Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)

High-level interaction between Mohamed Hamdan Daqlo (known as Hemedti) and the UN Special Envoy, Pekka Haavisto Analyzing this from a political and strategic perspective reveals several key layers regarding the current conflict in Sudan between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The Battle for Political Legitimacy The most striking element is the terminology used. Referring to Hemedti as the "President of the Presidential Council" is a significant political statement. The Context. Historically, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council. Hemedti was his deputy until the conflict began and Burhan officially removed him. The Strategy By adopting this title, the RSF is moving beyond being a "rebel militia" to claiming the status of a legitimate government. This is an attempt to achieve parity with the SAF on the international stage, signaling to the UN and regional powers that Hemedti views himself as the rightful leader of the Sudanese state. Strategic Focus: El Obeid (The "White City") The mention of El Obeid (the capital of North Kordofan) as a central topic is critical. Military Importance: El Obeid is a strategic crossroads connecting Khartoum to Darfur and the south. It has been a site of intense fighting and a prolonged siege. Civilian Impact:. By discussing El Obeid with a UN envoy, the RSF is attempting to control the narrative regarding the humanitarian crisis there. They are positioning themselves as protectors of the city’s residents rather than the force besieging them. Humanitarian Rhetoric as Diplomacy Hemedti’s emphasis on the Geneva Agreements and International Humanitarian Law. serves a clear diplomatic purpose: Counter-Accusations. The RSF has faced widespread international condemnation for atrocities, particularly in Darfur and Khartoum. This statement is a formal attempt to "sanitize" their image by explicitly committing to safe passages and civilian protection. Pressure on the UN: By promising "full cooperation" and "facilities" for aid, the RSF is positioning itself as the more cooperative partner for international NGOs, indirectly painting the SAF-led government in Port Sudan as an obstacle to aid delivery. Framing the Enemy: The "Muslim Brotherhood" Narrative. The text uses specific ideological language, accusing "Muslim Brotherhood terrorist and mercenary militias"of using civilians as human shields. Political Branding:. The RSF consistently frames the SAF not as a national army, but as a tool of the "Kezan" (the Islamist remnants of the Omar al-Bashir era). International Appeal: This framing is designed to gain sympathy from regional powers (like the UAE or secular-leaning neighbors) and Western nations who are wary of Islamist influence in the Horn of Africa. It attempts to reframe the civil war as a fight against "terrorism" rather than a power struggle between two generals. The Role of the UN Envoy The participation of Pekka Haavisto. (and by extension the UN) signifies that despite the legal ambiguities of Hemedti's status, the international community finds it "practically necessary" to engage with him. The UN’s focus on "intensifying efforts to alleviate suffering" shows that their priority remains humanitarian access. For the UN, these calls are less about recognizing Hemedti’s titles and more about securing "safe passages" mentioned in the text. Strategic Goals This communication is likely intended to achieve three things.Normalization. To make Hemedti’s Presidency" a accepted fact through repeated usage in official-sounding readouts. Deflection. To pivot the conversation away from RSF-led human rights abuses toward SAF-led "terrorist" actions. Governance. To demonstrate that the RSF is capable of high-level diplomacy and "state-like" behavior, such as upholding international treaties. The text reflects a sophisticated PR effort by the RSF to transition from a military faction to a governing body, utilizing the humanitarian crisis in North Kordofan as a platform to assert their legitimacy to the United Nations.

@Apollo_Hak Looks like a Hemedti /Yasser Al Atta hybrid

of urgent aid and medical care more accessible. Efforts would be on neutralizing, among those targeted, RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and SPLM-N leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and diminishing logistical capabilities…

Burhan and Hemedti were indeed partners before April 2023, and the conflict initially emerged from a power struggle within Sudan’s post-coup order. However, reducing the war in 2026 to a personal rivalry between two generals overlooks the profound transformation that has occurred on the ground. What began as an elite power contest has gradually evolved into a struggle over state authority, territorial control, and the future cohesion of Sudan itself. So in my view, the origins of the conflict remain important, but they no longer fully explain its current dynamics

@kaan_devecioglu Problem is all through April 15, 2023 Burhan & Hemedti were allies (they together staged the October 25,2021 coup) hence this conflict continues to be seen as a war between two generals despite all these years

@chadian_Ga I'm Bangladeshi and Hemedti was holding the position of deputy under Burhan when the former did Khurooj against the latter RSF are Khawarij and should be subject to the treatment they were in the Hadith