Cairo

Thirty-Six Years of Bloodshed: What Has Sudan Gained? By Einam Mohamadain Founder and Executive Director Centre for Sustainable Peace & Development (EM Centre) Sudan’s tragedy cannot be reduced to a single war, a single regime, or a single political rupture. It is the cumulative result of decades of armed conflict, authoritarian governance, political exclusion, regional marginalization, and repeated assaults on civilian life. Over time, the Sudanese people have paid the price not only of domestic failures, but also of external interventions and unresolved regional disputes that have deepened national fragility. The central question is both moral and political: after thirty-six years of war, fragmentation, and recurring abuses, what exactly has Sudan gained? The answer is painful. Sudan has gained territorial rupture, mass displacement, institutional erosion, social trauma, and a dangerous weakening of public trust. It has lost lives, futures, and the basic conditions required for building a stable and dignified political community. The long war in the South ended not in reconciliation, but in secession. Darfur became the site of one of the gravest humanitarian crises on the African continent, while the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile also endured prolonged conflict, displacement, and the steady collapse of normal civilian life. These were not isolated crises. They were symptoms of a deeper structural failure: the inability of the Sudanese state to manage diversity fairly, distribute power justly, and build institutions that citizens could trust. Violence in Sudan was never confined to conventional battlefields. Political detention, torture, restrictions on free expression, and the narrowing of civic space became part of the broader architecture of national suffering. When lawful political participation is denied, repression does not merely silence society; it also weakens the very possibility of peaceful reform. In that sense, internal authoritarianism was not separate from war. It was one of the conditions that repeatedly helped sustain it. Any serious reading of Sudan’s modern history must also acknowledge the role of external intervention in shaping moments of national trauma. One of the clearest and most painful examples remains Aba Island in 1970. Historical accounts report that Gaafar Nimeiry’s assault on the Ansar stronghold was carried out with the assistance of Egyptian Air Force fighter-bombers, and that the episode caused large-scale loss of life, even though the precise death toll remains contested in the historical record. For Sudanese memory, the significance of Aba Island lies not only in the scale of bloodshed, but in what it symbolized: the readiness of a ruling order to seek outside force in crushing an internal political and religious challenge. Whether read as a security operation, a political crackdown, or a foundational act of state violence, the event remains a lasting reminder that foreign-backed coercion leaves wounds far beyond the battlefield. This same problem reappears in a different but equally consequential form in the dispute over Halaib and Shalateen. The Halaib Triangle has long been contested between Sudan and Egypt, while Cairo currently exercises control over the territory and Khartoum has continued to assert its claim. From a Sudanese national perspective, Halaib and Shalateen are not merely a cartographic dispute. They represent a continuing wound in the idea of sovereignty itself, especially because multiple accounts describe Egypt as having imposed full administrative and military control over the area from the mid-1990s onward after renewed bilateral tension. Egypt, for its part, continues to state that the area falls under its full sovereignty. That unresolved contradiction between Sudanese claim and Egyptian control has turned Halaib and Shalateen into one of the most enduring symbols of imbalance in Sudan-Egypt relations. Recent events near the northern border have only reinforced these sensitivities. In March 2026, Darfur24 reported that at least nine Sudanese traditional miners were killed and 13 injured in clashes with Egyptian border guards in the Wadi al-Ansari area along the Sudanese-Egyptian border, citing relatives of the victims and local sources. This report echoed earlier tensions. In 2016, the Associated Press reported Sudan’s accusation that Egyptian forces had seized Sudanese gold miners from Sudanese territory and confiscated their equipment, with Sudanese officials describing the incident as an assault on innocent citizens on Sudanese soil. Whether viewed through the lens of border security, resource competition, or unresolved frontier claims, such incidents deepen the sense among many Sudanese that sovereignty is not being tested only in theory, but in the lives and deaths of ordinary citizens working at the margins of the state. A further development has sharpened this perception even more. In a public statement dated 17 June 2026, the Sudan Founding Alliance (Ta’sis) alleged that Egyptian aircraft attacked mining areas in North al-Wadi inside Sudanese territory for a second consecutive day, causing deaths and injuries among Sudanese miners and leaving others trapped beneath collapsed mining shafts. The statement framed the incident not as an isolated military event, but as part of a broader pattern of encroachment on Sudanese sovereignty, land, and resources. These claims require independent verification and careful documentation. Even so, the political significance of the statement is considerable, because it reflects a widening Sudanese perception that questions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the protection of citizens can no longer be separated from the debate over Sudan’s regional relations and internal collapse. The current war has pushed Sudan’s crisis to an even more devastating level. Cities have been shattered. Millions have been displaced internally and across borders. Essential services have collapsed. Ordinary people have been left to navigate daily fear, insecurity, and deprivation on a scale the country has not witnessed in decades. For that reason, the question of Sudan’s future cannot be addressed solely through military calculations or temporary bargains among elites. Sudan needs a deeper political reordering grounded in justice, citizenship, accountability, and equal human worth. It needs institutions that do not treat some regions as expendable, some communities as suspect, and some lives as negotiable. It needs a state measured not by the size of its coercive apparatus, but by its ability to protect civilians, uphold dignity, and provide a credible future. The lesson of the past thirty-six years is stark. War has not built Sudan. Repression has not stabilized it. External intervention has not protected its sovereignty. Territorial ambiguity has not strengthened its national confidence. Each has instead reproduced fragility in a new form. The only meaningful national project now is one that places the Sudanese human being at the center of political life. That means ending the normalization of violence, confronting the legacies of war honestly, and rebuilding public institutions on the basis of law rather than fear. It also means facing difficult regional questions with clarity, including the long shadow of Aba Island, the unresolved status of Halaib and Shalateen, and the recurring vulnerability of Sudanese citizens in borderlands and mining zones. Sudan does not need more war. It does not need more rhetorical solidarity offered after each catastrophe. It does not need another generation raised under displacement, emergency, and grief. It needs a just state one that protects the person before the territory, the citizen before the ruler, and life before the gun. May all those lost in South Sudan, Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Aba Island, and every corner of Sudan where blood has been spilled be remembered with dignity. Their memory should not serve only as lament. It should serve as a warning and a demand: that Sudan must finally become a country in which sovereignty is measured by the protection of human life, not merely by the language of power.

Egypt Moves from Backing the War to Killing Sudanese: An Aerial Massacre in Jabal Al-Aqaydat June 17, 2026 SPT Egyptian warplanes carried out airstrikes on Tuesday deep inside Sudanese territory, targeting civilian miners in the Jabal Al-Aqaydat area, according to multiple field testimonies and local accounts. The attack marks a significant escalation in Egypt’s involvement in Sudan’s conflict and is considered one of the most serious incidents attributed to Egyptian forces since the war began. According to local testimonies and Sudanese observers, this incident represents more than a new violation of Sudanese sovereignty. Rather, it reflects a shift in Egypt’s involvement from indirect political and military influence to direct military engagement inside Sudanese territory. The attack comes amid growing accusations that the Egyptian regime has played a pivotal role in prolonging Sudan’s war and fueling the conflict through military and political support provided to the army leadership, effectively turning Sudan into an arena for external intervention at the expense of civilian lives and the interests of the Sudanese people. Jabal Al-Aqaydat is known as one of Sudan’s largest artisanal gold-mining areas, attracting thousands of traditional miners from across the country. Unofficial estimates place their number at approximately 7,000. According to testimonies from miners and eyewitnesses, the bombardment killed at least 35 people and injured around 80 others, while dozens remain missing. The casualties resulted from airstrikes attributed to Egyptian Air Force aircraft targeting mining sites in the area. Miners published videos on Facebook and TikTok, which SPT verified as authentic, showing wrapped bodies, wounded civilians, and desperate appeals for help. Those who recorded the footage described the situation as catastrophic. Several miners said they had previously been subjected to ground attacks which they attributed to the Egyptian military, including the seizure of gold and mining equipment. However, they said this was the first time they had come under direct aerial bombardment. Mubarak Adam, an eyewitness, told SPT that the strikes began in the early morning hours and initially targeted the main mining site in Jabal Al-Aqaydat, resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries, some of them critical. “I saw four Egyptian military aircraft, which appeared to be MiG fighter jets,” he said. Adam explained that while fleeing the area, they managed to transport a number of injured people in trucks to the Al-Ansari market area in Abu Hamad locality in Northern State. He said the Egyptian aircraft continued flying over the area for more than two hours before striking Jabal Al-Ahmar near Al-Ansari, an area located close to the administrative boundaries of Red Sea State and River Nile State. “What I witnessed was nothing short of a full-scale massacre,” Adam said. “I saw bodies being blown apart and thrown into the air by the bombardment before I found myself running at full speed and taking shelter inside a tunnel in the mountain.” For his part, Hussein Al-Nour said that an Egyptian aircraft accompanied by drones had been flying over the area at various times of the day since last Friday, suggesting that they were conducting surveillance, reconnaissance and aerial mapping operations ahead of the attack. He stressed that what he witnessed was “a deliberate targeting of people rather than mining infrastructure or work sites,” adding: “I saw missiles and incendiary munitions raining down on miners and tearing them to pieces.” Al-Nour agreed with Adam’s account regarding the number of aircraft involved in the attack, saying there were four warplanes. He added that he believed they were Sukhoi aircraft, before clarifying that he could not be certain of their exact type. “This is a blatant act of aggression and a grave violation of Sudanese sovereignty, but we have no government that protects its citizens and no national army that defends the country. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan himself has become a soldier taking orders from Abdel Fattah El-Sisi,” he said. “We fled the war and came here to earn a living through our own hard work under extremely difficult conditions, yet we are being killed by the aircraft of a hostile state inside our own country.” “We are dying here and elsewhere so that Burhan can remain in power,” he added. When SPT asked a number of survivors about the reasons that might have prompted Egyptian aircraft to target unarmed civilian workers inside Sudanese territory, three of those interviewed agreed that the objective was to seize control of gold resources and exploit the conditions created by the war to expand Egyptian influence over parts of Sudan. Al-Nour said: “Egypt does not see Sudan as a homeland, nor Sudanese as a people. They see only land and resources. If they could, they would empty the country of its people in order to seize its wealth.” These allegations have reignited growing debate within Sudanese circles over the nature of Egypt’s role in the war that has been ongoing since April 2023, and the extent of its influence on the course of the conflict and the future of political and security stability in the country. A broad segment of Sudanese society, particularly within political and intellectual circles, believes that Egypt’s policy towards Sudan is based on a strategic vision aimed at keeping the country in a state of dependency that obstructs its agricultural and industrial development, limits its ability to make full use of its natural resources and share of Nile waters, and ultimately reduces Sudan to a source of raw materials, a market for Egyptian goods, and an instrument serving Cairo’s regional interests. Political figures within the Civil Democratic Forces Alliance argue that the Egyptian regime played a decisive structural role in undermining Sudan’s civilian democratic transition, in the 25 October 2021 coup, and in igniting the 15 April 2023 war and prolonging its duration. These figures further contend that the establishment of the Al-Oweinat air base along the Sudanese border has provided a platform from which warplanes, guided missiles, and Turkish-made Bayraktar drones are launched into Sudanese territory, particularly towards Kordofan and Darfur. According to this view, such operations have contributed to extending the war and deepening the humanitarian catastrophe. More than a day after the incident, neither the Egyptian government, the Egyptian military, nor Egyptian state media had issued any comment. The official spokesperson of the Sudanese army also declined to respond to an SPT inquiry regarding the alleged violation of Sudanese airspace by Egyptian military aircraft and the airstrikes inside Sudanese territory that reportedly killed and injured dozens of civilians. A prominent political figure, who requested anonymity, told SPT that while the Egyptian regime publicly declares its support for the Quadrilateral Initiative for peace in Sudan, it privately pressures army leaders to reject it in pursuit of what he described as narrow and short-sighted interests. He added that while Sudanese blood continues to be shed, Nile waters, including Sudan’s share, continue to flow into Egypt. Sudanese exports controlled by companies linked to the military establishment, along with livestock and agricultural products sold at the lowest prices, also continue to enter the Egyptian market. He further noted that Sudanese gold has significantly strengthened the reserves of Egypt’s Central Bank throughout the years of war, arguing that this raises serious questions about the extent to which the Egyptian regime benefits from the continuation of the conflict and the suffering of the Sudanese people. According to the same source, such profiteering has reached inhumane levels, with entry visas to Egypt reportedly being sold, even to patients and vulnerable individuals, for thousands of dollars. Influential groups within Sudan’s democratic civilian forces believe that achieving peace in Sudan will remain extremely difficult unless Egyptian interventions viewed as a major factor in prolonging the war and complicating prospects for a political settlement are effectively curbed. Sudanese civilian groups say they are looking to international actors seeking peace in Sudan, particularly the United States and the European Union, to take concrete measures towards Egypt. These include ending its hosting of Sudanese Islamist groups and their media and organisational networks, halting the supply of arms and ammunition to the Sudanese army, stopping military operations launched from the West Oweinat base, and abandoning what they describe as a dual policy of publicly calling for peace while continuing to fuel the war on the ground. As the war continues to claim Sudanese lives, growing numbers of civilian voices argue that no serious path towards peace will be possible unless external interventions foremost among them Egyptian intervention are confronted as one of the principal drivers of the conflict and a key obstacle to a political settlement. These voices maintain that respect for Sudan’s sovereignty and an end to all forms of foreign military and political interference remain essential prerequisites for any sustainable settlement capable of ending the war and opening the way towards peace and stability. PREVIOUS The Khartoum Airport Strike: Cairo’s Bid to Redirect Sudan’s War Towards Ethiopia

🚨 BREAKING NEWS: South Sudanese Journalist Deported from Egypt Missing After Arrival in Juba JUBA/CAIRO, June 17, 2026 – A South Sudanese journalist and registered refugee in Egypt has reportedly disappeared after being deported from Cairo to Juba, raising fears that he may be in the custody of South Sudan's security agencies. Family members say Kennedy Nimaya was arrested by Egyptian authorities on April 29 while attempting to renew his residency permit and remained in detention for more than a month before being deported to South Sudan on June 9. Since his arrival in Juba, relatives say they have been unable to contact him or determine his whereabouts. "We do not know where he has been taken since last week, whether he is being held by the police or the National Security Service," a relative, Lado Makeila Joshua, told Radio Tamazuj. Nimaya, who previously worked for Arabic-language newspapers in South Sudan and served as a journalist for Juba City Council, had been accused by authorities of links to the opposition armed group National Salvation Front (NAS). His family strongly denies the allegations and says he had been living in Egypt under refugee status granted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Rights advocates warn that the deportation could violate the international principle of Non-refoulement, which prohibits returning refugees to countries where they may face persecution or threats to their lives. The case comes amid growing concern over reports of South Sudanese nationals being detained, abducted, or forcibly returned from neighboring countries. Human rights groups and refugee organizations have recently documented allegations of arbitrary arrests and deportations involving refugees in Egypt and other countries in the region. South Sudanese government spokesperson Ateny Wek Ateny and Egyptian authorities had not publicly commented on the case at the time of publication. Source: Radio Tamazuj

📌 The Refugee Platform in Egypt was deeply saddened to learn the news of the death of forcibly displaced Sudanese citizen and asylum seeker Hamid Ali Adam Musa (64), after he was taken by Egyptian authorities to the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in Cairo to obtain a travel document in preparation for his deportation to Sudan, according to a statement issued by the Sudanese Embassy on June 1st, 2026. 📌 While RPEGY extends our sincere condolences and sympathy to Hamid Ali Adam Musa’s family and loved ones, we are also deeply concerned regarding the recurrence of deaths among refugees and asylum seekers during periods of detention or during procedures related to deportation. 📌 The total number of deaths of detained forcibly displaced Sudanese citizens documented by RPEGY has reached 12 since the beginning of this year, which necessitates greater transparency and disclosure regarding detention conditions and the health care provided to detained people, particularly the elderly and those with health conditions. 🔗 for more details about "The 12th Case Since the Start of the Year: Forcibly Displaced Sudanese Citizen and Asylum Seeker Dies Shortly Before Deportation" please visit our website through the URL in the first comment.

MIKE ARNOLD wrote: CHAINED BY GREED: WHY GREAT BRITAIN CANNOT AFFORD TO OFFEND MUSLIMS — ANYWHERE Great Britain cannot afford to offend the Muslim world — not abroad, where its fuel and its money come from, and not at home, where its peace and its votes are. And it cannot offend one Muslim country without offending all of them, because fifty-seven of them sit in one bloc — the Organization of Islamic Cooperation — that treats an insult to Islam anywhere as an insult everywhere. So Britain keeps quiet. About a lot of things. Including a genocide. The Gas tank Qatar keeps the lights on in London. Britain ships in close to 90 percent of its tanker-borne gas from one country, and that country is Qatar. Shell owns a quarter of the giant Qatari field that loads it and pulls nearly 7 million tons of Qatari gas a year. Turn off Doha and a British winter gets cold in a hurry. The Landlord The Gulf doesn’t just fuel Britain. It owns pieces of it. The Gulf sovereign wealth funds sit on roughly $5 trillion, and that money bought Harrods, the Shard, the Savoy, a slab of Canary Wharf, and a stake in Barclays. The UAE pledged another £10 billion into a partnership with the British government. Saudi Arabia’s fund owns Newcastle United. And the weapons run the same way — Saudi Arabia is the biggest foreign customer BAE Systems has, and those contracts are the largest arms deals in British history. Real jobs in real British towns ride on Riyadh staying happy. What the Silence Buys Abroad The price of all that money is a blind eye, paid out country by country. In Saudi Arabia, Britain looks past the men who butchered the journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside their own consulate and starved Yemen with British-made bombs. In the United Arab Emirates, past a regime arming the RSF militia carrying out the genocide in Darfur right now. In Qatar, past a state that houses Hamas’s leadership and built its World Cup on migrant labor that left thousands of workers dead. In Egypt, where BP pumps gas, past the Rabaa massacre — more than 800 people shot dead in a single day. In Azerbaijan, where BP runs the oil and the pipeline, past the cleansing of more than 100,000 Christian Armenians out of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. In Mauritania, where BP works the gas, past the last country on earth to abolish slavery, where Black Africans are still owned and it’s the abolitionists who get the jail cell. In Brunei, Shell’s fifty-fifty partner, past a sharia code that stones people for adultery. And in Nigeria, where Shell works the deepwater and the gas, past a Caliphate-driven genocide against Christians and non-jihadist Muslims. That is the trap. Britain cannot object to one without the bloc reading it as an attack on all. One pebble, fifty-seven ripples. So it objects to none. The Same Leash at Home The leash does not stop at the water’s edge. Offend Muslims at home and the bill still comes due abroad, because the bloc draws no line between a snub in Doha and a stand in London. France learned it the hard way. In 2020 a schoolteacher named Samuel Paty was beheaded outside Paris for showing cartoons of Muhammad in a free-speech lesson. When President Macron defended his country’s right to those cartoons — a purely domestic stand, made over a murdered teacher — the Gulf answered in the marketplace. Kuwait pulled French goods from more than 50 stores. Qatar scrapped its French culture week. Boycotts of Carrefour trended across Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. France’s own employers’ federation called it blackmail and told companies to brace and endure it. A stand at home, a bill abroad. Britain wrote that lesson before France did. In 1989 a British novel — Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses — drew a death sentence from Iran’s ayatollah, drove a British citizen into hiding for a decade, and wrecked Britain’s relations with the Muslim world overnight. One book. London never forgot what a single offense at home could cost. So Britain stopped giving offense. Look at what it now swallows to keep the peace. It looked away while gangs of mostly Pakistani-heritage men raped and trafficked thousands of girls in Rotherham, Rochdale, Telford, and Oldham. The national audit found that authorities had “shied away” from the perpetrators’ background for fear of being called racist. One retired officer told Parliament he had been ordered to stop investigating Pakistani-origin abusers in Bradford because the police did not want to offend the city’s Muslim community. The state chose community relations over the children. When a man burned a Quran outside the Turkish consulate in London, Britain prosecuted and convicted him — a blasphemy verdict in all but name, in a country that abolished blasphemy law in 2008. A judge later overturned it on free-speech grounds, and prosecutors are now fighting to put the conviction back. When a Batley schoolteacher showed the same kind of cartoon that cost Samuel Paty his head, Britain did not stand up for him the way France stood up for Paty. It hid him. He is reportedly in hiding still, and the school apologized. In 2024 the lesson reached the ballot box. Five independents ran on Gaza and beat the Labour Party outright; the party’s vote fell about 10 points in seats more than a tenth Muslim, and a shadow front-bencher lost his seat. The vote will punish you now, and it knows it. This past week it broke into the street. A Sudanese asylum seeker tried to behead a man in north Belfast, and the unrest that followed spread across Northern Ireland and into Scotland and England. A government that had spent years looking away to dodge the charge of bigotry now faced a home front it could no longer manage quietly — and its first move was to police the anger, not the cause. Because facing the cause means giving offense. And giving offense, as France found out, costs money. Who Owns the Oil BP and Shell are owned by index funds — giant managers like BlackRock and Vanguard, with Norway’s national fund close behind, holding most of it for pension funds and ordinary retirement savers. Whether any of the royal family’s private money rides inside those funds is hard to know; the palace keeps its books closed. What can be traced runs to the government. In 1914 Winston Churchill talked Britain into buying 51 percent of the company that became BP, to fuel the navy’s switch from coal to oil, and the state owned its oil outright until Thatcher sold the last of it in 1987. Britain did not stumble into the oil business. It built the thing. The money comes home as dividends. Shell has been the single biggest company on the London market, and a market that hands shareholders around £87 billion a year sends a fat slice of it into British pensions. The British pensioner doesn’t know it, but part of his monthly check comes off a Qatari tanker and a Nigerian rig. That’s the chain. Nobody had to plot it. The whole saving public is quietly invested in the oil staying friendly, so no government dares disturb it — because disturbing it means touching every pension in the country. The Bill Is Real None of this is a bluff. In 1973 the Arab oil producers cut the oil to punish the West for backing Israel, and the recession that followed rolled over every Western economy, Britain’s with it. That is the one time the weapon came all the way out, and nobody who runs Britain has forgotten what it did. Why Britain Looks at Its Shoes Now the silence makes sense. While the slaughter in Nigeria grinds on — more than 125,000 Christians and 60,000 non-jihadist Muslims killed since 2009 — Britain studies the carpet. It will not name the genocide. It will not lay a finger on the regime in Abuja. And Abuja holds a weapon of its own. A Nigerian government can seize the oil — nationalize the wells, tear up the licenses, throw Shell out. Britain has felt that knife before: in 1951 Iran nationalized the very company that became BP, and Britain was so shaken it helped overthrow the government to claw the oil back. Cross the wrong oil state and the whole field can vanish overnight. So Britain keeps Abuja content. Protect the regime, keep the oil. Move against it, risk losing it. That is what keeps Bola Tinubu safe. Not Britain’s conscience. Britain’s balance sheet. The chain runs from the gas meter to the bank vault to the ballot box to the ordinary man’s pension, and it pulls the same direction whether the offense is given in Abuja or in Belfast. Britain did the math a long time ago and decided silence was cheaper than principle. The dead in Nigeria are the price of that math. #EarthShaker Mike Arnold is the author of EPICENTER: Nigeria, Radical Islam, and the War for Global Order (#1 Amazon Bestseller) and founder of Africa Arise International. Sources Qatar has supplied close to 90 percent of the UK’s liquefied natural gas imports and held more than £40 billion in British assets, as reported around 2016–2017. Reuters; PressReader, March 2017. Shell holds a 25 percent stake in Qatar’s North Field East LNG expansion, the largest such project in the world, and analysts estimate it takes roughly 6.8 million tonnes of Qatari LNG a year. Energy Digital, 2022; Al Jazeera, March 2026. Gulf Cooperation Council sovereign wealth funds collectively managed roughly $5 trillion as of early 2025. Diplo, September 2025. Qatari holdings in Britain include the Shard, Harrods, the Savoy, a stake in Canary Wharf, and a stake in Barclays. PressReader/Reuters, March 2017. The UAE pledged £10 billion into a sovereign investment partnership with the UK government. Reuters. Saudi Arabia is BAE Systems’ largest export customer; the Tornado and Typhoon programs are the largest arms deals in British history. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund acquired Newcastle United in 2021. Saudi agents killed and dismembered journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018; UK-supplied arms have been used in the Saudi-led war in Yemen. UN experts and multiple investigations have found the UAE supplying arms to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces during the ongoing campaign of mass killing in Darfur. Qatar has hosted the political leadership of Hamas; investigations documented thousands of migrant-worker deaths under the labor system that built its 2022 World Cup infrastructure. Egyptian security forces killed more than 800 people in a single day dispersing the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in in Cairo in August 2013. Human Rights Watch. Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh drove more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians, an overwhelmingly Christian population, from the enclave. Mauritania was the last country in the world to abolish slavery (1981); chattel slavery of Black Mauritanians persists, and anti-slavery activists have been jailed. Brunei Shell Petroleum is a 50/50 joint venture between Shell and the government of Brunei; Brunei adopted the full sharia penal code, including stoning, in 2019. After President Macron defended the right to publish cartoons of Muhammad following the 2020 beheading of teacher Samuel Paty, Muslim-majority states launched boycotts of French goods — Kuwaiti retailers pulled products from more than 50 stores, Qatar University postponed its French culture week, and Carrefour boycotts trended in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. CNN; BBC, October 2020. Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued a 1989 fatwa calling for the death of British author Salman Rushdie over The Satanic Verses; Rushdie spent years in hiding and the affair severed UK–Iran relations. Baroness Casey’s June 2025 national audit found that authorities had “shied away” from the ethnicity of grooming-gang perpetrators; a 2020 University of Southampton and University of Reading study of 498 convictions found 83 percent of perpetrators were of Muslim background, mainly Pakistani heritage. House of Commons Library; Hansard, December 2025; Reuters. A retired officer told Parliament he had been ordered by a serving chief superintendent to stop investigating abuse by Pakistani-origin taxi drivers in Bradford because local police did not want to offend the city’s Muslim community. Hansard, December 2025. Hamit Coskun was convicted in June 2025 of a religiously aggravated public order offence for burning a Quran outside the Turkish consulate in London; the conviction was overturned on free-speech grounds in October 2025, and the Crown Prosecution Service is appealing to reinstate it. National Secular Society, November 2025. A Batley Grammar School teacher who showed a cartoon of Muhammad in a 2021 lesson was forced into hiding after protests; the school apologized, and the teacher reportedly remains in hiding. Five pro-Gaza independents beat Labour in the July 2024 UK general election; Labour’s vote fell about 10 points in constituencies more than 10 percent Muslim, and shadow front-bencher Jonathan Ashworth lost his seat. The National; Hyphen, July 2024. On June 8, 2026, a Sudanese man attempted to behead a man in a street attack in north Belfast; anti-immigration unrest followed across Northern Ireland and into Scotland and England. CBS News; Yahoo News, June 2026. BlackRock is BP’s largest single shareholder at around 9 percent, with Vanguard and Norway’s Norges Bank among the next largest; Shell’s largest holders are Vanguard, BlackRock, Norges Bank, and State Street. Most of what these managers hold, they hold on behalf of pension funds and retirement savers. Simply Wall St; tikr, 2025. At Churchill’s urging, the British government bought a controlling stake (just over 50 percent) in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1914 to fuel the Royal Navy; the government’s BP holdings were sold off in stages between 1977 and 1987. DeSmog, 2014; BP corporate history. Shell has at times been the single largest constituent of the FTSE 100 by market value. The Motley Fool, 2013. Total UK dividend payments ran around £87.2 billion in 2025, with Shell and BP among the largest payers. Computershare Dividend Monitor via interactive investor, 2025. The 1973 Arab oil embargo, imposed over Western support for Israel, quadrupled oil prices and triggered recession across the West. Casualty figures for the Caliphate-driven genocide in Nigeria — more than 125,000 Christians and 60,000 non-jihadist Muslims killed since 2009 — per Intersociety. Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company — the predecessor of BP — in 1951; in 1953 British intelligence, with the U.S. CIA, helped orchestrate the coup that removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and restored Western control of Iranian oil. DeSmog, 2014; BP corporate history. Uche Alo

🚨 59,000 Dead in Sudan — Here's Who the U.S. Must Pressure and What You Can Do 🚨 59,000 dead. Millions displaced. 34 million people needing aid. The world's largest humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Sudan while much of the world looks away. The United States should be applying pressure on every government helping fuel this war: the UAE through sanctions and diplomatic pressure, Egypt through conditions on its $1.3 billion in annual aid, Turkey through NATO relationships, and Saudi Arabia through security and diplomatic leverage. 📞 American citizens can do something: • Call your representatives. • Demand an arms embargo on both the SAF and RSF. • Support sanctions on individuals and companies fueling the conflict. • Push for humanitarian access and accountability. Silence is not neutrality. It benefits the people supplying the weapons. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ ⚔️ Foreign Powers Are Fueling Sudan's War — Here's How The conflict began on April 15, 2023, when Sudan's military (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) turned their power struggle into a full-scale civil war. Neither side has clean hands. Both SAF and RSF forces have been accused by international organizations and human-rights groups of grave abuses against civilians. 💰 Who Is Backing Whom? 🇦🇪 UAE → RSF The UAE is widely viewed as the most influential external actor supporting the RSF. Reports indicate it has supplied Chinese-made drones (Wing Loong II, CH-95), armored vehicles, artillery, and ammunition through networks operating via Chad and Libya. The UAE is also a major destination for Sudanese gold exports, a trade that analysts say has helped sustain networks tied to the conflict. 🇹🇷 Türkiye → SAF Turkey has emerged as a major military partner of the Sudanese Armed Forces, supplying Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones that played a significant role in SAF counteroffensives. The SAF reportedly signed a $120 million drone and munitions agreement. 🇮🇷 Iran → SAF Iran supplied Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones early in the war, helping strengthen the SAF's battlefield capabilities during critical stages of the conflict. 🇪🇬 Egypt → SAF Egypt has reportedly provided intelligence, training, and operational support to the SAF, including allegations of drone-related assistance. Cairo views stability in Sudan as closely tied to its Nile water security interests. 🇷🇺 Russia → RSF Russia's Africa Corps (formerly associated with Wagner Group operations) has been linked to weapons transfers and security activities benefiting the RSF, while also protecting Russian interests tied to Sudan's gold sector. 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia → SAF Saudi Arabia has generally backed the SAF diplomatically while also participating in mediation efforts aimed at ending the conflict. Riyadh's interests include Red Sea security and protection of major agricultural investments. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 💔 The Human Cost 📅 2023 (April–December) • Fighting erupts in Khartoum and spreads across Sudan. • Mass displacement begins. • Darfur again becomes a center of atrocities. 📅 2024 • Front lines harden. • RSF captures additional territory. • Drone warfare expands dramatically. 📅 2025 • At least 2,670 people are killed by drones alone. • Drone-related deaths increase by roughly 600% compared to 2024. • Following an 18-month siege, RSF forces seize El-Fasher, reportedly killing at least 6,000 civilians in just three days. 📅 January–May 2026 • More than 1,000 civilians are killed by drone strikes. • Verified conflict deaths since the war began reach at least 59,000. Many researchers believe the real death toll is substantially higher because large portions of Sudan remain inaccessible to independent monitors, and countless deaths from hunger, disease, and displacement are never formally recorded. 🚨 Current Crisis • 34 million people require humanitarian assistance. • Nearly two out of every three Sudanese now depend on aid. • Sudan has become the largest humanitarian emergency on Earth. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 🕊️ What Is Needed to Stop the War 1️⃣ End External Support All foreign governments must immediately halt the flow of weapons, fuel, financing, and military assistance to both sides. The Berlin Principles (April 2026) explicitly call for ending external military support. 2️⃣ Immediate Humanitarian Truce A verified and internationally monitored ceasefire is needed to allow food, medicine, and aid to reach millions of civilians. 3️⃣ Civilian-Led Political Transition Sudan's future cannot be determined by competing armed factions. A genuine transition to civilian governance remains essential for any lasting peace. 4️⃣ Accountability & Sanctions Whether the weapons come from the UAE, Iran, Russia, Egypt, Turkey, or elsewhere, those enabling atrocities should face targeted sanctions and financial penalties. No ally should receive a free pass while civilians are being buried. 💚✊✌️