Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)

The Israeli regime has been reportedly providing covert intelligence and military assistance to the Sudanese army’s rivaling UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. Africa Intelligence reported that RSF leadership has had secret high-level military contact with the Israelis since before the start of the war in Sudan. Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the UAE-backed RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known by his nom de guerre Hemedti, have been in a deadly power struggle since 2023. Hemedti, who was Burhan’s former deputy, secretly visited Tel Aviv in May 2025 and February 2026 for meetings with the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Africa Division and Israeli officers affiliated with spy agencies, according to the Africa Intelligence report. During the visits to Israel, Hemedti’s two brothers, Abdul Rahim and Algoney, accompanied him. Abdul Rahim is the RSF’s second-in-command. Earlier reports about the links between the RSF leadership and the Israelis emerged in 2022. Israeli newspaper Haaretz and Dutch investigative news outlet Lighthouse reported that a jet delivered sophisticated EU-made phone-surveillance and hacking equipment to the RSF. The jet was linked to former Israeli spy Tal Dilian, founder of the Cyprus-based Intellexa network.

No Peace Under Fire: Enforcing a Ceasefire is the Only Path to Saving Sudan By Yahya Abnaouf The eyes of the exhausted Sudanese people turn toward the halls of the international community, coinciding with ongoing diplomatic efforts and visits from United Nations delegations and international fact-finding mechanisms aimed at advancing the peace process. However, these efforts—despite their noble importance—continue to clash with the bitter reality citizens face daily: there can be no talk of peace or negotiations while the smoke of bombardment rises, and guns continue to claim the lives of our most valuable asset—the Sudanese people. A Firm Message to the International Community: Beware the Trap of Evasion We address this humanitarian and political appeal to the United Nations, as well as international and regional powers, to warn against repeating failed scenarios. The international community must fully grasp the true nature of the warring factions; both Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) have repeatedly demonstrated their mastery of delay tactics and evasive strategies. Engaging in endless, open-ended negotiation rounds without firm enforcement on the ground entices the conflicting parties to: Exploit negotiations to alter the military landscape: Utilizing cosmetic truces and closed-door sessions to resupply and adjust military tactics at the expense of civilian lives. Buy time to impose a new status quo: Bypassing the aspirations of the people by relying on their exhaustion, effectively turning the humanitarian catastrophe into a bargaining chip. Therefore, approaching both parties with good intentions or diplomatic leniency amounts to indirect participation in prolonging the suffering of the Sudanese people. First: Enforcing a Ceasefire Through Pressure and Resolve Setting priorities to exit this catastrophe requires acknowledging a single truth: enforcing an immediate ceasefire by all available means, even if it requires the use of coercive international leverage and strict sanctions. Peace cannot be piecemeal, nor can temporary, superficial truces be accepted. An immediate and comprehensive cessation of hostilities is a fundamental prerequisite to: Protect civilian lives: Opening safe corridors and ensuring the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid to all parts of Sudan. Close the door on evasion: Forcing the generals of this war to comply with international and national willpower instead of wasting time. Second: The Structural Roadmap (The Five Pillars) Once the sound of gunfire is silenced, the transition to building political stability must begin immediately through five key steps to ensure Sudan does not slip back into war: A permanent and detailed end to the war: Transitioning from temporary truces to strict, ground-level international and regional monitoring mechanisms to safeguard civilians. Expanding civilian coordination frameworks: Broadening spaces for dialogue among political, civilian, and independent forces to build a national front that reflects the true priorities of the public. A nationally-owned peace process: Crafting an independent Sudanese-Sudanese political track entirely free from the dominance of the armed factions and external influence. Active participation of grassroots forces: Including women, youth, internally displaced persons, refugees, trade unions, and local committees in decision-making to ensure the future is not hijacked. Establishing a civilian democratic transition: Implementing clear transitional arrangements to rebuild Sudanese state institutions on the basis of equal citizenship and the rule of law. Third: Addressing the Historical Root Causes of the Crisis The cessation of hostilities does not mean the end of the Sudanese crisis; rather, it marks the beginning of addressing long-ignored issues that served as the real fuel for this conflict: Marginalization and social justice: Addressing the severe developmental and social disparities between the regions and the center, alongside ensuring the fair distribution of wealth and opportunities. Identity and the constitution: Drafting a permanent social contract and constitution that embraces Sudan’s cultural and ethnic diversity without exclusion. Accountability and the rule of law: Seeking justice for victims and holding accountable anyone who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity against the Sudanese people. There is no reconciliation without justice, and no stability without accountability. Conclusion and a Final Appeal The Sudanese people can no longer endure further political maneuvering. Our appeal to the UN delegation and international envoys is clear and direct: do not fall into the trap of Burhan and Hemedti's delay tactics. Make the strict enforcement of an immediate halt to bombardment—and negotiating under real pressure—the first and only item on your urgent agenda. True peace is not reduced to redistributing power among warlords; it begins with protecting human lives and ends with a civilian state that encompasses all under the rule of law Entering negotiations without a prior ceasefire reflects genuine fears of cementing the status quo or legitimizing a parallel reality that could ultimately lead to fragmentation and the division of the country. In this scenario, dialogue becomes piecemeal among scattered parts of the Sudanese nation, rather than addressing the crisis holistically within a comprehensive national framework. On the other hand, some analysts and mediators argue that political processes and ceasefires often run on parallel tracks, where negotiations serve as a tool to achieve a truce and establish mechanisms for its monitoring. They contend that the absence of any negotiation channel keeps the door firmly shut against any peaceful resolution. However, the primary challenge remains: how to ensure that any partial political or security arrangements do not become steps that solidify the fact accompli and deepen the crisis rather than resolve it. How do you view the optimal framework for international and domestic pressure to enforce a ceasefire as a prerequisite for any future political process?

Schizo Armchair General Presents: East/Horn of Africa- The Geopolitical Tinderbox no one is talking about 🇸🇴🇪🇹🇪🇷🇸🇸🇸🇩🇪🇬 After my last Schizo Armchair General post about the Iran War, I got a lot of interesting feedback and may make this a recurring series for my fellow armchair generals on this subreddit. I am not an expert on geopolitical and military matters, just an autistic schizo who obsesses over them. Today I want to talk about the major flashpoints occurring in East Africa and the Horn of Africa that is buried in the news cycle. This will be a long read, so grab a snack. In the past decade, these regions have seen an explosion in violence related to a myriad of factors be it water in the age of the climate crisis, access to mining, land rights, and various other disputes to which some call this region a “conflict belt.” Worryingly, many players and factions in this neighborhood have competing and overlapping interests spurred on by greater outside powers on the global stage. This complex web of alliances and rivalries reminds me of Europe before World War I with wide differences. While a major war in this region isn’t inevitable, there are many factors that make a greater conflict likely to occur. **Somalia** **and Somaliland** 🇸🇴 For over forty years, Somalia has become a failed state due to increased meddling by outside powers and poor governance from past leaders such as General Siad Barre. It’s a tragic shame as years ago Somalia was a developing country, but it’s a victim of geography as it’s situated at the mouth of the Red Sea, a key shipping lane. Internally, it occasionally struggles to put down insurgencies by Islamist groups such as Al-Shabaab and other militant groups. Because Somalia can hardly keep control of its own territory, it makes it vulnerable to be carved up piecemeal by outside powers. In the past couple of years, the breakaway region of Somaliland has received recognition from countries such as Ethiopia, who want access to the sea (more on that in a bit), and Israel, who want a key launching pad for attacks on Ansar Allah in Yemen. Somalia is furious at both of these developments, but there isn’t much they can do about it as of now, given that they had no choice but to allow for Türkiye’s mediation efforts with Ethiopia. Somalia has simultaneously increased military and economic ties with Türkiye and Egypt, the latter of whom is Ethiopia’s chief regional rival (more on THAT in a bit also). **Ethiopia VS. Eritrea** 🇪🇹🇪🇷 For a long time, the land of what is now Eritrea was part of Ethiopia, but Eritreans rebelled against Addis Ababa’s rule and engaged in an armed rebellion in September 1961 which ended in May 1991 with Eritrean independence. Both nations had periodic conflicts along their shared borders but it was none other than Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who helped negotiate peace with Eritrea for which he won a Nobel Peace Prize (hilariously ironic considering the path he’s gone down). The existential problem for Ethiopia is that it is now the most populous landlocked country in the world and the second largest country by population in Africa behind Nigeria. A growing population with increasing energy needs and costs is an unsustainable status quo for Ethiopia yet these ambitions for Ethiopia, and to an extent Abiy Ahmed himself, have put it at odds with other regional powers. After Abiy won the Nobel Peace Prize, the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia launched an armed insurgency against the Ethiopian state led by the TPLF. Depending on who you ask, Tigrayans rebelled either because of lack of representation in government or ethnic disputes. In response, Ethiopia, with an alliance of Eritrea and local groups like the Oromos and the Amhara’s Fano group, was able to beat back the TPLF’s advances and contained it until a peace deal was signed in 2022 at an enormous humanitarian cost of an estimated 600,000 lives. The Tigray War quietly slipped under the radar as Ethiopia controlled what information got out. Both sides committed horrific war crimes and what little peace remains hasn’t soothed the ethnic and tribal divisions. Ethiopia’s once allies against the TPLF are now switching sides as Abiy’s power moves have placed them at odds. The Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups have their own grievances against Addis Ababa and Eritrea has grown uneasy at Abiy’s plan to gain access to the sea at the expense of Eritrean land. In response, Eritrea has grown close to none other than Egypt for a strong military ally. It’s already too messy and I haven’t even talked about the apocalyptic horror show unfolding next door. **Sudan’s Civil War and the South Sudanese Descent** 🇸🇩🇸🇸 I don’t even know where to begin with this one. Sudan has unfortunately been too familiar with conflict ever since independence from British/Egyptian colonial rule in the late fifties. Like many post-colonial countries, there has been a lot of internal strife due to land and ethnic disputes stemming from artificially-drawn borders. In what is now Sudan, you have majority Muslim Arabs and Arab-speaking ethnic groups. In South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan in 2011, you have majority black populations who are Christian or practice local indigenous faiths and traditions. When both Sudan and South Sudan were one country, there were decades of war between the ruling Islamic military regime in Khartoum against southern rebels such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The south was also home to Sudan’s biggest oil wells from where the profits were never given back to the South Sudanese. South Sudan gained independence after decades of struggle (and possibly George Clooney, I shit you not), but decades of intentional underdevelopment by Khartoum set South Sudan back causing civil war, and eventually a compounding refugee crisis from the north. Sudan’s ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is the current greatest humanitarian catastrophe in the world today and most don’t even know about it. Over ten million people have fled the country, millions of people have lost access to food, water, and medicine, and an untold number of people, possibly in the tens or hundreds of thousands have been killed. A gruesome number of women and children have suffered untold sexual violence, mostly at the hands of the RSF. Where most conflicts in Sudan’s modern history have been in the peripheries of the south and the western Darfur region, the ongoing civil war came home to the capital Khartoum and the larger cities such as Omdurman. The RSF, led by the psychopathic warlord Mohamad Hamdan Dagolo (Hemedti), are a criminal enterprise and a private army of sadistic, evil fucking bastards. They grew out of the Janjaweed (Devils on horseback) militia, created by former dictator Omar al-Bashir to genocide the Darfur peoples who engaged in rebellion against the state in 2003. Soon the Janjaweed rebranded and served powers like the United Arab Emirates who want Sudanese gold and cannon fodder for their wars such as in Yemen. The RSF now has a near-monopoly on Sudan’s gold mines thanks to strong UAE backing. The RSF in conjunction with the Sudanese military, overthrew Omar al-Bashir after a popular uprising in 2019, but turned on each other after failures to implement a power-sharing agreement. The RSF are committing the same atrocities today through ISIS-style genocidal violence against non-Arabs throughout Sudan. For example, when the RSF took the city of Al-Fasher, they killed so many people that you could see pools of blood from space. During the ongoing civil war, the RSF with UAE backing, have set up a complex logistical network in East Africa from Libya, Chad, down and across the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has allegedly given access to RSF forces for training and shelter to undermine key SAF ally Egypt. The RSF reportedly formed an alliance with southern rebel group SPLM-North and has ties to South Sudan, traditional enemies of Khartoum. South Sudan meanwhile has its own power struggle between President Salva Kiir (former SPLM commander) and former vice president Riek Machar, each of whom lead their own armed factions. Unsurprisingly, conflict from the north has potential to overlap into the south and oil fields determine the course of a potential war. Despite being cordial, Salva Kiir allegedly has ties to anti-Khartoum forces in the north and allows RSF supply routes on South Sudanese soil; South Sudanese citizens have even fought in the RSF as mercenaries. In its corner, the SAF has close ties with Egypt as much of their officers were trained in Egyptian military academies. Allegedly, the SAF have backers in both Türkiye and Iran, who have provided weapons like munitions and drones. The Sudanese civil war is not just another African conflict, but a proxy war driven primarily by the UAE’s lust for gold they can sell in their tacky shopping centers in Dubai. As of now, neither side can gain an advantage in the war and a realistic possibility is that Sudan will fragment into separate states again unless outside powers gain greater momentum in the war. **The Egypt Equation** 🇪🇬 Out of all the outside players, it’s Egypt that has much skin in the game of power competitions occurring within these regions and it’s all because of the Nile River. Their regional adversary, Ethiopia, built what is called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) which has the output to provide electricity for millions of its people. The problem is that they built it in parts of the Nile, which travels upwards to Egypt and can possibly reduce water flow which is necessary for Egypt’s livelihood and survival, unacceptable for them especially now during Climate Change. This has been a thorn in Egypt’s side and negotiations have broken down between both countries. No war is on the horizon, but Ethiopia has dug its heels in while Egypt, wielding the largest military in the Arab world, has made moves to ally itself with Eritrea and Somalia. Due to economic constraints, Egypt cannot embroil itself in a protracted war, so its influence over regional events have remained in the shadows. I’ve heard whispers that Ethiopia accused Egypt of backing the TPLF during the Tigray War, but no hard evidence of this exists. In Sudan, Egypt provides diplomatic (and possibly material) support to the SAF in their war against Ethiopian allies in the RSF. Ethiopia’s internal instability benefits Egypt so Ethiopia must play its own hand accordingly. To summarize, everything’s fucked, but not to the point where the entire region will ignite all at once. Egypt’s economy is in poor shape and cannot afford a protracted war that will damage its society further especially with Ansar Allah’s Red Sea blockade and the Iran War. Ethiopia’s internal ethnic divisions continue to stall Abiy Ahmed’s dreams to gain permanent access to the Red Sea. Until Ethiopia can stabilize its own internal divisions, there’s no way a single Ethiopian soldier will set foot in Eritrea. Yet, neither Ethiopia nor Egypt can afford the current status quo. Ethiopia cannot afford to be landlocked and Egypt cannot afford reduced water into the Nile because of Ethiopia’s dam projects during the age of the Climate Crisis. Sudan and its people will tragically continue to suffer through savage civil war no thanks to the UAE and its neocolonial ambitions to secure gold. If you’ve made it this far, I salute you fellow armchair generals for your patience as you’ve read through my schizophrenic ramblings. Carry on.🫡 **Sources** [https://cja.org/where-we-work/somalia/](https://cja.org/where-we-work/somalia/) [https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tuerkiye-expands-security-footprint-in-somalia-with-anti-piracy-operation-5580048](https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tuerkiye-expands-security-footprint-in-somalia-with-anti-piracy-operation-5580048) [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/ethiopia-and-eritrea-are-on-the-brink-of-war-again/](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/ethiopia-and-eritrea-are-on-the-brink-of-war-again/) [https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/b210-ethiopia-eritrea-and-tigray-powder-keg-horn-africa](https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/b210-ethiopia-eritrea-and-tigray-powder-keg-horn-africa) [https://hornreview.org/2026/08/04/nethiopias-tigray-the-return-of-war-by-other-means/](https://hornreview.org/2026/08/04/nethiopias-tigray-the-return-of-war-by-other-means/) [https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/148414/Egypt-Eritrea-reject-non-littoral-states-](https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/148414/Egypt-Eritrea-reject-non-littoral-states-) [https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-sudan-s-war-is-destroying-its-development-future](https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-sudan-s-war-is-destroying-its-development-future) [https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/south-sudan/](https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/south-sudan/) [https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/sakane\_16.html](https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/sakane_16.html) [https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/9/3/foreign-fighters-and-external-support-fuel-sudans-war-un-backed-probe](https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/9/3/foreign-fighters-and-external-support-fuel-sudans-war-un-backed-probe) [https://acleddata.com/report/blue-nile-peripheral-front-central-battleground-sudan-conflict](https://acleddata.com/report/blue-nile-peripheral-front-central-battleground-sudan-conflict) [https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/south-sudan-could-be-dragged-into-war-next-door/](https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/south-sudan-could-be-dragged-into-war-next-door/) [https://responsiblestatecraft.org/egypt-ethiopia-tensions/](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/egypt-ethiopia-tensions/) [https://hornreview.org/2026/05/08/egypts-geometry-of-pressure-and-the-multi-front-containment-strategy-sudan-tigray-and-the-logic-of-shadow-pressure/](https://hornreview.org/2026/05/08/egypts-geometry-of-pressure-and-the-multi-front-containment-strategy-sudan-tigray-and-the-logic-of-shadow-pressure/)

The reported meeting between Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and Israeli leadership—including the Prime Minister and the Chief of National Security—on August 31, 2026, represents a significant shift in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa and the ongoing Sudanese conflict. The Quest for International Legitimacy For Hemedti, a formal meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister is a major diplomatic victory. Since the outbreak of the war against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in April 2023, Hemedti has sought to transition from being viewed as a "militia leader" to a legitimate statesman. By engaging with Israel—a key U.S. ally and a major power in the Middle East—he is signaling to the international community that the RSF is a viable governing entity in Sudan. Military and Intelligence Calibration The discussion regarding the Israeli army training the RSF is the most controversial and impactful aspect of this visit. Technological Edge: The RSF has previously been linked to the use of Israeli-made surveillance technology (such as the Predator spyware). Formalizing a training relationship suggests a shift toward sophisticated urban warfare, intelligence gathering, and drone operations. Counter-Terrorism Narrative: Hemedti likely framed this cooperation under the guise of counter-terrorism and securing the Red Sea, areas where Israel has high strategic interests. By positioning the RSF as the "protector" against radical elements, he aligns himself with Israeli security doctrines. The "Race for Favor" between SAF and RSF Historically, both the SAF (led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan) and the RSF have competed for Israel’s backing. Al-Burhan met with Israeli leadership in Uganda in 2020 to kickstart normalization. However, Israel’s intelligence services (Mossad) have reportedly maintained closer ties with Hemedti, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was historically closer to the SAF. This visit suggests that Israel may be leaning toward the RSF. seeing them as a more effective partner for security cooperation or perhaps seeing Hemedti as the more likely victor in the current civil struggle. Strategic Implications for the Abraham Accords Sudan’s accession to the Abraham Accords has been stalled by the internal war. Hemedti’s speech regarding a "strong relationship" rather than just "normalization" suggests he wants to move beyond symbolic gestures to a functional strategic alliance. For Israel, a stable Sudanese partner ensures a "bridge" to sub-Saharan Africa and helps secure the Red Sea corridor from Iranian or Houthi-adjacent influences. Risks and Regional Backlash This visit carries substantial risks: Domestic Opposition:A large portion of the Sudanese population and the remaining political blocs (like the FFC) remain wary of normalization, especially when conducted by a military faction during a civil war. Regional Friction: Traditional RSF rivals and SAF allies (like Egypt) may view Hemedti’s deepening ties with Israel with suspicion, potentially escalating the proxy nature of the Sudanese conflict. Human Rights Concerns.The RSF has been accused by international bodies of war crimes and ethnic cleansing (particularly in Darfur). Direct military training from Israel could lead to significant international pushback against the Israeli government for aiding a group with such a record. Hemedti’s visit to Israel is a calculated move to outflank the SAF diplomatically and gain a technological military advantage. For Israel, it is a high-stakes gamble on the future of Sudanese power, prioritizing immediate security and intelligence cooperation over the uncertain stability of a formal democratic transition.

Based on the report by international and United Nation and the current geopolitical situation in August 2026, the potential withdrawal of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the Saudi-led coalition represents a significant shift in both the Sudanese civil war and the security architecture of the Arabian Peninsula. Diplomatic Breakdown: The End of a Strategic Partnership For nearly a decade, the RSF (and its predecessor units) acted as a primary ground force for Saudi Arabia in its conflict with Houthi rebels in Yemen. This arrangement provided the RSF with: Funding: Direct payments that helped build Hemedti’s economic empire. Combat Experience: Training and equipment that made them more formidable than the regular Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in urban warfare. Legitimacy: A degree of international cover as a regional security partner. The reported public criticism from Riyadh at the United Nations suggests that the "neutral mediator" role Saudi Arabia attempted to play (via the Jeddah talks) has reached a breaking point. Riyadh’s shift likely stems from mounting international pressure regarding RSF atrocities in Darfur and Khartoum, or a calculation that the RSF is no longer a reliable partner for long-term regional stability. Impact on the Sudanese Civil War If thousands of battle-hardened RSF fighters are repatriated from the Yemeni border, the internal balance of power in Sudan could shift: Reinforcements: These troops are among the most disciplined and experienced in the RSF. Their return would likely be directed toward stalled fronts, such as the siege of El Fasher or the push toward eastern Sudan. Resource Strain: While the return of troops adds manpower, it also places a massive financial burden on the RSF. Without Saudi payrolls, Hemedti will have to fund these units through depleted domestic resources or alternative foreign backers. Redefining Saudi-Sudanese Relations The RSF’s move to "vacate forward positions" and regroup in bases indicates an immediate cooling of military cooperation. Saudi Border Security: A sudden withdrawal of Sudanese ground troops leaves a vacuum on the Saudi-Yemen border. Saudi Arabia may be forced to redeploy its own National Guard or increase its reliance on costly automated surveillance and mercenary alternatives. Political Realignment: By distancing itself from the RSF at the UN, Riyadh may be signaling a pivot toward supporting the SAF (Sudanese Army) or pushing for a more aggressive international intervention/sanctions regime against RSF leadership. The Role of Darfur24 and Information Warfare Darfur24 has been a consistent source of local intelligence during the conflict. The fact that RSF units are "awaiting instructions" suggests that this is not yet a total withdrawal but a high-stakes diplomatic gambit by Hemedti. He may be using the threat of a border vacuum to pressure Riyadh into softening its stance at the UN or to extract better terms in ongoing negotiations. The withdrawal marks the unraveling of a "mercenary diplomacy"that has defined the RSF’s rise. For Sudan, it means more specialized domestic combatants and potentially more bloodshed. For Saudi Arabia, it signifies a difficult realization that their former tactical allies in Sudan have become a strategic liability on the global stage.

#Sovereign_Council "Sudan Accuses Ethiopia of Direct Involvement and Supporting RSF Attacks" The Transitional Sovereign Council of Sudan accused Ethiopia of direct involvement in the ongoing conflict by allowing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia to stage attacks into Blue Nile State from a military base in Assosa. The accusation coincides with RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo's ("Hemedti") visit to Addis Ababa, amid reports confirming ongoing military and logistical operations hosted there. Presidential Advisor Amjad Fareed stated that satellite imagery and independent analysis provide documented proof of Ethiopian territory being used as a launchpad for aggression. The Sovereign Council emphasized that facilitating militia movements constitutes a direct violation of good-neighborly principles and international laws governing relations between sovereign states. #ALNilein_News