Khartoum

Sudan’s Sovereign Council chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan said the country’s leadership will remain in Sudan and does not need a visa or permission from any foreign government, in an apparent response to the United States’ decision not to issue him a visa to attend the UN General Assembly in New York. Reuters reported that the visa decision appeared linked to Burhan’s position on a US proposal for a 90-day ceasefire, which Khartoum rejected and asked the United Nations to intervene over.

US ties Sudanese army leader's UN visa to ceasefire plan, sources say The United States is withholding a visa for Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan ahead of his scheduled UN appearance in a move that Sudanese and other sources say is linked to a US-backed ceasefire proposal that Khartoum has resisted. The ‌dispute threatens to deepen tensions between Washington and Sudan's army at a critical moment in the civil war, which the United Nations calls the world's largest humanitarian crisis. A senior Sudanese source said Burhan had postponed his trip to New York but had yet to receive official notice that the visa had been denied. "We in the Sudanese government express our deep regret because this is a violation of the UN Convention and international law," the source said. "Sudan's government affirms its stance towards peace." Sudan's UN ambassador appealed to Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to intervene, arguing in a letter that preventing Burhan from attending the General Assembly would violate the UN's obligations toward member states. U.S. officials have made Burhan's attendance contingent on his agreeing to a 90-day ceasefire proposed ⁠by U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos, according to a Sudanese diplomatic source and a Western analyst close to American and Sudanese officials. The impasse represents a nadir in US-Sudan relations since war broke out in Sudan between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, and comes as Burhan was scheduled to address the General Assembly on Thursday. Another Sudanese source told Reuters that foreign minister Mohieldin Salem would give the address instead. Sudan's army voiced reservations about the Boulos-proposed ceasefire in July. Burhan is unlikely to engage with Boulos' efforts further if the visa is not granted, the analyst and diplomatic sources said. "Burhan rejects this take-it-or-leave-it approach, any proposal is subject to suggestions and changes," the Sudanese diplomatic source said. The letter, addressed to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and signed by Sudan's UN Ambassador Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith, asked for the United Nations' "immediate intervention" with US authorities to ensure the issuance of the visa, in the letter dated September 21. "Should this situation persist, it would effectively prevent the Head of State of a Member State of the United Nations from participating in person in the work of the ‌General Assembly," ⁠read the letter. In a statement sent to Reuters, UN spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric said the secretary-general is "deeply concerned that a visa has reportedly not yet been issued to the President of the Transitional Sovereign Council of the Sudan," adding that he is engaging with the US on the issue. Burhan, the head of Sudan's army, has been the country's de facto leader since 2019, though the African Union and Western powers withdrew recognition after a 2021 coup he led with RSF head Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, against the civilian leadership. Burhan has spoken at the UN General Assembly on Sudan's behalf since the coup. The war has created what the United Nations calls the world's ⁠largest humanitarian crisis. Dagalo, known as Hemedti, has set up a rival government that has so far struggled to gain legitimacy. The United States has made efforts to mediate the conflict within a so-called "Quad" format that also includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, countries seen as having the most influence in Sudan. In a piece in US outlet Foreign Policy published on Monday, Burhan said he would refuse external directives about the war and ⁠said previous pauses in fighting had only allowed the RSF and its backers to regroup. Under the agreement for the United States to host the UN headquarters in New York, it is not supposed to deny visas, though it has denied entry to the head of the Palestinian Authority. Relations between the US and Sudan's army have already been strained in recent weeks over a US proposal to extend an ⁠existing arms embargo over Sudan's Darfur region – the RSF's stronghold – to the rest of the country, a move that Burhan's backers say would disproportionately punish the army. For his part, in a speech sending soldiers off to battle, Dagalo said "it's time for the rifles to speak." Sudan's civilian prime minister before the coup, Abdalla Hamdok, is in New York this week as part of the General Assembly, along with members of his anti-war coalition.

Finally going to the crossroads after 2 decades. I've been listening to the show for a very long time. In early 2007 I was in my early 20s, driving all across the Bay Area like many others to get to work, and every morning I had The Woody Show on. It was great. The Woody Show used to feel like hanging out with my best friends and their girl (Ravey). He was loud and stupid in the way only someone you love can be. She could cut him down, keep him honest, and still be in on the joke. Mornings felt like I had people with me in the car to laugh with. Over time I went to a listener event or two and have personally heard Menace reset in the Khartoum's bathroom in Campbell. After some time I found them again in AZ when they were being played locally. I was so happy to have my friends back in the car. Listening on the way to work and even texting in a few times. Then it happened. They split, and things slowly changed. The bits got recycled. The room got different. I kept tuning in anyway, hoping my friends would be back to normal. However, like a lot of longtime listeners, I went from enjoying it to hate-listening. I'd put it on, listen to a few bits, then Gina pops in and has to take over. I get irritated, and come back the next day hoping it would sound like before. That's a stupid way to spend a morning. Gina talks too much. She jumps in too much. She doesn't leave space for anyone else to land a thought. The old hang had a rhythm. People piled on, but it still felt like a conversation among people who knew each other. With her it feels like she is running the room. Woody and so many will defend her and say, "It's her job to talk." But how can any other member do their job of talking if she never shuts up? Morgan is the other thing I can't get past. Putting Tyler in the hot seat after the roommate mess was backhanded. He was already the easy target. She took a personal fight, put it on the air, and the table treated it like ball-busting. It wasn't. It was one-sided, and it was mean in a way the old show used to aim at itself, not at the person with the least power in the room. Woody's famous for asking what really broke the camel's back and made you leave the show. It was Gina and Morgan. They've taken all the joy out of the show for me, and the best thing I can do for myself is move on. Woody is beyond happy with his new loves of his life, and that's not going to change. So all I can do now is unfollow, stop listening, and move on. Good luck to the rest of you who still enjoy the show.

Sudan Krizinin Anatomisi: Kızıldeniz Hattında Devleşen Vekalet Savaşı Kızıldeniz ticaret koridorunun hemen kıyısında, Afrika'nın en stratejik altın havzalarının tam merkezinde cereyan eden bu hesaplaşmanın yalnızca iki generalin iktidar kavgası olduğunu düşünürsek yanılabiliriz. Bugün Hartum sokaklarından Port Sudan limanına kadar uzanan fay hattında, bölgesel başkentlerin ve küresel güç merkezlerinin doğrudan dahil olduğu çok katmanlı bir vekalet savaşı cereyan ediyor. ***Çift Kulvarlı Dengeleme (Hedging) Stratejisi*** Aşağıdaki şemada görüleceği üzere, bazı dış aktörlerin Sudan krizinde tek bir tarafa bağımlı kalmayarak ***"çift kulvarlı dengeleme"*** (hedging) stratejisi izlediği görüyoruz. Örneğin Rusya; bir yanda **uluslararası alanda tanınan hükümet (SAF)** ile Port Sudan’da askeri deniz üssü kurmaya dönük resmi diplomasiyi yürütürken, diğer yanda gölge askeri ağlar vasıtasıyla paramiliter HDK ile altın ve lojistik ilişkisini sürdürmektedir. Bu strateji, sahadaki güç dengesi ne şekilde değişirse değişsin, küresel aktörlerin Kızıldeniz ve bölgesel kaynaklar üzerindeki nüfuzunu garanti altına alma amacına dayanıyor. SUDAN (De Facto Bölünmüş Devlet ve Çatışma Sahası) │ ├── 1. ULUSLARARASI TANINAN HÜKÜMET & ORDU (SAF) [Lider: Org. Abdulfettah el-Burhan] │ ├── Bölge: Port Sudan Merkezi, Doğu ve Kuzey Eyaletleri, Kızıldeniz Kıyı Şeridi │ │ │ ├── 🛠️ Taktiksel Eklemlenen Yan Unsurlar (Özerk Komuta - Pragmatik İttifak): │ │ ├── Darfur Ortak Gücü (Eski Muhalif Yapılar: Minni Minnawi & Gibril Ibrahim) │ │ ├── Halk Direniş Har. & Gönüllüler (Al-Bara' ibn Malik vb. Yerel Milisler) │ │ └── SPLM-N (Agar Kanadı / Malik Agar) │ │ │ └── 🌐 Dış İrtibatlar ve Destek Ağları: │ ├── Askeri / SİHA Tedariki: İran (Mohajer-6 ve Ebabil SİHA'ları) │ ├── Diplomatik & Finansal Denge: Suudi Arabistan, Mısır │ └── Askeri Üs Müzakereleri: Rusya (Port Sudan 25 Yıllık Tesis Sözleşmesi) │ ├── 2. PARAMİLİTER DESTEK (HDK / RSF) [Lider: Gen. Muhammed Hamdan Dagalo - Hımidti] │ ├── Bölge: Batı Darfur / Nyala, Kordofan Hatları, Altın Madeni Sahaları │ │ │ ├── 🛠️ Taktiksel Eklemlenen Milisler ve Sınır Ötesi Unsurlar: │ │ ├── Cancavid Milis Yapılanmaları & Tamazuj Grubu │ │ └── Bölgesel / Sınır Ötesi (Çad ve Libya Sınır Boyları Paralı Askerleri) │ │ │ └── 🌐 Dış İrtibatlar ve İkmal Hatları: │ ├── Finansal & Lojistik:(BAE) (Altın Ticareti & SİHA/Zırhlı Araç Sevkiyatı) │ ├── Askeri & Saha Desteği: Rusya (Pragmatik/İkili İlişki: Savaşın başında RSF'ye yoğun destek verilirken, günümüzde Rus resmi politikası Port Sudan üssü karşılığında SAF'a yaklaşmıştır) / Gölge Askeri Ağlar (Libya Üsleri). │ └── Transit Geçiş Koridoru: Halife Hafter Güçleri (Libya) │ ├── 3(A). BAĞIMSIZ "ÜÇÜNCÜ YOL" - SPLM-N (Al-Hilu Kanadı) │ ├── Bölge: Güney Kordofan ve Mavi Nil Eyaletleri │ └── 📌 Statü: SAF ve HDK'yi tanımayan, bölgesel otonomisini savunan bağımsız │ └── 3(B). BAĞIMSIZ "ÜÇÜNCÜ YOL" - SLM (Abdulvahid el-Nur Kanadı) ├── Bölge: Darfur - Jebel Marra Sarp Dağlık Alanı └── 📌 Statü: İki askeri bloka da kapalı, bölgesel özerkliği koruyan bağımsız **📌 SAF yanındaki taktiksel müttefiklerin temel güvenilmezliği;** Kurumsal bir bağlılıktan ziyade HDK tehdidine karşı geliştirilmiş pragmatik bir *"ortak tehdit"* ittifakına dayanmasından kaynaklanıyor. Bu yapılar, askeri kadrolarını uluslararası alanda tanınan orduya devretmeyip kendi otonom komuta zincirlerini ve silahlı unsurlarını korurlar. Dolayısıyla çatışmaların sonlanması aşamasında, ordunun yürüteceği Güvenlik Sektörü Reformu (SSR) ve silahsızlanma süreçlerine direnerek merkezi otoriteye karşı yeni bir iç güvenlik riski oluşturma potansiyeli taşıyorlar.. **📌 HDK / RSF Güvenilmezlik Risk Analizi:** HDK şemsiyesi altındaki bu gruplar, merkezi bir askeri disiplinden ziyade **ganimet paylaşımı, kayıt dışı altın kaynakları ve aşiret aidiyetleri** üzerinden bir arada duruyor. Bu durum, HDK komuta kademesinin sahayı tam anlamıyla kontrol etmesini zorlaştırmakta; çatışma sonrası olası bir entegrasyon veya ateşkes sürecinde bu grupların otonom çetelere dönüşme riskini artıyor. 🌐 **ABD ve Batı Nerede Duruyor? (Denge Hesabı):** ABD ve Avrupa ülkeleri aslında sahaya doğrudan asker sokmak istemiyor. Onların bütün derdi; Kızıldeniz’deki deniz ticaret yolunun güvenliğini korumak ve krizin daha da yayılmasını engellemek. Bir yandan insani diplomasi, ateşkes çağrıları ve BM yaptırımlarıyla süreci frenlemeye çalışıyorlar. Diğer yandan da Rusya ve İran’ın Kızıldeniz kıyısında kalıcı askeri üs kurmasını önlemek için yaptırım kozunu ve donanma gözetimini bir caydırıcı olarak sahada tutuyorlar. *👉 Sudan'da bölgesel rekabet, küresel jeopolitik hamleler ve yerel dinamiklerin kesiştiği son derece karmaşık ve çok katmanlı bir süreç devam ediyor.* *Derin ve daha kapsamlı analizler için* ***substack policystrategies*** *takip etmenizi öneririz.* \--- ***English Translate*** # Anatomy of the Sudan Crisis: A Looming Proxy War Along the Red Sea Corridor Unfolding on the immediate littoral of the Red Sea trade corridor and at the epicenter of Africa’s most strategic gold basins, it would be a critical miscalculation to view this showdown as merely a power struggle between two rival generals. Today, across a fault line stretching from the streets of Khartoum to the docks of Port Sudan, a multi-layered proxy war is underway—one in which regional capitals and global power centers are directly engaged. ***Dual-Track Hedging Strategy*** As illustrated in the operational layout below, several external actors have avoided unilateral alignment, instead adopting a deliberate "dual-track hedging" strategy. Russia provides a clear case in point: while pursuing formal diplomacy with the internationally recognized government (Sudanese Armed Forces - SAF) to secure a naval base at Port Sudan, it simultaneously leverages shadow military networks to maintain transactional gold and logistical ties with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This maneuver is engineered to insulate external leverage over the Red Sea littoral and regional extraction corridors, regardless of how the balance of power shifts on the ground. SUDAN (De Facto Partitioned State & Theater of Kinetic Conflict) │ ├── 1. INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT & ARMED FORCES (SAF) [Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan] │ ├── Territorial Footprint: Port Sudan Administrative Hub, Eastern & Northern States, Red Sea Littoral │ │ │ ├── 🛠️ Tactically Integrated Auxiliaries (Autonomous Command Chains — Pragmatic Alignment): │ │ ├── Joint Protection Force of Darfur (Signatory Rebel Blocs: Minni Minnawi & Gibril Ibrahim) │ │ ├── Popular Resistance Movements & Irregulars (Al-Bara' ibn Malik Battalion & localized militias) │ │ └── SPLM-N (Agar Faction / Malik Agar) │ │ │ └── 🌐 External Vectors & Procurement Architecture: │ ├── Kinetic Assets / UCAV Logistics: Iran (Mohajer-6 and Ababil Combat Drone Systems) │ ├── Diplomatic Leverage & Financial Hedging: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Arab Republic of Egypt │ └── Sovereign Basing Negotiations: Russian Federation (25-Year Naval Logistics Facility Accord) │ ├── 2. PARAMILITARY OPPOSITION (RSF / Rapid Support Forces) [Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo — "Hemedti"] │ ├── Territorial Footprint: West Darfur / Strategic Nyala Axis, Kordofan Transit Corridors, Gold-Mining Basins │ │ │ ├── 🛠️ Integrated Irregulars & Transnational Enablers: │ │ ├── Janjaweed Remnants & Third Front (Tamazuj Formations) │ │ └── Cross-Border Asymmetric Assets (Mercenary Corridors along Chadian & Libyan Frontiers) │ │ │ └── 🌐 External Facilitation & Strategic Supply Lines: │ ├── Financial Clearing & Material Conduit: United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Illicit Gold Flows, UCAVs, Armored Vehicle Procurement) │ ├── Military & Operational Support: Russia (Pragmatic/Dual-Track Alignment: While providing heavy initial support to the RSF at the onset of hostilities, contemporary Russian state policy has pivoted toward the SAF in pursuit of a naval logistics facility in Port Sudan) / Shadow Military Networks (Staging Hubs in Libya). │ └── Strategic Transit Corridor: Libyan National Army (LNA — Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar) │ ├── 3(A). ARMED NON-ALIGNMENT / THE "THIRD PATH" — SPLM-N (Al-Hilu Faction) │ ├── Operational Sector: Southern Kordofan and Strategic Pockets of Blue Nile State │ └── 📌 Strategic Posture: Rejecting both SAF and RSF hegemony; entrenched territorial defense and de facto sub-state sovereignty │ └── 3(B). ARMED NON-ALIGNMENT / THE "THIRD PATH" — SLM/A (Abdul Wahid al-Nur Faction) ├── Operational Sector: Darfur — Jebel Marra Mountainous Redoubt └── 📌 Strategic Posture: Insulated defense-in-depth; fully decoupled from both warring factions, maintaining strict local territorial autonomy 📌 **Tactical Alignment and the Structural Vulnerability of SAF Allies:** The fundamental volatility of the SAF-aligned tactical coalition stems from its nature: it is not bound by institutional allegiance, but rather by a pragmatic "common threat" consensus against the RSF. Crucially, these allied factions have refused to integrate their rank-and-file into the regular armed forces, retaining autonomous chains of command and independent armed cadres. Consequently, in any post-conflict transition, they are poised to resist army-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) protocols—introducing a critical internal security liability for the central authority. **📌 RSF Structural Fragility and Operational Risk:** Formations operating under the RSF umbrella are bound less by centralized military doctrine than by spoils-sharing arrangements, illicit gold flows, and transactional tribal allegiances. This decentralized architecture compromises the operational control of the RSF high command, significantly elevating the risk that these elements fracture into autonomous warlords and marauding syndicates during any negotiated settlement or ceasefire implementation. **🌐 Where Do the US and the West Stand? (The Strategic Balancing Act):** The United States and European powers remain fundamentally averse to deploying boots on the ground. Their primary strategic imperatives center on securing freedom of navigation along the vital Red Sea maritime corridor and containing regional contagion. To this end, they deploy a dual-track approach: mitigating kinetic escalation through humanitarian diplomacy, multilateral ceasefire initiatives, and UN sanctions frameworks, while leveraging the threat of targeted secondary sanctions and forward naval posture to deter Russia and Iran from establishing a permanent military foothold along the Red Sea littoral. *👉 Sudan remains locked in a high-stakes, multi-vectored conflict where regional rivalries, global grand strategy, and localized kinetic dynamics collide.* *For in-depth, comprehensive strategic assessments, subscribe to* ***policystrategies on Substack.*** ***wiki:*** [sudan](https://www.reddit.com/r/policystrategies/wiki/regions/sudan) | [substack\_en](https://policystrategies.substack.com) | [substack\_tr](https://policystrategiestr.substack.com)

What is the average cost of living in Sudan Khartoum I wanted to send money to family. From USA. What is a good amount for a person no kids lives at parents house. Just to help them get by. Not trying to feed the village just help them. They told me the cost of lamb is 700,000 pounds. In Cairo I can buy a lamb for like 12,000 pounds. Unfortunately this person doesn’t understand money. Please help me.

Geopolitical and military breakdown of the ongoing civil war in Sudan # 1. Factions & Zones of Control (Map Colors) * **Yellow Hatched / Yellow Areas:** Controlled by **Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF / Al-Burhan)**. * *Foreign Backers:* Egypt, Qatar (Tacit support: Russia, Turkey). * *Estimated Strength:* 150,000 – 300,000 troops. * **Pink / Light Red Areas:** Controlled by **Rapid Support Forces (RSF / Hemetti)**. * *Foreign Backers:* UAE, Ethiopia, Russia (Africa Corps). * *Estimated Strength:* 100,000 troops. * **Green Area:** Controlled by **Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N)**. * **Blue Area:** Controlled by **Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)**. * **Red Explosion Stars:** **Disputed or active battlegrounds** (e.g., Khartoum, El Fasher, Babanusa). * **Red / Grey Arrows:** Foreign aid routes and mercenary/force deployments (e.g., Africa Corps, UAE proxy supply lines). # 2. Humanitarian Crisis & Conflict Dynamics * **Blue Dots:** Land conflict zones between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers. * **Pink/Purple Diagonal Hatched Lines:** Regions with active separatist movements or inclinations. * **Grey Dotted Areas:** Neighboring conflict zones directly affected by instability (e.g., Tigray, CAR border). * **Large Orange Arrows (Refugee Influx since early 2024):** * **South Sudan:** \~590,000 * **Chad:** \~560,000 * **Egypt:** \~450,000 * **Ethiopia & Eritrea:** \~50,000 each * **Central African Republic:** \~29,000 * **Displacement Totals:** * **Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):** 7 million * **Refugees Abroad:** 1.9 million * **Total Displaced:** 8.9 million * **UN Missions:** * **UNISFA (Abyei):** 3,500 personnel * **UNAMID (Darfur):** 8,900 personnel # 3. Natural Resources & Infrastructure * **Yellow Stripe Pattern:** **Gold deposits** (Sudan's top export revenue source). * **Purple Diamonds:** **Oil fields**. * **Purple Solid Line:** Main **Oil Pipeline** connecting interior fields and South Sudan to Port Sudan for export. # 4. Regional Socio-Economic Context (Bottom Charts) * **Urbanization Rate:** Egypt (42.9%), Sudan (35.6%), Chad (23.8%), Ethiopia (22.2%), South Sudan (20.5%). * **GDP per Capita ($ USD, 2022):** Egypt ($15,000), Sudan ($4,215), Ethiopia ($2,800), Chad ($1,660), South Sudan ($1,500). * **Primary School Enrollment Rate (2017):** Egypt (97.4%), Ethiopia (85.4%), Chad (78.8%), Sudan (55.4%), South Sudan (32.1%).