المعارك في السودان يدفع ثمنها المواطنين السودانيين خاصة الأطفال
بقلم: ياسين عمران علي إسماعيل
نشاهد في هذا المقطع الذي تم تصويره في ميدان المعركة في اقليم كردفان الكبري و مثله في اقليم دارفور الكبري حالة المواطنين خاصة النساء و الأطفال يستنجدون بقوات من قوات المشتركة التي تقاتل مع الجيش السوداني ضد قوات الدعم السريع التي كانت جزءا من الجيش السوداني و التي كانت تقاتل مع الجيش ضد الحركات المسلحة في دارفور قبل الإطاحة بنظام الرئيس الأسبق عمر حسن البشير في عام 2019 بعدها تحول الحكم في السودان بتكوين حكومة مؤقتة تجمع المدنيين والعسكريين و لكن سرعان ما اختلفوا المدنيين مع العسكريين مما دفع بالعسكريين باستلام السلطة في اكتوبر 2021 و الكان الجيش السوداني بقيادة الفريق أول ركن عبد الفتاح البرهان و نائبه محمد حمدان دقلو موسي قائد قوات الدعم السريع استولوا علي السلطة بدعم من بعض قيادات حركات الكفاح المسلح في دارفور التي وقعت في اتفاقية سلام جوبا و فندق روتانا و لكن سرعان ما انقسم التحالف العسكري بين الجيش السوداني و قوات الدعم السريع في أبريل 2023 و استطاع المدنيين من قوي الحرية و التغيير من السيطرة علي قوات الدعم السريع قبل الانشقاق و تكوين جسم مدني يسمي صمود و في جانب الجيش السوداني الذي كان يحارب وحده حليفه السابق قوات الدعم السريع و كان قيادات المشتركة و حركات الكفاح المسلح تقف في الحياد لتقريب وجهات النظر بين الجيش السوداني و قوات الدعم السريع و لقد لعب حاكم اقليم دارفور مني أركو مناوي دورا بارزا لوقف الحرب بين الجيش السوداني وقوات الدعم السريع فكان يلتقي بقائد ثاني لقوات الدعم السريع عبد الرحيم دقلو موسي في تشاد بينما يلتقي بقوى الحرية والتغيير في مصر و ظل قائداً حركة العدل والمساواة دكتور جبريل يقود شؤون الدولة حتي لا تنهار من بورتسودان و بعد اجتاحت قوات الدعم السريع معظم ولايات السودان و زحفها نحو القضارف و سنار كان لا بد للجيش السوداني فك الحصار باي ثمن فتم دمع حركات الكفاح المسلح و المشتركة و تم تجنيد عدد كبير من المواطنين و هنا تغيرت الأوضاع في حرب السودان بين الجيش السوداني وقوات الدعم السريع فاستعادت القوات السودانية عدد من الولايات التي كانت قد سقطت في يد قوات الدعم السريع و تلي ذلك انسلاخ قائد درع الجزيرة كيكل من قوات الدعم السريع و انضمامه للجيش السوداني و تحركت القوات العسكرية السودانية نحو كردفان و دارفور و مع اشتداد الحرب و القتال تمكن قائد قوات الصحوة الشيخ موسي هلال من الخروج من دار فور بمساعدة قوات المشتركة التي أمنت الطريق أمام الي ان وصل الي أم درمان و اصبح الجيش السوداني يتقدم ادركت قوات الدعم السريع أنها في حالة خطر و الدول التي تقدم لها الدعم العسكري فأدخلت قوات الدعم السريع الطائرات بدون طيار (المسيرات) في الوقت الذي كان الجيش السوداني يستخدم السلاح الجوى بينما كان الدعم السريع يعتمد علي قواته العسكرية بالعربات ذات الدفع الرباعي و قوات المشاة العسكرية و مع انضمام قوات المشتركة للجيش و بعض الكتائب العسكرية كالبراء و درع الوسط العسكري اصبح الجيش السوداني يخوض معارك عسكرية برية و ما يهمنا هنا حماية المواطنين من خاصة النساء و الأطفال و الشيوخ كما شاهدنا فى هذا الفيديو من استنجاد عدد من النساء بقوات المشتركة كما نناشد الجميع بوقف إطلاق النار فورا و محاسبة المسؤولين على هذا الحرب حفظ الله السودان و شعبه
The price of the fighting in Sudan is being paid by Sudanese citizens, especially children.
By: Yasin Omran Ali Ismail
In this footage, filmed on a battlefield in the Greater Kordofan region—a scene mirrored in the Greater Darfur region—we see citizens, particularly women and children, pleading for help from the "Joint Forces." These forces are fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF was once part of the Sudanese military, having fought alongside it against armed movements in Darfur prior to the 2019 ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. Following that, a transitional government—comprising both civilians and military figures—was formed in Sudan. However, rifts soon emerged between the civilian and military components, leading the military to seize full power in October 2021. This takeover was orchestrated by the Sudanese military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemedti"), commander of the RSF. They were supported by certain leaders of the armed struggle movements in Darfur—signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement and the Rotana Hotel agreement. Yet, the military alliance between the SAF and the RSF collapsed in April 2023. Prior to this split, civilians from the "Forces of Freedom and Change" had managed to exert influence over the RSF, eventually forming a civilian entity known as "Sumoud" (Resilience). Meanwhile, the Sudanese military found itself fighting its former ally, the RSF, alone. The leadership of the Joint Forces and the armed struggle movements initially remained neutral, attempting to bridge the gap between the two warring sides. Minni Minnawi, the Governor of the Darfur region, played a prominent role in efforts to halt the conflict, including holding meetings with the RSF’s second-in-command, Abdelrahim Dagalo. While some factions engaged with the Forces of Freedom and Change in Egypt, Dr. Gibril Ibrahim—leader of the Justice and Equality Movement—remained in Port Sudan, managing state affairs to prevent the collapse of the government. Following the Rapid Support Forces' (RSF) sweep across most of Sudan’s states and their advance toward Al-Qadarif and Sennar, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) found it imperative to break the siege at any cost. Consequently, the SAF integrated armed struggle movements and "Joint Forces" (a coalition of various armed groups) into their ranks, while also recruiting a large number of civilians. This shifted the dynamics of the conflict: the Sudanese forces managed to reclaim several states that had previously fallen to the RSF. Subsequently, Abu Aqla Keikal—commander of the "Jazira Shield" (a force aligned with the RSF)—defected and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces. Meanwhile, the Sudanese military advanced toward Kordofan and Darfur. As the fighting intensified, Sheikh Musa Hilal, leader of the "Awakening Forces" (Sahwa), was able to exit Darfur with the assistance of the Joint Forces, who secured his route until he reached Omdurman. As the Sudanese Armed Forces continued to advance, the RSF—along with their foreign military backers—realized they were in a precarious position; in response, the RSF introduced combat drones. At the same time, the Sudanese Armed Forces utilized their own air power, while the RSF relied primarily on ground forces—consisting of infantry and vehicles equipped with mounted weapons. With the integration of the Joint Forces and various military battalions—such as the "Al-Baraa" and "Central Shield" units—the Sudanese Armed Forces began engaging in large-scale ground combat. Our primary concern remains the protection of civilians—especially women, children, and the elderly—as evidenced in this video, which shows women appealing to the Joint Forces for help. We call for an immediate ceasefire and for those responsible for this war to be held accountable. May God protect Sudan. Branch
#org_saf#org_saf#org_saf#org_rsf
ياسين عمران على إسماعيل
Sudan War & Military Situation
15 engagementsBismillah Al-Rahman Al-Raheem
#Answer_to_Question: Sudan and the Tensions with Ethiopia (Translated)
========
#Question:
The Sudanese Ayin Network published the following on 9 November 2026: “With the Sudanese civil war expanding and conflicts in northern Ethiopia reigniting, the shared border is rapidly becoming a site for regional rivalries. This escalating tension threatens to replace direct military engagement….” Reuters had reported on 4 November 2026, quoting a senior Ethiopian official, that “his country had closed the Sudanese consulate in the border town of Asosa and ordered the six diplomats working there to leave within 48 hours.” The agency also quoted Sudanese officials as saying that “the Sudanese government responded by closing the Ethiopian consulate in the eastern Sudanese city of Gedaref and expelling the diplomats working there.” The Undersecretary of the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stated during a briefing to diplomatic missions accredited to Sudan that “the Ethiopian base in Asosa has turned into a centre for supplying the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and equipment, in addition to facilitating the passage of foreign fighters and mercenaries into Sudanese territory to take part in the military operation…” (Sudan News, 4 November 2026).
What lies behind these tensions between the two countries? And is America playing a role in this, given that it is pressuring the Sudanese government to sit down with the separatist rebels?
#Answer:
To clarify the answers to the above questions, we will examine the following matters:
1. America is planning to separate Darfur from Sudan. Its proposal, presented on 20 June 2026 through its President’s Special Envoy for Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, calls on Sudan to surrender to the fait accompli under the terms of what it presented as a proposal for a comprehensive and immediate nationwide humanitarian truce lasting 90 days. We stated in an Answer to a Question dated 29 July 2026: “The truce included in the American proposal, under the pretext of delivering humanitarian aid, when conducted with separatist rebel group like the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), it recognizes their entity and accepts what they do. Similarly, when the document speaks of "security arrangements, including steps for withdrawal and redeployment of forces," it confirms the continued presence of the RSF and avoids any mention of dismantling or ending their existence. In fact, it implicitly calls for their continued presence when it calls for their redeployment. This equates the national army with those seeking to dismantle it, such as the RSF. The document also calls for "limited military withdrawals" under the pretext of "facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, protecting civilians, and creating conditions for the return of displaced persons," which confirms the preservation of these forces without their dissolution. In this paper, it affirms the legitimacy of the existence and dominance of the Rapid Support Forces when it calls for “a comprehensive and immediate nationwide humanitarian truce for 90 days” and when it calls for “using the truce period to negotiate a permanent ceasefire and to begin a transition process led by a civilian authority.” It does not refer to the RSF as separatist and rebel forces, but rather acknowledges their separatist government to divide Sudan.
It should be noted that the latest American proposal is not a new initiative but rather a revival of the proposal previously advanced by the Quartet—comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates—on 12 September 2025. The proposal calls for a three-month humanitarian truce as a pathway toward a permanent ceasefire.” End Quote.
2. Sudan announced its rejection of the American Boulos paper, but was prepared to accept it under certain conditions. We stated in our Answer to the Question issued on 29 July 2026: “The Sudanese response to the latest US proposal, issued on 20/6/2026, was delivered on 25/7/2026. Details of the response were published later. Al Jazeera network on 10/7/2026, citing official Sudanese sources reported the response of the government to the latest American proposal. These sources said that the response: “reaffirmed the government's commitment to ending the war through negotiations and establishing a 90-day humanitarian truce, contingent upon the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) withdrawing from all cities they have controlled since 11/5/2023” which is the date of the signing of the Jeddah Declaration by the two parties under US-Saudi sponsorship. The response also included: “guarantees for Sudan's unity and territorial integrity, the preservation of the Sudanese Armed Forces as a unified national army, the integration of all military formations within it, an end to foreign interference in Sudanese affairs, and a halt to the provision of weapons and mercenaries to the RSF.” The second part of the Sudanese government's response included; the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces from cities and their regrouping in designated locations in three phases: the first phase, to be implemented within 30 days; includes withdrawal from the Blue Nile region, North Kordofan state, and North, Central West Darfur. The second phase will begin 30 days after the completion of the first.
This involves the RSF withdrawing from cities in West Kordofan and South Darfur states. The third phase, to begin 30 days after the second, it includes withdrawal from East and South Kordofan states. The assembly point was designated as Kauda, the stronghold of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which is allied with the RSF. The third part of the response: “included details of the political process through a comprehensive Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue leading to a civilian transitional government that would remain in power until free and fair elections were held.” The Sudanese government's demand for the RSF to withdraw from the cities it seized and then redeploy to specific locations effectively acknowledges its existence and prevents its dismantling and elimination. It should be noted that the RSF will not easily comply with the government's demands for withdrawal or negotiations; otherwise, it would not have rebelled, committed atrocities, perpetrated the crimes it committed, and caused the displacement of millions. The only way to resolve the matter is to decisively eliminate the RSF through military force.” End Quote.
3. On 23 September 2026, the US State Department issued a statement saying: “Neither the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, nor their respective leaders, represent legitimate, constitutional governance for Sudan…” The US State Department claimed in its statement that “We seek to restore peace and give power back to the Sudanese people.” The statement also said that “We have repeatedly asked the two parties to accept a humanitarian truce as presented without preconditions, and to commit to an inclusive political dialogue that leads to a transition to a civilian government.” (Al Jazeera, 23/09/2026). This statement is directed at Burhan himself, since he is the commander of the army, one of the official state institutions, and the person leading the country politically in the name of the Presidential Sovereignty Council. This is a threat to withdraw recognition of his leadership on the grounds that he is a military commander rather than a political leader. Yet he is keen for America and others to recognise him as Sudan’s official president.
4. America then applied further pressure. It refused to grant Burhan an entry visa so that he could travel to New York and deliver a speech before the United Nations General Assembly during its customary annual meetings in September 2026. He is the highest official representative of Sudan, just as the presidents and representatives of other member states attended the Assembly in New York. America linked this to Burhan’s acceptance of its proposal for a 90-day ceasefire and the terms contained in the paper presented by Boulos, the American President’s envoy. Burhan understood that this was pressure from his master, America, to make him accept the partition of his country by agreeing to its proposals. On 26 September 2026, he responded by saying: “‘The country will not respond to any pressure or blackmail.’ He also said: ‘Our goal is to cleanse all of Sudan, including Darfur, of these scoundrels (awbash).’” (Anadolu Agency, 26/09/2026). It should be noted that Burhan himself lost Darfur when he withdrew the army from the region without any significant resistance, as America had instructed him to do, telling him that the withdrawal would be temporary. However, it became a consolidation of control and a declaration of a separate state in Darfur. Now Burhan says: “Our goal is to cleanse all of Sudan, including Darfur, of these scoundrels”!
5. After all this diplomatic pressure from America on the Sudanese government, headed by Burhan, President of the Sovereignty Council, it appears that America wants to pressure him through Ethiopia. This is why the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, while celebrating his country's acquisition of 12 Russian Sukhoi fighter jets at the end of last October, said “the fighters will enhance his country’s strategic deterrence capability. However, possessing these fighters and the diplomatic escalation do not mean that a full-scale confrontation with Sudan is imminent, and talk of a direct war at the present stage is premature, considering the burdens it would entail for both parties.” (Sudan News, 4 November 2026). This statement hints that he is prepared to wage war on Sudan, as it contains a threat, particularly when considered alongside the announcement that Ethiopia has acquired advanced military aircraft. Before this, the Sudanese Sovereignty Council announced in a report issued on 1 November 2026 that it had: “Recorded 70 attacks between February and October 2026 originating from Ethiopian launch areas, involving 187 drones.” The report was prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with Sudan’s military intelligence and General Intelligence Service. It also stated: “‘Those attacks resulted in 484 civilian casualties, both killed and wounded, and the deaths of 176 army recruits in the Blue Nile and Khartoum regions, among others. They targeted hospitals, residential areas, and fuel and electricity facilities’… “Sudan is seeking accountability and compensation for the damages and destruction resulting from those acts” pointing out that “an attack targeted displaced families in Wad al-Mahi in the Blue Nile state last month, resulting in the killing of 30 civilians, including 26 women and 4 children” (Agence France-Presse (AFP), Al Jazeera, 1 November 2026). The Sudanese regime remained silent for ten months, then suddenly came forward to announce that drones launched from Ethiopia had killed and wounded hundreds of civilians and military personnel and caused destruction and damage to electricity stations and infrastructure! It then demanded that Ethiopia stop these attacks, close the facilities belonging to the rebellious separatist Rapid Support Forces, and pay compensation, without taking action in response to these attacks! This demonstrates the regime’s weakness and failure to act, which encourages others to become emboldened against it, attack it, and support those opposing it, including the separatist rebels.
6. The institution to which the Sudanese regime resorts most often is the United Nations, which works against it and calls on it to negotiate with the separatists in preparation for recognising them and sharing the country with them. On 1 November 2026, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it had submitted a complaint against Ethiopia to the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. Amjad Farid, adviser to the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, said: “‘Ethiopia is seeking to drag Sudan into direct confrontation, and Khartoum has submitted an official complaint to the UN Security Council against Addis Ababa over drone attacks targeting Sudanese territory.’ He added: ‘Sudan has confirmed that the drones originated from Ethiopian territory, and the complaint included details and evidence concerning these attacks’” (Al Arabiya, 2 November 2026). Earlier, on 28 October 2026, the Sudanese Minister of Defence told the Sudan News Agency: “More than 20 countries are participating in the ongoing war in Sudan through logistical support, mercenaries, money, and drones supplied to the Rapid Support Forces.” If Sudan’s rulers have realised that a major conspiracy is being plotted against the country, then they are obliged to crush the Rapid Support Forces, sever the foreign hands manipulating the country’s fate, and declare a general mobilisation. What Ethiopia is doing amounts to a declaration of war against Sudan. They should not resort to the Security Council, which is headed by America and includes countries such as Britain, France, and others, all of whom are conspiring to partition Sudan!
7. Following these accusations against Ethiopia and the submission of a complaint against it to the Security Council, tensions between the two countries increased, and they took diplomatic measures against each other. Reuters reported on 4 November 2026, quoting a senior Ethiopian official, that: “‘His country had closed the Sudanese consulate in the border town of Asosa and ordered the six diplomats working there to leave within 48 hours.’” The agency also quoted Sudanese officials as saying: “‘The Sudanese government responded by closing the Ethiopian consulate in the eastern Sudanese city of Gedaref and expelling the diplomats working there.’” Ambassador Muawiya Othman Khalid, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, had stated during a briefing to diplomatic missions accredited to Sudan that: “‘The Ethiopian base in Asosa has turned into a centre for supplying the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and equipment, in addition to facilitating the passage of foreign fighters and mercenaries into Sudanese territory to take part in the military operation’…” (Sudan News, 4 November 2026). Ethiopia is the guilty party and the aggressor. Nevertheless, it acts as though it is the one being attacked, closing Sudan’s consulate in protest against the accusations made against it and the complaint filed against it. Sudan, meanwhile, limits itself to a reciprocal diplomatic response and does not attack the bases in Ethiopia from which the attacks against Sudan are launched!
8. Thus, it becomes clear that the escalation with Ethiopia serves objectives related to America’s plan to separate Darfur, although Ethiopia has its own local interests in conspiring against Sudan. Ethiopia does not intervene in Sudan except at America’s direction. It previously supported the separation of South Sudan. It is in Ethiopia’s interest to participate in threats against Sudan and conspire against it because of the crisis surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Ethiopia built and which harms Sudan as it does Egypt. Both countries object to it because it violates the agreement governing the distribution of water among the three countries. The dam has become a hotbed of tension in the region, created by America after it encouraged Ethiopia to build it in 2011. This enables America to intervene and strengthen its influence in these countries by creating conflicts and disagreements between them, so that they turn to America and remain under its control.
In this regard, the following was stated at the meetings of the second round of the 2+2 consultative mechanism between Sudan and Egypt, involving the four foreign and irrigation ministers of the two countries, on 2 November 2026: “‘The two countries affirmed their rejection of any threat to Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, and affirmed their determination to strengthen joint coordination in order to restore stability in Sudan. They agreed on the need to defend the water security of the two Nile basin downstream countries and preserve their full water rights and uses under the 1959 Agreement, without allowing any infringement of those rights. They also agreed that the unilateral Ethiopian dam… has serious consequences and represents an ongoing threat to the two downstream Nile countries…’” (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed and Sudan’s Al-Zool News, 2 November 2026). It is in Ethiopia’s interest to weaken Sudan so that it cannot object to the projects Ethiopia is carrying out that harm Egypt and Sudan. This also weakens Egypt, because it cannot confront Ethiopia once it loses the Sudanese front and becomes more distant from Ethiopia’s borders. However, the Egyptian regime did not act from the very first day to prevent the construction of this dam. It waited until its completion before beginning to speak about it. This demonstrates its lack of seriousness in taking any action and its submission to American orders not to intervene.
9. Thus, America introduces a new source of pressure on Sudan to tear the country apart, including through the secession of Darfur. From American statements equating the Sudanese army with the Rapid Support Forces, to the Boulos proposals, to the denial of a visa to Burhan, and finally to bringing Ethiopia into the picture as a new means of pressure—all of this is intended to prepare the ground for the separation of Darfur, just as America did with South Sudan! No serious action should be expected from Sudan’s rulers to reclaim Darfur and prevent its separation. They make their forces fight in other regions, deceiving people into thinking that they have retaken territories here and there and that the final campaign will be directed towards Darfur. All of this is deception designed to consolidate Hamidti’s authority and the RSF’s control over the Darfur region in preparation for its separation. For whoever truly wishes to prevent this would direct the attack towards the source of the disease: the Darfur region itself. They would mobilise all their forces and move specifically towards it, eliminating the head of evil there. Consequently, the other areas controlled by Hamidti and his Rapid Support Forces would fall automatically, leaving no trace of them.
Since these rulers are agents who have carried out America’s wishes and brought the country to its present condition, no good can be expected from them. It is therefore necessary to work towards removing them and bringing forth a sincere and aware political leadership from the Ummah: the leadership of Hizb ut Tahrir. It would establish the Khilafah (Caliphate) and implement the rulings of Islam concerning rebels, disobedient people, mutineers, agents, and separatists. It would protect the country from the evils of enemies, both within and outside, and provide security, safety, and shelter for its people, who have been displaced by this dirty war. This will come to pass, by Allah’s permission, in fulfilment of the words of our Messenger (saw), as narrated by Ahmad, al-Tayalisi, and al-Bazzar:
«ثُمَّ تَكُونُ خِلَافَةً عَلَى مِنْهَاجِ النُّبُوَّةِ»
“Then there will be a Khilafah upon the method of Prophethood.” This will be achieved through the efforts of the believers and with the support of the Almighty, the All-Wise:
(يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنْ تَنْصُرُوا اللَّهَ يَنْصُرْكُمْ وَيُثَبِّتْ أَقْدَامَكُم * وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا فَتَعْساً لَهُمْ وَأَضَلَّ أَعْمَالَهُمْ)
“O you who believe! If you support Allah, He will support you and make your foothold firm. But as for those who disbelieve, misery will be theirs, and He will render their deeds fruitless.” [TMQ Surah Muhammad: 7-8].
1 Jumada al-Akhirah 1448 AH
11 November 2026 CE
النسخة العربية: https://www.facebook.com/AtaAboAlrashtah/posts/122159723973129051
#أمير_حزب_التحرير
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عطاء بن خليل أبو الرشتة
Sudan War & Military Situation
94 engagementsSudan’s army deepens defence ties with Pakistan
Pakistan and Sudan signed an agreement in Islamabad on November 7 allowing official and diplomatic passport holders to travel between the two countries without visas, Pakistan’s Interior Ministry said.
Mohsin Osman
ModernDemocracy.eu
November 8, 2026
Pakistan and Sudan signed an agreement in Islamabad on November 7 allowing official and diplomatic passport holders to travel between the two countries without visas, Pakistan’s Interior Ministry said.
The two sides also agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding on cybercrime and to expand cooperation in security, police training and civil registration, the ministry said.
Reports since January have linked Sudan’s army-led authorities to Pakistani weapons supplies. The army’s war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is in its fourth year.
Sudan’s Interior Minister, Lieutenant General Babiker Samra Mustafa Ali, signed the agreement with his Pakistani counterpart, Mohsin Naqvi.
Naqvi said Pakistan was ready to help Sudan restore peace and rebuild, and Samra said Sudan hoped to draw on Pakistan’s experience against cybercrime, according to the ministry.
Samra met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on November 5. The next day he met Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces and Chief of Army Staff, in Rawalpindi, where they discussed security and counterterrorism cooperation, the military’s media wing ISPR said.
Naqvi and Samra discussed deploying UN peacekeepers in Sudan when they met in July, Naqvi said at the time.
◼️ From suspended deal to delivered armour
Pakistan was close to a $1.5 billion deal to supply weapons and jets to Sudan’s army, Reuters reported in January, citing a former senior air force official and three other sources.
Two sources said the package included 10 Karakoram-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 drones and air defence systems. Retired Air Marshal Aamir Masood called it a “done deal” that would also include Super Mushshak trainers and possibly JF-17 fighters, according to Reuters.
Pakistan suspended the deal in April after Saudi Arabia said it would not pay for it, Reuters reported, citing two Pakistani security sources.
About 100 Pakistani Mohafiz-V armoured vehicles appeared in a Khartoum parade on August 2, and several sources told Radio France Internationale that Saudi Arabia had paid for them. The vehicle is made by Pakistan’s state-owned Heavy Industries Taxila on a Toyota Land Cruiser chassis and carries eight people.
None of the three governments has confirmed the financing or the terms of any deal.
Pakistani drones and jets could help the army regain the air supremacy it lost to RSF drones, Reuters reported in January. Areig Elhag, writing for the Washington Institute’s Fikra Forum, argued that the deal could prolong the war and turn Sudan into a proxy arena like Libya.
The war between the army, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, began in April 2023.
◼️ Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani pact takes shape in Sudan
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7.
Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said the pact treats an attack on one member as an attack on all three. The risk consultancy RANE, citing the Financial Times, said the text lacks a clause requiring automatic collective defence.
Sudan is not a signatory but is the pact’s first arena, the French newspaper Le Monde reported. Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow at Chatham House, told Le Monde that the three countries’ cooperation in Sudan “will now accelerate,” with Riyadh paying for Turkish drones and Pakistani weapons.
Saudi Arabia and Sudan’s army-led government signed their own cooperation agreement on August 17, Le Monde reported.
◼️ US pressure on Sudan
Neither the army nor the RSF “represent legitimate, constitutional governance for Sudan,” State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott said on September 22, The National reported. Sudan’s foreign ministry rejected the statement the next day.
Washington also withheld al-Burhan’s visa for the UN General Assembly, making it conditional on his accepting a 90-day ceasefire proposed by US adviser Massad Boulos, Reuters reported on September 22.
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*Sudan’s Interior Minister Lieutenant General (Police) Babiker Samra Mustafa Ali shakes hand with Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) Field Marshal Asim Munir at GHQ in Rawalpindi on Nov 6, 2026. — Credit: ISPR
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BerhaneMeskel Habtemariam
Sudan War & Military Situation
4 engagements