDE* * *OPERATION PRAYER* *BULLETS/TESTIMONIES FOR ALL NATIONS* *DATE: 15/6/2026* *BY THE SENIOR PASTOR; BRO. JOSEPH OZOEMENA* *WELCOME TO OUR MONTH OF TOTAL RESTORATION.* *TOPIC:DETHRONING WITCHCRAFT MANIPULATION IN THE CHURCH PART 3* *BIBLE READING: Galatians* 3:1-3 Key Verse: “O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, that ye should not obey the truth, before whose eyes Jesus Christ hath been evidently set forth, crucified among you?” — Galatians 3:1 (KJV) 2. SIGNS OF WITCHCRAFT MANIPULATION IN THE CHURCH Witchcraft manipulation often operates subtly and can infiltrate leadership, worship, and interpersonal relationships within the Church. a) Control of people’s will (Colossians 2:18–19): When individuals seek to impose their will rather than God’s, manipulation is at work. b) Substitution of the Holy Spirit’s leading (Romans 8:14): Witchcraft replaces divine guidance with emotional or human control. c) Suppression of spiritual liberty (2 Corinthians 3:17): Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; manipulation removes freedom in worship and service. d) Promotion of fear and confusion (James 3:15–16): The fruit of witchcraft is always confusion, strife, and lack of peace. Biblical Example: Elymas the sorcerer sought to turn the governor away from faith until Paul, filled with the Spirit, rebuked and silenced him (Acts 13:6-11) .*Major crimes & security issues in Sudan – May/June 2026* The war between Sudanese Armed Forces SAF and Rapid Support Forces RSF is now in its 4th year. May/June 2026 reports show: *1. Major Crimes/Threats* - *Drone war on civilians*: RSF drone strikes hit El Obeid, North Kordofan 4-10 June, killing 23 civilians at homes, a funeral, and food trucks. SAF also used drones on Kubum, South Darfur and Hamrat El Sheikh, North Kordofan. Both sides accused of failing to distinguish military vs civilian targets. - *Mass killings & war crimes*: UN Human Rights Council accused both SAF + RSF of extrajudicial killing, large-scale attacks on civilians, torture. RSF massacre of 460+ patients/staff at Saudi Maternity Hospital, El Fasher reported. SAF airstrikes on Kabkabiya market, North Darfur killed dozens. - *Sexual violence*: UN officials called it “baric acts” echoing Darfur 20 years ago. Overwhelming evidence of rape, gang-rape, sexual slavery mainly by RSF + SAF. Women/girls walking for water/firewood in Blue Nile face harassment + abuse. - *Ethnic targeting + summary executions*: RSF waves of ethnically targeted killings with “hallmarks of genocide” in North Darfur’s al-Fashir. Civilians face summary executions, arbitrary detention, family separation. - *Looting & destruction of infrastructure*: Hospitals, schools, homes, Merowe dam/hydro plant supplying 70% of Sudan’s electricity hit by drones. 400,000 displaced after RSF attack on Zamzam IDP camp, homes/businesses set on fire. - *Famine + aid blockade*: 21 million face acute food insecurity, famine in Darfur/Kordofan. 62% of population, 29M people, lack enough food. Humanitarian aid blocked, only 17% of UN 2026 appeal funded. - *Displacement*: 14M displaced total - 9M internally, 4.4M crossed to Chad, Egypt, South Sudan. 9.5M internally displaced as of April 2026. *2. Prayer Focus for Sudan – May/June 2026* Churches + aid groups are calling for focused prayer on: 1. *Peace & ceasefire*: Pray for “end to the war and a Sudanese-owned political process”. “War must stop now and not tomorrow”. Pray SAF + RSF honor commitments not to target civilians/residential areas. 2. *Protection of civilians*: Cover women, children, elderly, IDPs, refugees. Pray against rape, sexual violence, summary executions. “Open the paths of peace” for those fleeing homes in Sudan. 3. *Humanitarian access + famine*: Pray aid reaches 30M+ needing help. For community kitchens feeding people as 42% shut down due to no funds. “Comfort and sustain your people… who face hunger and disease”. 4. *Justice & accountability*: Pray perpetrators of war crimes, massacres, sexual violence face justice. “May we be instruments of God’s justice”. 5. *Healing for the land*: Pray for unity “north and south, east and west”. For restoration of hospitals, schools, water, electricity destroyed. 6. *Strength for the Church*: Pray for Archbishop Ezekiel Kondo, local pastors, and believers supporting displaced people with limited resources. 7.Pray for the Action Faith Prayer Ministry WorldWide Families & other believers living in Sudan as a Country. 8. Pray for God's Protections for all the Action Faith Prayer Ministry WorldWide Kingdom Ambassadors world wide. *ANNOUNCEMENT* Remember this is OUR HEALING MOMENT. *Date:* 16th June 2026 *Time:* 10 AM Prompt Please come along with your faith for prayers concerning the month of June 2026. *For more enquiry, text message. Remain Blessed

@_hudsonc direct this question to your friend Al-Burhan. While criminals are being pursued in Kenya, the very same criminals are being welcomed in Port Sudan, and individuals wanted by the ICC are being protected in Merowe. Your friend is undoubtedly shielding criminals