The Red Sea Question: Ethiopia’s Historical Access, the New Horn Rivalry, and the Struggle Over Regional Order The politics of the Horn of Africa are increasingly being shaped by one strategic reality: control, access, and influence around the Red Sea. What appears on the surface to be a series of separate disputes—Ethiopia’s search for maritime access, the Ethiopia–Somalia dispute, tensions involving Eritrea, Sudan’s civil war, Egypt’s Nile-water concerns, and Ethiopia’s internal conflicts—are increasingly interconnected. The statement in the accompanying image, particularly its emphasis on Red Sea governance, the Nile, Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland, illustrates this wider geopolitical contest. Ethiopia is not mentioned, but Ethiopia is central to virtually every one of these strategic questions. Ethiopia and the Red Sea: A Historical Question Ethiopia’s relationship with the Red Sea is not a new ambition. For much of modern history, the Ethiopian state was connected to the Red Sea through the territories that became Eritrea. Following the post-Second World War arrangements, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and was subsequently incorporated into Ethiopia in 1962. During that period, Massawa and Assab were important maritime outlets for Ethiopia. The political situation changed dramatically after the Eritrean war of independence. Eritrea became independent in 1993, during the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Ethiopia subsequently became a landlocked country. It is therefore historically inaccurate to describe the situation simply as one Ethiopian government “giving away” Assab and Massawa to Eritrea. The separation of Eritrea was the result of a much longer political, military and international process. Nevertheless, the strategic consequence for Ethiopia was enormous: A country of more than 100 million people became landlocked while remaining geographically dependent on the Red Sea corridor. That geographical reality has never disappeared. Why the Red Sea Matters So Much to Ethiopia For Ethiopia, access to the sea is not merely a question of national prestige. It affects: * import and export costs; * national economic competitiveness; * access to international markets; * energy and logistics security; * military and strategic autonomy; * development of manufacturing; * regional trade integration; * and Ethiopia’s long-term geopolitical independence. Djibouti currently provides Ethiopia’s principal maritime gateway. The development of alternative corridors involving Somaliland and other regional routes is therefore strategically important. This explains why Ethiopia’s maritime-access policy has generated such intense regional reactions. The El Alamein Message The declaration shown in the image places particular emphasis on five issues: 1. Red Sea governance by Red Sea littoral states; 2. protecting Egyptian and Sudanese interests concerning the Nile; 3. maintaining Sudan’s territorial unity; 4. rejecting recognition or support for Somaliland; 5. supporting Somalia’s fight against terrorism and the African Union mission in Somalia. Taken individually, these positions can be presented as regional-security policies. Taken together, however, they reveal something much larger: The emerging contest over who defines the political order of the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is a major regional power located immediately adjacent to this strategic system, yet it is not a Red Sea littoral state after Eritrea’s independence. That creates an uncomfortable geopolitical contradiction. Ethiopia has enormous economic, demographic and military weight in the Horn, but no sovereign coastline. Egypt’s Strategic Concern Egypt’s interest in the Horn of Africa cannot be separated from the Nile. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has fundamentally changed the strategic relationship between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Cairo regards the Nile as a vital national-security issue, while Ethiopia regards hydropower development as essential to its economic transformation. The result is a wider strategic competition. From Egypt’s perspective, developments that increase Ethiopia’s strategic independence—particularly an Ethiopian maritime arrangement, military capability on the Red Sea, or stronger relations with Somaliland—can potentially alter the regional balance. From Ethiopia’s perspective, efforts to prevent it from obtaining reliable maritime access can be interpreted as an attempt to contain Ethiopia economically and strategically. This is why the Red Sea and Nile questions increasingly overlap. ⸻ Eritrea: The Missing Piece Eritrea occupies an exceptionally important position. It controls a long Red Sea coastline, including the ports of Massawa and Assab, while Ethiopia remains landlocked. The relationship between Addis Ababa and Asmara has consequently enormous strategic significance. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a devastating border war from 1998–2000 and later restored diplomatic relations in 2018. However, the relationship has subsequently deteriorated again. Eritrea’s strategic interests do not necessarily coincide with Ethiopia’s. For Ethiopia, greater access to the Red Sea is an economic and national-security objective. For Eritrea, maintaining sovereignty over its coastline and preventing a return of overwhelming Ethiopian influence is a fundamental strategic concern. This creates a structural rivalry that cannot simply be reduced to the personalities of individual leaders. ⸻ Somalia and Somaliland: Another Front in the Same Strategic Competition Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland dramatically intensified the regional debate. The agreement was widely understood as opening the possibility of Ethiopia obtaining long-term access to the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden through Somaliland. Somalia strongly rejected the arrangement, arguing that Somaliland remains part of Somalia. The issue subsequently became internationalized. Türkiye’s mediation produced the Ankara Declaration in December 2024, in which Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to pursue mutually acceptable commercial arrangements giving Ethiopia reliable access to the sea under Somalia’s sovereignty. This was an important diplomatic development because it demonstrated that the maritime-access question could potentially be addressed without permanently transforming the territorial status of Somaliland. But the strategic competition did not disappear. ⸻ Sudan: The Third Strategic Pressure Point Sudan is equally important. The Sudanese civil war has created a major security vacuum between Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, South Sudan and the Red Sea. Egypt has strong historical and security interests in Sudan. Ethiopia has its own interests, including border security, refugees, trade routes, the Nile and the disputed Al-Fashaga area. Eritrea also has security concerns along Sudan’s eastern frontier. Consequently, Sudan’s instability has the potential to transform the balance of power throughout the Horn. The principle expressed in the El Alamein statement—support for Sudan’s territorial unity—therefore has major regional implications. ⸻ Ethiopia’s Internal Conflicts Cannot Be Separated From the Regional Environment This is where Ethiopia’s internal political crisis becomes particularly important. The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 ended the major phase of the Ethiopia–TPLF war in northern Ethiopia. However, serious political and territorial disputes remained, including questions surrounding the status of disputed territories and the implementation of the peace agreement. At the same time, the conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and Fano-affiliated armed groups in Amhara has created another major security challenge. These conflicts weaken Ethiopia internally at precisely the time when the country faces intense external strategic competition. That creates a dangerous situation. A country does not need to be defeated militarily to lose geopolitical influence. Internal fragmentation can produce the same result. ⸻ Are Fano and the TPLF Working Together to Break Up Ethiopia? This claim needs to be treated carefully. There are widespread political allegations that Ethiopia’s internal conflicts are being exploited by external powers, including Egypt and Eritrea. There are also political narratives alleging cooperation between different Ethiopian opposition forces. However, there is not sufficient publicly established evidence to state as a fact that Fano and the TPLF are jointly operating under Egyptian or Eritrean direction to dismantle Ethiopia. Indeed, the political and military histories of the TPLF and Fano include substantial hostility and fundamentally different political interests. That does not mean external actors cannot exploit Ethiopia’s internal divisions. It means the stronger and more defensible argument is this: Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation creates opportunities for external powers to pursue their own strategic interests, regardless of whether those Ethiopian actors are formally coordinating with one another. This distinction is important. A serious geopolitical analysis should separate documented facts, political allegations and strategic possibilities. ⸻ The Greater Danger: Fragmentation The most serious danger for Ethiopia may therefore not be a single foreign alliance. It is the combination of: internal political fragmentation + armed conflict + ethnic polarization + economic pressure + regional rivalries + external intervention. If these factors reinforce one another, Ethiopia could become increasingly preoccupied with internal survival rather than long-term national strategy. And that would directly affect the Red Sea question. A fragmented Ethiopia would have considerably less bargaining power with: * Egypt; * Eritrea; * Somalia; * Somaliland; * Sudan; * Djibouti; * Gulf states; * and international powers. ⸻ The Red Sea Cannot Be Understood Without Ethiopia The central contradiction of the current regional order is therefore clear. The Red Sea is increasingly described as a strategic space belonging to its littoral states. But one of the largest and most influential countries in the Horn of Africa—Ethiopia—is geographically dependent upon that same sea while possessing no sovereign coastline. This creates a long-term strategic question that cannot simply be removed from regional politics. Ethiopia’s interest in maritime access is unlikely to disappear because of diplomatic declarations. Likewise, neighboring states are unlikely to ignore Ethiopia’s growing economic and strategic importance. The realistic solution therefore cannot be perpetual confrontation. It must eventually involve a mutually acceptable framework for Ethiopian maritime access that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring states while recognizing Ethiopia’s legitimate economic and strategic interests. ⸻ A New Geopolitical Reality The Horn of Africa is entering a period in which the following issues are becoming inseparable: The Red Sea ↓ Ethiopian maritime access ↓ Somaliland and Somalia ↓ Eritrea ↓ Egypt and the Nile ↓ Sudan’s war ↓ Gulf-state competition ↓ Ethiopia’s internal stability This is why Ethiopia’s domestic political stability is no longer only an Ethiopian matter. A weakened Ethiopia changes the balance of power throughout the entire Horn. A stable Ethiopia, by contrast, can become an economic bridge between Africa, the Red Sea, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. ⸻ Ethiopia’s Strategic Choice The lesson from the current regional environment should not be that Ethiopia must seek confrontation with Egypt, Eritrea or Somalia. Nor should Ethiopia assume that every regional initiative is automatically a conspiracy against it. The lesson should be that Ethiopia needs a coherent national strategy. That strategy should combine: * internal political reconciliation; * preservation of national territorial integrity; * implementation of the Pretoria peace process; * peaceful resolution of disputes with neighboring countries; * diversified port access; * strong relations with Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland; * pragmatic engagement with Eritrea; * continued dialogue with Egypt and Sudan; * expansion of economic diplomacy with Gulf and Asian powers; * and a long-term national maritime-access strategy. The Red Sea question will not disappear. The real question is whether Ethiopia will approach it as a divided country reacting to events—or as a stable regional power shaping its own future. Final thought The history of the Horn of Africa demonstrates that geography cannot be negotiated away. Ethiopia may have lost its sovereign coastline when Eritrea became independent, but its economic geography did not change. Ethiopia remains physically connected to the Red Sea system and economically dependent upon it. Therefore, the future of the Horn will permanently designed by Ethiopia.
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